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 The  Revolutionary Heroine—the female protagonist in novels of the French Revolution 
written by women between 1801 and 1871—is the unique literary manifestation of women 
authors’ head-on challenge to the promises of equality that the Revolution appeared to offer their 
sex, but which instead reduced it to “the most absurd mediocrity” (De Staël). By confronting a 
century’s worth of political, social, and sexual history, the Revolutionary Heroine recasts the 
drama of 1789: as an embodiment of all that is politically other, she presents at once a rewrite, a 
correction, an alternative, and a challenge to male literary heroes who are complicit with failed 
revolutionary policies, to literary heroines who have yet to realize the scope of the debate at 
which they are the heart, and to the Revolution itself. Deconstructing doctrines of propriety, 
redefining women’s nature, politicizing her domestic contributions, calling for her citizenship, 
denouncing revolutionary violence, and revalorizing the Enlightenment cosmopolitanism that 
perished in antagonistic Franco-British relations during the Terror, the Revolutionary Heroine 
neutralizes the period’s greatest sources of public and private anxiety with the philosophical 
justification that the crisis itself was unable to institutionalize.   
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Chapter I 
The Origins of the Revolutionary Heroine 
 
 What “Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive!” wrote William Wordsworth of the 
thrilling hopes that the French Revolution promised to the European world. Not surprisingly, 
such heroes’ despair as they watched the uprising collapse into violence and greater forms of 
absolutist tyranny has been the topic of many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novels and 
subsequent critical analyses. Scholarship, however, has neglected the European literary heroine 
as a specifically revolutionary subject in her own right. Many capable studies of women writers 
resisting patriarchal structures during the Enlightenment exist, such those by Mary Siedman 
Trouille, Joan B. Landes, and Nicola J. Watson; Romantic scholars, in turn, have done much 
significant work on women authors’ striving for autonomy during the post-revolutionary period 
of conservative backlash, such as Madelyn Gutwirth, Pam Perkins, Naomi Nachumi, Anne K. 
Mellor and Doris Kadish. However, none so far has considered the extraordinary intersection of 
literary and historical circumstances that created what I am calling the  Revolutionary Heroine—
the female protagonist in novels of the French Revolution written by women between 1801 and 
1871—that I propose to study here. While individually these different categories—the heroine, 
the female author, the narrative of the Revolution—are worthy of analysis, they coalesce to 
represent the period’s greatest sources of public and private anxiety: the emancipated and 
therefore subversive fictional heroine, acting autonomously during a period of social and 
political upheaval, penned by a flesh and blood woman doing the same. Indeed, women authors 
struggling against the exigencies of a patriarchal society that affords them little intellectual 
autonomy and virtually no civic role outside of the home is by no means a new field in the 
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critical analysis of women’s literary presence during the period of time in question. And yet, the 
precise turn of events in the French Revolution—its historically unparalleled application of 
socio-political philosophy to the deconstruction of the public sphere, its initial embrace of 
women’s participation in that process and subsequent brutal rejection of it, followed by the 
grossly over-corrective reduction of the sex to “the most absurd mediocrity”1—allowed the 
authors analyzed in this study to reexamine Enlightenment ideals and the promises of revolution 
with greater force and depth than any study of the period has yet to concede. The degree to 
which they engage intellectually with a century’s worth of political, social, and sexual history 
itself attests to the extraordinary synthesis that the French Revolution seemed to require, and 
which these writers were in the exclusive position to undertake. The act of recasting the drama of 
1789, then, is multiplicitous and complex: as an embodiment of all that is politically other, the 
Revolutionary Heroine presents at once a rewrite, a correction, an alternative, and a challenge to 
male literary heroes who are complicit with failed revolutionary policies, to literary heroines who 
have yet to realize the scope of the debate at which they are the heart, and to the Revolution 
itself.  
 
Who is the Revolutionary heroine? She is rich, like de Staël’s Corinne, she is without 
fortune, like Edgeworth’s Belinda. She is noble, like the Baroness’ Delphine, she is a peasant, 
like Sand’s Nanon. She is French and she is English, she is literate and illiterate, named and 
nameless, impeccably virtuous by the century’s standards and less so. What, then, ties this 
disparate group of women together? It is the very synthesis of this failure, the unsuccessful break 
with a broadly prejudiced ontonolgy despite promised social regeneration, that they collectively 
represent as they individually challenge the legacy left to women by the long eighteenth century: 
                                                 
1
 De Staël, De la Littérature, Part II, Chapter 4. 
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sexual determinism and philosophies of essentialized gender, the domesticating discourse that 
removed women from the public sphere while denying them the education that would offer them 
alternative destinies, the sex’s glaring omission from the various declarations of rights and 
liberties underpinning the Revolutionary agenda, including the expanding parameters of 
citizenship, and the xenophobic and increasingly misogynistic nationalism that followed the 
descent of promises of exquisite liberty into national Terror on both sides of the Channel.  
The personage of the Revolutionary Heroine and her changing literary circumstances, 
then, expose the gamut of reactions to historical events, ranging from the complex to the 
codified, and in order to establish her uniquely subversive role, we must first recognize what 
structures, discourses, stereotypes, powers, and models she is working against. The goal of this 
chapter, then, will be to delineate the various Enlightenment, revolutionary and post-
revolutionary voices in both France and Britain with which these heroines engage, showing, at 
the same time, the ways in which they cast off various kinds of ideological and logocentric 
imprisonment while recasting themselves as the missing link in successful nation-wide social 
reform in both France and England. 
 
What is woman? 
Eighteenth-century literature could not exist, argues Nancy K. Miller, without a collective 
“obsessing about an idea called ‘woman’ and without a female reading public” (ix). Indeed, 
determining, precisely, what was the nature of woman—especially in respect to man—was an 
all-consuming occupation of the early 18
th
 century, and therefore it would be impossible to make 
a statement about the rise of the novel and the literary heroine without referencing the 
construction of modern femininity and woman’s gender identity, and vice versa. This 
4 
 
intersection of textual, sexual, and social practices confirms the collective justice of three 
primary theories on the origin of the novel: Ian Watt, who sees the birth of the novel as a result 
of burgeoning economic individualism, but who discounts women in his portrait, Nancy 
Armstrong, who reads the genre a having sprung from the century’s explorations of sexual 
relationships, and Joan DeJean, who identities the intellectual exchanges of the aristocratic salon 
as the  birthplace of the novel. Indeed, all three approaches are relevant for understanding the 
complex overlapping of discourses that intimately linked “the woman question” and the growth 
of the novel, the sphere in which it was most fiercely debated, in the eighteenth century. From 
the point of view of literature, then, it was undoubtedly the women’s century, since they were the 
period’s primary producers and consumers of novels, so much so that men often lamented that it 
was more profitable to publish under a woman’s name. Indeed, women’s discursive practices in 
salons, Aurora Wolfgang has argued, “such as polite conversation, letter writing, and male-
female sociability, inspired original, but vehemently debated, forms of modern French literature” 
(17). As progressive writers claimed the superiority of feminine discernment and sensitivity, 
which was tied to the then feminine discursive form of love letters, emotional exercises that 
emanated from the body, novelists tried to emulate and adopt a feminine voice that channeled the 
sex’s natural sensibility. By the early part of the century, the practice in both nations of male 
authors appropriating the female voice in their fictions “had become a popular and innovative 
narrative ploy” (Miller 5), which took the form, as it did in Marivaux’s novels, for example, of a 
“natural and transparent writing style, a refined analysis of love, and an examination of social 
manners” (Wolfgang 2), which authors constructed via intertextual allusions, imitations, and 
parody.  
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However, as Mary Poovey has astutely observed, “if eighteenth-century fiction is 
arguably gynocentric, eighteenth– and nineteenth-century English society was emphatically not” 
(ix), a truth that Revolutionary Heroines are not alone in exposing. It goes without saying that 
French society was in more or less the same boat. Indeed, the charming feminine traits of 
sensibility and penetration held little credit for women themselves outside of aristocratic social 
and intellectual circles and outside of fiction. Instead, as Miller has shown, “’the heroine’s text,’ 
while based on female experience and presented as feminocentric writing, is, in fact a fiction 
intended to circumscribe women’s identity and destiny, leading all heroines into marriage, the 
convent, or death” (3). That women’s style of writing stood in stark contrast to the scholastic, 
classical tradition made it a somewhat revolutionary undertaking when men appropriated it. That 
women, however, gained no political ground from this association between their allegedly innate 
sensibilities and the political doctrines that progressive authors were trying to force by linking 
their own subversive values to this feminized form of expression—what Marilyin Butler has 
called Sentimentalism’s “radical inheritance”—is the very kernel of the Revolutionary Heroine’s 
raison d’être.   
At the heart of this paradox is what Madelyn Gutwirth has called “social woman,” or the 
“spectacular” (Joan Landes) Ancien Régime woman who rules with her sexual power, using 
boudoir politics, or what the Admiral in Burney’s novel calls a petticoat government, to meddle 
in public affairs. Though her penetration and sensibility were lauded, she was also seen as a 
scourge to public stability and an emasculating force on men. A variety of discourses were 
therefore erected in order to control this fearsome figure, including conduct books and novels, 
which, as Nancy Armstrong has shown, eventually developed a kind of symbiotic relationship to 
the point that they became one in the same, Richardson’s Pamela being the most evocative 
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example. Conduct books, Armstrong has demonstrated, portrayed aristocratic women as the 
“very embodiments of corrupted desire, namely, desire that sought its gratification in economic 
and political terms” (60). Rousseau, in turn condemned the feminizing effect of salon society, 
whose women, objects of spectacle that “crush our sex with its own talents” (LDA 286), turned 
men of letters into femmelettes. Such creatures were seen to be at the same time a perversion of 
all that women was supposed to be, and yet, all that woman always already—naturally—was, as 
the “Mother of miseries,” the descendant of Eve who took the apple, seduced Adam, and who 
continues to destroy men’s best-laid plans with her carnal appetite and hunger for sexual flattery. 
It was therefore relatively easy to justify refusing the era’s claims for greater education and 
mobility for women made by such apologists as such as Mary Astell and Elisabeth Elstob in 
England and Hortense Mancini and Gabrielle Suchon in France. 
The Revolutionary Heroines in this study, however, powerfully counter these early-
century practices with their purposeful reclamation of women’s sensibility, sociability, 
transparency, and even her potential for spectacularity, and their subsequent reassignment of 
them to political action. De Staël’s Corinne and Delphine, for example, will argue for the 
valorization of these traits in women and will demonstrate how society at large suffers when it 
forbids the second sex from exercising them outside of the domestic sphere; indeed, both 
heroines will point to this exclusion as a deciding factor in revolutionary failure. In so doing, 
they engage directly with Rousseau and his pronouncements on both dangerous public women 
and the necessity of women’s submission to men, “her lawful head,” in domestic roles. In Emile 
the philosopher asserts that “the reason of women is practical reason, which gives them great 
skill in finding the means for reaching a known end, but it does not cause them to find the end 
itself.” From this association he extrapolates the necessary influence of women’s “moral 
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personality” in domestic affairs. In their co-governing the couple forms a single body, in which 
“woman is the eye and man is the arm […]. It is from the man that the woman learns what must 
be seen, and from the woman that the man learns what must be done” (275). If this is the case in 
the ideal family home, and if these rising discourses themselves represented, as Jacques Donzelot 
has argued, “the transition from a government of families to a government through the family’” 
(qtd in Armstrong 18), what possible excuse could there be for excising the wisdom of women’s 
“moral eye” from public debates? In short, the Revolutionary Heroine boldly asks why, if man 
needs woman’s special capacities in private, does he not then need them in public as well. Both 
Corinne and Delphine, I will demonstrate in chapter 2, drive themselves to the grave in an effort 
to expose this paradox in Enlightenment gender theory. Nanon, in turn, a Revolutionary Heroine 
created nearly a century later, will take Corinne’s and Delphine’s political practices in far bolder 
directions, and will ultimately tie this same paradox to the economic health of the nation at large. 
 
Propriety and the Angel in the House 
And yet, the extinguishment of social woman required an extremely rigid and dogmatic 
doctrine that could convince women themselves of their alleged perversion while offering them 
appealing domestic alternatives. Constructed in accordance with the century’s growing 
fascination with the natural, an inheritance of Locke’s Family Romance and the core of 
Rousseau’s eventual founding portrait of ideal domesticity, Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse (1761), 
nearly all of these texts in France and Britain identified women’s desire as dangerous and 
unbounded because of the very receptivity to sensation and penchant for emotion that writers 
prized and imitated earlier in the century. Most, therefore, established boundaries of angelic 
behavior and offered prescriptions of education that served to control a woman’s sexuality and 
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the way that she wielded her disruptive desirability. “At the heart of the explicit description of 
the ‘feminine,’ Angelic women, superior to all physical appetite,” Mary Poovey has observed, 
“resides the ‘female’ sexuality that was automatically assumed to be the defining characteristic 
of female nature” (19). The discourse that was constructed, then, defined women’s nature as 
essentially sexual at the same time that it called the prescribed behaviors and manners to obscure 
that latent sexuality “natural.” From the jumping off point of a kind necessary sexual repression 
to maintain the allegedly original state of feminine innocence, conduct book writers on both 
sides of the Channel encouraged women to “not allow or admit to appetites of any kind [and to] 
display no vanity, no passion, no assertive ‘self’ at all” as the surest way to avoid 
overindulgence. “In keeping with this design, even genuinely talented women were urged to 
avoid all behavior that would call attention to themselves” (Poovey 21), because, as Rousseau 
explained it, “any woman who shows herself off disgraces herself” (LDA 312). The reward 
offered to women for this self-deprivation was the promise of reinstatement of superiority and 
glorification in the duties of wife- and motherhood, an oath that the philosopher fulfilled with 
exquisite international success in Julie. 
Indeed, Rousseau’s role in the creation of the domesticating discourse and its 
complicated relationship with eventual revolution cannot be overemphasized, for his novel was 
the source of a profound transformation in the century’s conception of virtue. By channeling 
woman’s empire into the home, where she was meant to embrace her calculating nature and 
sexual potency in order to guide her husband’s conduct and steer him toward sound moral 
choices, Rousseau intended to preserve the nation from the perceived threat that her sexual wiles, 
when wielded in the realm of politics, posed to matters of state. As long, therefore, as the effects 
of her desire did not overflow into the public space, she no longer presented any danger. In the 
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context of his most successful work of fiction, the heroine, Julie, who has transgressed social and 
religious law by giving herself to her lover St. Preux, ultimately finds redemption for this sin in 
the abandonment of her individual, female desire in favor of marriage to M Wolmar, according 
to her father’s wishes. Her reward for this act of self-abnegation that maintains the flow of 
patriarchal authority is, first, her continued appellation of “a virtuous woman,” and second, her 
reinscription into the patriarchal family model at Clarens, where she becomes the single most 
influential figure of domestic bliss in all of eighteenth-century literature. In addition to being 
indicative of France’s longstanding relative indifference, as compared with Britain’s, to the 
demand for women’s absolute sexual purity, Rousseau’s oxymoronic ideal of “virtuous 
fornication” had more to do with politics than sexual transgression. Indeed, Julie’s return to the 
fold of virtue and patriarchal inscription hangs, essentially, on her public silence and invisibility, 
which stand in stark contrast to the deep political and philosophical discussions in which she 
engages with her forbidden lover in the first quarter of the novel. Instead, it forms the 
inaugurating literary gesture of the gradual modification of the meaning of virtue during the 
course of the eighteenth century in France, which transformed the ideal from a religious and 
sexual imperative into a socio-political principle; the hallmark of the doctrine was woman’s 
“confinement to the private realm," which, Joan Landes has argued, "functions as a public sign 
of her political virtue” (69). In short, women’s willing self-removal from the public sphere to the 
domestic sphere represents what many scholars have called “the sexual contract”—women’s 
political atonement for their inherent sexual transgression—that the century used to justify the 
sex’s exclusion from the gradual march toward equality. In this new compact, which, for women, 
took the place of the Social Contract that Rousseau proposed to men only one year after 
publishing Julie, they were freed from the taint of original sin but had willingly consigned 
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themselves to political inferiority in exchange. Indeed, they had essentially acquiesced to and 
ensured their definitive exclusion from citizenship by their own admission of their 
quintessentially private destiny. However, we must not forget that standards of sexual virtue 
were far from forgotten: women were now held to two oppressive standards, especially in 
Britain, where “the restrictions on them were harsher in some respects than elsewhere” (243), as 
Linda Colley has observed. 
Both the severity of doctrines of propriety, which in England quickly came to be 
associated with anti-Jacobin social prescriptions at the outset of the Revolution, and of 
injunctions of women’s political virtue represent discourses upon which the Revolutionary 
Heroines in this study will operate astonishing transmutations. The English heroines in 
particular—Belinda and Juliet—will challenge prescriptions of propriety and definitions of 
women’s nature head on, identifying both as a source of real physical danger for women, who 
become increasingly exposed when the conduct that is supposed to mask their innate sexuality 
comes, instead, to represent the very exhibition of it and an invitation to exploit it. While Belinda 
encourages her readers to consider the civic and political utility of women’s confinement to a 
narrow sphere of behaviors and occupations, Juliet exposes how doctrines of propriety put 
women in an impossible double bind that operates at the public as well as the private level: the 
exclusion of women from the national economy, because of the undesirable association with the 
value of the material body that the idea of working women infers, threatens the nation’s 
economic stability as much as women’s personal safety and happiness. Delphine, in turn, objects 
to the application of “virtue” to any concept that is not strictly moral in quality. For this 
Revolutionary Heroine, virtue is independent both of politics and sex, in the sense that it 
represents the individual moral action that the Revolution proposed rather than the conformity to 
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the arbitrary moral injunctions and interdictions of the Ancien Régime that it claimed to oppose. 
Nanon takes this same interpretation of virtue to greater heights, both in terms of her self-
actualization and the role that she plays in the reformation of the nation in Sand’s novel. She and 
her partner Émilien perfect the practice of de Staël’s virtue and institutionalize it as a necessary 
benchmark of civic becoming, that is, the journey that men and women both take on the path to 
earned citizenship. 
 
Intensification of exclusion 
Because of these discourses throughout the century on women’s nature and appetites and 
the accompanying corrective assertions on their natural duties, women’s participation in the 
French Revolution was rendered all the more extraordinary and controversial in 1789 than it 
might have been even just decades before. Middle-and lower-class French women themselves 
had a long history of grass-roots political involvement in the form of marches and petitions, 
including the submission of hundreds of cahiers for the meeting of the Estates General meeting 
in 1789, their more overt usurpation of political action such as the raid on Versailles, and their 
establishment of women’s political clubs in the early 1790s. Calling for divorce, rights for 
progeny, protection against physical abuse, increased education, and political equality, bold 
citoyennes in both France and Britain acted upon the liberating promises of the 1789 declaration 
of The Rights of Man. However, historians and scholars agree, the privilege of political and 
social self-determination continued to be reserved for a certain male elite, and women 
themselves, particularly in the wake of the Revolution’s descent into violent self-destruction, 
ultimately experienced a tightening of state control over their public and private lives. Moreover, 
their efforts met with swift retribution from male revolutionaries, who were initially enthusiastic 
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about women’s early participation, but who soon determined that their public exposure was a 
violation of virtuous republican conduct, a criticism that they couched in the language of duty 
and gender propriety that the doctrine of separate spheres justified. Starting with the banning of 
women’s political clubs in 1793, at which time the convention pronounced the sex as unfit and 
lacking the moral and physical strength necessary for political participation, the rights that 
women had earned in France since 1789—presence in the galleries of the Assembly, protection 
from spousal abuse, increased rights in estate and property law, the right to teach in public 
institutions—were all revoked by 1796. Only eight years later Napoleon’s Civil Code restored 
the husband’s authority in the family, effectively repealing divorce and protection from abuse, 
relegating women to the status of children who could neither own property nor appear in court 
without their husband’s permission. In Britain, in turn, where “pre-existing anxieties about 
women [became] still more intense […] after the war with France broke out in 1793,” Colley 
explains, “by marriage the very being or legal existence of a woman is suspended. […] Stripped 
by marriage of a separate identity and autonomous property, a woman could not by definition be 
a citizen and could never look to possess political rights” (259, 243). To contain her seditious 
reach, women’s role in the revolution in France or the counter-revolution in Britain was reduced 
to empty allegory, as Madelyn Gutwirth, Lynn Hunt, Joan Landes, and Linda Colley have 
expertly shown in their studies of revolutionary-era political iconography. Their bodies made to 
symbolize grand ideals of liberty and reason or freedom and the British nation in tracts and 
patriotic images, women themselves were cast into a role of “passive sculptural projections of 
[…] the primary forces in play in the Revolutionary era” (Gutwirth 253) that implicitly inhibited 
actual women from stepping outside of this imaginary deified state to sully themselves by 
claiming the ideals that their figure represented.  
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Once again, however, the Revolutionary Heroines studied here reappropriate the 
language of the conflict and the philosophies that underlie it in order to recast themselves as 
heroines in rewritings of it. In each of the novels I will analyze, we will see a whole-hearted 
valorization of women’s intellectual pursuits and their embrace of such revolutionary platforms 
as fraternity and reason, which lead to the heroines’ own self-awareness and, subsequently, to a 
civic awareness that prompts the women to undertake acts of patriotism on various levels and in 
diverse domains of life. They, in turn, counter the Revolution’s turn to the absolutism that it 
sought to vanquish by putting into practice very real acts of Enlightenment idealism, such as 
Delphine’s social charity that comes to the aid of those who suffer when revolutionary principles 
go dramatically astray and Belinda’s empirical approach to both her social education and to the 
francophobia which with the text attempts to assault her. These Revolutionary Heroines, in turn, 
refuse both the empty feminine iconography of the Revolution—by heroically living out its 
principles and, in the cases of Corinne and Nanon, being literally elevated to the status of 
meaningful icon—as well as the dark portraits of real women that emerged, such as the 
tricoteuse, the Amazone, and the salonnière who has abandoned her domestic duties, all while 
demystifying and redeeming the scourge of the public woman. Indeed, the journeys they 
undertake are fraught with meaning and the texts they inhabit are highly politically-charged, 
excruciatingly aware of the Revolution, even decades later. Perhaps most importantly, the 
women literally save lives that are symbolic of the lives lost to the guillotine in the Revolution’s 
bloodiest years. In so doing, they refuse tired clichés of femininity of weakness of mind and 
body, of frivolity, of duplicity that the domesticating discourse debated, and cast themselves 
instead in literary and literal roles reserved for men, ultimately saving the nation from future 
revolutionary reverberations. 
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Franco-British Terror 
However, women’s reactions to and involvement in the Revolution obviously took very 
different forms in France than in Britain, where virtually anything imported from France—
novels, fashions, or ideas—was inseparably associated with the centuries of animosity that 
characterized the relationship between the two nations. Indeed, independent of wars, invasions, 
and political and economic disagreements over the decades, Britain had long perceived France as 
an essentially effeminate culture—“subtle, intellectually devious, preoccupied with high fashion, 
fine cuisine and etiquette, and so obsessed with sex that boudoir politics were bound to direct it” 
(Colley 257)—a fact that ironically made Rousseau’s doctrines of separate spheres and gender-
specific education exceptionally appealing. However, as the political vogue in France became 
increasingly more liberal in the 1780s, culminating in the fall of the Bastille, it became necessary 
in Britain to purge theories of gender from their French taint. Early Bluestockings and later 
reformers such as Hannah More and Jane West appropriated Rousseau’s writings on women’s 
roles, translating them into the conservative feminist reform movement in Britain. These women, 
however, worked explicitly against the seed of rebellion contained in Rousseau’s political 
writings which, by 1789, had come to represent the philosophical justification of the Revolution, 
because of the drastic restructuring of hierarchy that they suggested. Radical feminists, in turn, 
such as Mary Wollstonecraft and Mary Hays, took to the philosopher’s political writings while 
condemning his writing on women; the former includes the famous Genevois in her chapter 
treating “some of the writers who have rendered women objects of pity, bordering on contempt” 
(150) in Vindication on the Rights of Woman. Both approaches, however, sought to raise women 
from inferior status by reforming her manners and education, inscribing “themselves in the 
lacunae of Enlightenment ideology by indicating—and exploiting or developing—what men’s 
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discourses about power, competition, equality, and law, men’s representations of the family, and 
men’s expectations of women, willfully or blindly, left unthought” (6), as Eve Tavor Bannet has 
argued. That their point of commonality was their mutual ambivalence toward Rousseau’s 
doctrines—an attitude that we will see played out to a degree in Revolutionary Heroinism as 
well—made it all the more important for them clarify their respective positions on the 
philosopher and, in the case of conservative feminists, to go to great lengths to separate their 
work from the foreign association. It was an especially necessary exercise for these groups of 
women debating about the nature and duty of British women since French women themselves, 
the lower- and middle-class of which poured into the streets of Paris in the early stages of the 
uprising to voice their opinions and join the general fray, had long been seen in polite circles in 
Britain as having “too much of the wrong kind of power” (Colley 256) in the form of their 
relative intellectual autonomy and famous political intriguing at court. As the British nation felt 
the growing ideological rumbling of its neighbor, then, it often had protective recourse in casting 
what it saw as dangerous political ideas in terms both of foreignness, specifically Frenchness, as 
well as of gender, since, following the publication of Rousseau’s enormously popular Emile, 
Britain had invested such stock in reinforcing the functional differences between men and 
women as part and parcel of its national culture and identity. By the time things began to turn 
violent in France, then, the conjoining of gender and nationality in bourgeoning anti-
revolutionary discourse in Britain had become quite acute. Edmund Burke, whose Reflections on 
the Revolution in France (1790) was one of the founding treatises of the conservative anti-
Jacobin movement, as it came to be called, too cast the threat that France’s dissentient politics in 
terms of gender and, above all, the anarchy of gender confusion that he thought would result 
from the destruction of Britain’s chivalric link between sex, rank, class, and political stability.  
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As a result, novels written at the time, particularly anti-Jacobin novels, are immersed in 
this fear of the French Threat and the dissolution of class and gender hierarchy that it 
represented. While many expressed a typical “anxiety about women wearing pseudo-masculine 
dress” (Colley 247), others sought to castigate inappropriate feminine behaviors that were seen to 
be essays in French revolutionary-ism along the lines of Wollstonecraft’s writings and lifestyle. 
Indeed, protecting the nation from such anatomizing contagion became the new nationalism 
during the revolutionary period in Britain, and it most often took the form of gross misreadings 
of the Revolution’s most basic principles and its most enthusiastic supporters. However, 
Revolutionary Heroines Belinda and Juliet channel counter-revolutionary hysteria that poses as 
nationalism in order to expose the ways in which such attitudes bar the nation from the natural 
civic evolution that their authors believed Enlightenment and revolutionary doctrines were 
capable of inciting. Moreover, they redirect that same hysteria and fanaticism into their critique 
of the absurdly contradictory expectations of feminine propriety that the fear of the French 
Threat had caused to intensify, as the gap between women’s real needs and the increasingly 
idealized image of femininity continued to widen. In so doing, they engage deeply with heavy-
weight political theorists and philosophers, such as Kant, Price, Burke, and Wollstonecraft, 
defying, as the other heroines in this study do, Rousseau’s opinion that, “as for works of genius, 
they are out of [women’s] reach” (Emile 281). In their deconstruction of the new national myths 
that were cohering as Britain continued to define itself in perfect binary opposition to France and 
its revolution, Belinda and Juliet also show, in no uncertain terms, that their Gallic neighbor does 
not hold exclusive proprietorship of terror and tyranny. By exposing the systemic abuse endemic 
to Britain’s own hierarchy—social, sexual, and political—these Revolutionary Heroines both 
condemn their own nation’s absolutism as well as free the Enlightenment principles from the 
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taint and blood of 1793, thereby reasserting them for reconsideration independent of the events 
to which they had become so closely tied. Finally, all of the heroines in this study demonstrate 
that the excessive feminine delicacy that doctrines of propriety and separate spheres foster 
ultimately stunts social and economic growth at the national level. Nanon’s dainty counterpoint, 
Louise, is unable cultivate any kind of economic increase whatsoever, Belinda rejects Mr. 
Vincent’s overly sentimental wastefulness for the promise of enlightened prosperity, Juliet 
exposes the danger of the nation’s disregard for  the value of women’s labors, while Corinne and 
Delphine essentially leave the world behind them in ruins, a definitive statement on the halt of 
national progress and evolution that the impossible standards to which women are held 
represents.  
In the absence, however, of the doctrines and practices that the Revolutionary Heroines 
expose as counterproductive, unenlightened, and xenophobic, they propose real alternatives. The 
rebirth of a nation, they argue, must include a reclassification and a re-evaluation of all manner 
of civic practices. But perhaps most important of all, they deconstruct the belief that essentially 
violent codes of any kind could ever possibly lead to peaceful ones. The pacifism of these 
novels, then, is their ultimate legacy, one that the authors do not hesitate to identify as uniquely 
feminine. Whether violence takes the form of actual physical abuse, of abusive love, of social 
bullying, or of violence to self in the name of conformity, it is continually transmuted at the 
hands of the Revolutionary Heroine, exposed as false, neutralized, denounced, rechanneled into 
good, and turned inward to reappear as what that the women propose as their sex’s viable 
contribution to the nation. 
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Chapter II 
Corinne and Delphine, the Revolution’s Public Women 
 
Despite the long tradition of French women’s involvement in political events, and its 
subsequent and abrupt end during the later years of the Revolution, Madame de Staël’s novels 
Corinne, ou l’Italie and Delphine do not appear, from the outset, to engage directly in the 
question of women’s political rights or their level of overt political participation. In both works 
the author avoids the well-worn tropes that have dominated the lore and iconography of women’s 
participation in the uprising: Amazonian women warriors, like Théroigne de Méricourt, wielding 
a sword and charging the Tuileries, and belligerent fishmongers rifling through Marie 
Antoinette’s undergarments. And although both novels contain examples of the corrupt and 
manipulative aristocratic woman (à la Mme. Pompadour) whom, as we saw in chapter one, the 
Revolution in some degree targeted, it is only in order to advance de Staël’s arguments about the 
attritional effect that centuries of overmastering have had on the female character.  
Instead, the author approaches the question of women’s rights, revolutionary doctrines, 
and politics in the two novels in a circumlocutory manner, one more suited to her own 
experience. In contrast to Madelyn Gutwirth’s tendency in the last decade toward 
autobiographical readings of the Baroness’ novels, from the point of view, for example, of 
divorce, breastfeeding, or father-worship, my interpretation will instead focus on her feminized 
approach both to politics and to the novel, a point of departure that draws less from the events of 
the author’s own life and more upon her intellectual experience as an individual who is gendered 
feminine during a socio-political revolution in which gender itself is one of the identities at stake. 
Simone Balayé, in turn, has written extensively about de Staël’s mirrors of feminine suffering 
and the inevitability of female victimization in her novels. And while I agree that that de Staël’s 
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works have a strong descriptive element, that they function, in part, as a kind of negative image 
that, by darkening the destinies of women, exposes the injustices to which they must submit, I 
will insist upon a certain proactivity on the part of both heroines, one that revolutionary theories 
themselves make possible. Through Corinne and Delphine’s actions (rather than passivity) de 
Staël harnesses the Rights of Man for women, and argues for a woman’s rights to citizenship, to 
form a definable and civilly constituted half of the body politic, and to choose an artistic and 
intellectual career above the usual domestic destinies reserved for women.  
Lori Jo Marso is the only scholar to date who has undertaken a significant study of de 
Staël’s treatment of the Enlightenment question of citizenship, and I am indebted to her work. 
However, Marso does not explicitly address citizenship in terms of the French Revolution. 
Moreover, she frames her argument exclusively upon the women’s engagement in social politics 
and the interpersonal politics of morality. While both of these areas of emphasis will be 
important to my arguments, I will also insist on the very real interactions between Corinne, 
Delphine, and the ruling governmental bodies in their nations. What’s more, I disagree with 
Marso’s concept of de Staël’s “unmanning” of citizenship—indeed, the difference in my reading 
here is crucial to the thesis of this chapter. Rather than unmanning citizenship, de Staël’s 
Revolutionary Heroines go about feminizing citizenship while unmanning men, thereby insisting 
upon the importance of women’s influence in the national revolt and restructuring, as well as 
offering a pointed critique of the very traits of masculine politics that caused it to fail.  
It is in these two acts specifically—feminizing citizenship and unmanning men—that the 
author inaugurates a Revolutionary Heroinism, which unites and employs the gendered poles of 
reason/rationality and emotion/sensibility to effect change on a social and political level.
2
 In so 
                                                 
2
 It its embryonic form in de Staël’s texts, Revolutionary Heroinism evolves in the works studied in subsequent 
chapters. As I move chronologically through the novels in question, the reader will see the concerns and 
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doing, de Staël furnishes her protagonists with alternate paths that explore the limitations 
imposed on a woman’s expression, the curious absence of her sex’s best characteristics in the 
neo-Republican concept of revolutionary citizenship, and the ways in which men’s inability (or 
refusal) to extend revolutionary freedoms to her not only traps her further, but dooms the very 
changes that the Revolution was meant to bring about.  
 
Delphine 
In this 1802 novel that unfolds in the first years following the storming of the Bastille, de 
Staël promotes her vision of feminized revolutionary political action with her titular heroine, 
whose politico-morality is a product of her strong sense of empathy and her keen awareness of 
the disparate forces that influence a woman’s fate beyond her control. Delphine d’Albémar’s 
code of conduct has deeply political implications, we shall soon see, and ultimately points to the 
rigidly androcentric Enlightenment conceptions of equality as the source of the Revolution’s 
failure, that is, the fact that there is no real place for women in the discourse of equality.  
However, the self-sacrifice that the heroine’s code requires of her works to short-circuit 
Rousseau’s imperative of masculine citizenship, offering a beneficent political model that 
embodies actual revolutionary and Enlightenment ideals in the place of gender exclusion. 
Ultimately, Delphine’s version of citizenship privileges the conjoining of masculine and 
feminine traits—reason and sensibility—that she attempts to depolarize. In so doing, I will 
demonstrate, she rejects unforgiving honor and religion and the prison of motherhood, the 
dogmatic constructs that trap both sexes, favoring granting women the freedoms that the 
Revolution denied them. 
                                                                                                                                                             
reclamations of the heroine metamorphose across the decades and between France and Britain. The final novel, 
George Sand’s Nanon, will offer the fullest and boldest portrait of the Revolutionary Heroine. 
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To begin, Delphine’s revolutionary heroinism originates in her role as a kind of anti-
judge in Parisian society, who always seeks to relativize and explain the transgressions of others: 
instead of arbitrary, inflexible social maxims by which people—but women in particular—must 
live and be judged, Delphine argues for an indulgent and universal objectivity. The 
Enlightenment practice of reason, de Staël argues in Essai sur les Fictions, often goes to 
cerebral, masculine excess, with “des philosophes sévères qui condamnent toutes les émotions, et 
veulent que l’empire de la morale s’exerce par le seul énoncé de ses devoirs (EF 45). But by 
marrying the practice of reason with women’s natural sense of goodness and pity, Delphine’s 
religion counters both the absolutism of the Ancien Régime as well as the tyranny of the Terror. 
When she attempts to put the missteps of the social pariah Mme de R into perspective for 
Léonce, for instance, she inquires of her inflexible lover  
Pouvons-nous savoir toutes les circonstances qui l’ont perdue? A-t-elle eu pour 
époux un protecteur ou un homme digne d’être aimé? Ses parents ont-ils soigné 
son éducation? Le premier objet de son choix a-t-il ménagé sa destinée, n’a-t-il 
pas flétri dans son cœur toute espérance d’amour, tout sentiment de délicatesse? 
Ah! De combien de manières le sort des femmes dépend des hommes! (D, I, 180)  
Each of Mme de R’s choices, Delphine argues, is a function of choices that were made for her 
previously by others—by individuals such as her parents or husband, or by the institutions that 
formed her character and expectations by denying her education and forcing her into a marriage 
of convenience—and that have influenced her very ability to think and see clearly. The heroine’s 
willingness to relativize the gravity of Mme de R’s iniquities by weighing the effect of 
mitigating circumstances is just one example of her uniquely feminine breed of charity, which 
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revolves around one simple precept: “faire toujours du bien aux autres et jamais de mal” (D, I, 
126).  
De Staël’s Revolutionary Heroine resists the arbitrary, discriminatory conventions that 
rule women’s lives, and from which many believed that the insurrection would free them, by 
exercising her liberté to practice fraternité in very concrete ways: living by her revolutionary 
code of morality often means dismissing unwritten rules of conduct upon which a woman’s 
reputation is dependent, for which there are consequences. However, she always chooses to 
“faire du bien aux autres” rather than protecting herself. Such is the case in the scene with Mme 
de R: “Puisqu’encore une fois les convenances de la société sont en opposition avec la véritable 
volonté de mon âme,” Delphine reasons when she sees her sitting alone and weeping at her own 
alienation, “qu’encore une fois elles soient sacrifiées” (D, I, 177). However, it is ultimately 
herself that she sacrifices as she goes to sit by the castoff when no one else will, an act that her 
lover Léonce and the rest of Paris condemn. A kind of non-denominational altruism, then, her 
particular moral code uses the empathy of the Revolution’s allegedly equalizing fraternité to 
bypass judgment in favor of comprehension in the social rehabilitation of the outcast individual.  
Delphine’s credo, however, operates beyond the personal level: because her acts of social 
charity work against attitudes that propagate gender, class, or race inequality—or simply 
intolerance and blatant unkindness—they work in direct opposition to the inhumane policies of 
both the Revolution and the counter-Revolution in 1789-1793 Paris. For example, she asserts 
that “il faut se dévouer quand on le peut à diminuer les malheurs sans nombre qu’entraîne une 
révolution” (D, I, 462). She could simply mean that one should provide emotional support and 
friendship to those that have suffered from the fall of the monarchy and the demonization of 
nobility. But the reader knows that she is speaking of concrete actions that actively thwart the 
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institutions and powers at war during the crisis, as de Staël herself did many times during the 
early 1790s.
3
 For example, Delphine agrees to shelter Monsieur de Valorbe who, after incautious 
involvement in the King’s departure, “avait reçu l’avis à l’instant qu’un mandat d’arrêt était 
lancé contre lui, et devait s’exécuter dans quelques heures. Il venait me demander de se cacher 
chez moi cette nuit même.” Her response to this man, whom she dislikes immensely, is 
immediate agreement: “un asile peut-il jamais être refusé?” (D, II, 33). Here Mme D’Albémar 
offers clear evidence of her significant participation in the revolutionary political realm beyond 
her resistance to un-fraternel social niceties such as those that forced Mme de R to the fringes of 
the crowd in a public gathering. The heroine’s effort to influence those whom the government 
does not discipline (because, of course, as a pacifist Delphine would never promote capital 
punishment), and therefore its authority to make law, assess guilt, and extol punishment, subverts 
the entire scope of the Judicial branch of the revolutionary government. Moreover, the exercise 
of her moral code actively denounces the prejudice inherent in both revolutionary camps because 
she does not withhold it from her enemies and those who work against her (as Valorbe will do 
later in the novel). 
In short, her actions are rife with political meaning because they manipulate and bargain 
with ruling bodies that control the mobility of people and information at a time when the 
inflexible socio-political realm is, in the face of revolutionary uprisings that challenge 
contemporary class and gender hegemony, tightening its control over the lives of its citizens. 
Moreover, they do so as an explicit expression of revolutionary ideals. The simple act, therefore, 
of befriending a social outcast like Mme. de R has political import in Delphine’s world because 
it aligns her inseparably with radical opinions and rejects society’s mainstream maxims and 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, Part III, chapters X and XVIII of Considérations sur les principaux événements de la Révolution 
Française, in which the author relates hiding acquaintances in her Paris home in 1792 while guards searched 
surrounding residences. 
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corresponding judgments. To love Léonce, too, becomes political because it flies in the face of 
the marriage convention as a socio-political institution, challenges the rule of Parisian upper-
class women and their economic and political machinations of wedlock, and channels the nascent 
Enlightenment individualism upon which the Revolution is based, but which—Delphine 
discovers as the novel progresses, like women in history also did—is ultimately denied to the 
second sex.  
Delphine’s revolutionary heroinism, then, finds its fullest expression in the advocacy of a 
revised and universal citizenship that favors reasonable human goodness—“la continuité des 
mouvements généreux” (D, I, 299)— over the new and greater kinds of elitism and the necessary 
social cleansing that Revolutionary principles ultimately came to represent under the Terror.  By 
consistently privileging personal morality over arbitrary convention, she discovers many 
opportunities to help suffering individuals while simultaneously thwarting the heartless socio-
political institutions that oppress. The implications of her revolutionary relativism, in turn, are 
two-fold: they highlight women’s ability to reason, a fact that was far from widely accepted at 
the time, as well as canonize their innate empathy as part of the socio-political process rather 
than as proof of their insufficiency for any role outside of wife- and motherhood. Based on 
progressive political goals in line with the revolutionary spirit of the times, such as the 
equalization of social worth for all individuals regardless of class or gender, companionate 
marriages, the right to divorce, and the call for greater mobility for women, Delphine’s code, 
then, creates a necessary link between the successful application of revolutionary ideals and 
women themselves. 
Through Delphine’s devotion to unbiased human generosity, de Staël illustrates the 
political model upon which revolutionary citizenship should have been based. The union of 
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positive masculine- and feminine-gendered traits, Delphine’s acts intimate, would free women 
from the exclusive exercise of self-sacrifice and pity within the domestic sphere and men from 
equally claustrophobic strictures of honor and duty. In effect, each time that Delphine determines 
to take action according to her moral code, she displays this consolidation of (masculine) reason 
and (feminine) empathy. Combining her “superior” rational mind and her naturally humanistic 
feminine instincts,  she resists the magnetic pull of social norms by analyzing situations 
individually in order to determine the most universally moral course of action, regardless of 
expectations of “strict virtue,” the scorn her disregard for custom will provoke, or the difficulties 
that her choice might bring her.  
Delphine displays this resistance to the gender tyranny that the novel uses to mimic the 
absolutism of both the Ancien Regime and of the Terror each time she analyzes how to best 
succor victims of the era’s revolutionary and counter-revolutionary absolutism. In deciding 
whether or not to offer a haven to her friend Thérèse d’Ervins and her lover, M. Serbellane, for 
one last union, she calls upon her democratic alliance of reason and sensibility to calculate the 
quantity of suffering that various courses of action would cause and to opt, ultimately, for the 
path that leaves the least collateral damage in its wake. While at first Delphine instinctively 
rejects Thérèse’s request, not wishing to be the force that facilitates her friend abandoning her 
duties, she soon begins to perceive the ways in which those very duties, in their degree of 
constraint, have pushed her toward her indiscretions. Delphine first takes into account the 
circumstances around her friend’s marriage: united at 14 with a man 25 years her senior, during 
the first ten years of matrimony, her husband “la retenait […] dans la plus triste terre du monde” 
(D, I, 87). She also takes note of the “cruelle jouissance” that M d’Ervins takes in her suffering, 
how he refers to her as his “propriété,” and of the “reproches les plus outrageants” and “les 
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menaces” with which he terrorizes her regularly. Finally, she considers her friend’s education, 
acknowledging that “elle n’a point reçu cette éducation cultivée qui porte à réfléchir sur soi-
même; on l’a jetée dans la vie avec une éducation religieuse superstitieuse et une âme ardente; 
elle n’a lu, je crois, que des romans et des vies des saints; elle ne connaît que des martyrs 
d’amour et de dévotion” (D, I, 137). With little self-awareness and only models of fanatical self-
immolation before her, Thérèse is incapable of separating herself from the tragic role in which 
her decisions have cast her. While ultimately Delphine understands that Thérèse must, by law 
and custom, remain with her husband and respect the commitment into which she has entered, 
after weighing the evidence against M d’Ervins and in favor of Thérèse’s somewhat faultless 
ignorance and lack of resolve, she determines that reason and pity combined, that is, her devotion 
to “la généreuse bonté: le culte de toute ma vie” (D, I, 172), require her to risk her own 
reputation by hosting a final meeting between the lovers.  
However, Thérèse is more than a mere unfaithful wife. Indeed, de Staël tightens her 
alignment between Delphine’s practices and the ideals of the Revolution with the backstory of 
this unfortunate couple: it was Delphine herself who introduced Thérèse to M de Serbellane, who 
had left Italy only three months earlier, “attiré en France par la Révolution” (D, I, 88). Like 
women in history such as Mme Roland, who was arrested and shortly after guillotined for 
betraying her sex with her political activism, Thérèse has been “seduced” by revolutionary 
interest and has become a kind of national adulteress who mistakenly senses for a moment that 
her lover’s freedom to “se fixer dans le pays qui combattait pour [la liberté]” (D, I, 88) suggests 
her own freedom to love beyond convention. Delphine’s willingness to unite the victim of social 
prejudice, seduced by the seemingly liberating doctrines of the Revolution, and the man whose 
free choice has brought him to honor those same philosophies testifies of the Revolutionary 
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Heroine’s mission to facilitate examples of citizenship that favor the harmonious conjoining of 
reason and sensibility. Moreover, her own joint exercise of these gendered poles of knowledge is 
an attempt to “free” Thérèse from the conventions that trap her. M d’Ervins is ultimately killed 
in a dual, and his wife is free to marry Serbellane and create a new life in America. However, it 
is Thérèse’s own stunted womanhood, her inability to separate her natural freedom from the 
gendered-superstition of religion in which she was raised, which prevents her from embracing 
her release and beginning a new life. Her lover is unable to understand her decision to abandon 
her child and shut herself in a convent: “What expiation is required?” he wonders. “What good 
can come of the unhappiness she means to endure, either for the dead or the living? If she 
believes she has done wrong, is it not better to make up for it through active virtue?” (135). Such 
is Delphine’s approach too, but once liberated from her chains, Thérèse, as faultless and ignorant 
as before, merely chooses to chain herself to a different kind of slavery. 
Because of the delicate nature of Delphine’s actions, their deep interference in the public 
sphere from which women were barred, her performances meet with more than a little resistance. 
However, she defies the existence of a public sphere that is gendered exclusively male, refusing 
phallic control over her actions even when Léonce challenges her. When she realizes, for 
example, that he will probably disapprove of her decision about Thérèse and Serbellane, she 
must face the possibility that his feelings will change. “Léonce est-il donc devenu ma 
conscience?” she asks herself in frustration, “Ne suis-je donc plus capable de juger par moi-
même ce que la générosité et la pitié peuvent exiger de moi?” (D, I, 171). Ultimately she 
determines that love cannot influence her criteria for truth and right, asserting unequivocally her 
right to choose how and when to interfere, as a citizen, in the machinery of social customs and 
institutions: “Non, Léonce, vous pouvez tout sur moi; mais je ne vous sacrifierai pas la bonté” (D 
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74). It would be difficult to underestimate the importance of this conclusion. Despite de Staël’s 
own admission—both in her Lettres sur Rousseau and in this very novel—of women’s physical 
and intellectual dependence on men, because of all “les qualités et les défauts que cette destinée 
faible et dépendante peut entraîner” (D, I, 71), and the sacrifices of her own principles that she 
must make to love, her heroine advocates the absolute opposite: Delphine holds herself to her 
own criteria of truth and right, and no other, and that standard is anchored in the ideals of liberté, 
égalité, fraternité as she understands them.  
This subjective moral autonomy is what de Staël and many other women expected from 
the burst of egalitarian fury at the outset of the Revolution. “Laissez chacun en paix,” Delphine 
initially prescribes to her cousin Mathilde early in the novel, “chercher au fond de son cœur le 
soutient qui convient le mieux à son caractère et à sa conscience” (D, I, 71). Her expectation, 
however, that a government or ruling class could and should live by that same credo in precisely 
the same way that she does, that is, in a manner that requires the significant upheaval of 
centuries-old custom and prejudice that Delphine’s actions suggest, is ultimately this first 
Revolutionary Heroine’s downfall. 
Indeed, this incoherence between Rousseauian political liberty, in which men are free 
from arbitrary political tyranny, and de Staël’s congenerous social liberty, in which men and 
women are free from society’s arbitrary conventions, is representative of what the author sees as 
the failure of the Enlightenment conception of égalité and its conflicting discourse on freedom 
and gender: in short, it is the failure of the Social Contract itself, the compact that gave the 
Revolution its philosophical justification. De Staël and other women of the period, such as 
Olympe de Gouges and Théroigne de Méricourt, were keenly attuned to the unprecedented 
coexistence of doctrines of freedom and majority opinion. “Vous vivez, par un hasard que vous 
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devez bénir,” Delphine explains to  Léonce, “dans une de ces époques rares où la puissance ne 
méprise pas les lumières” (D, II, 67), reminding him of what a privilege it is to live at a time 
when change is actually a political doctrine en vogue. But Delphine’s (and many real-life 
women’s) naïve trust in the principles of the Revolution, which lead her to believe that both men 
and women have the right to act as independent agents free of prejudice and arbitrary custom, 
violates this contract precisely because, as Rousseau makes clear in subsequent treatises,
4
 it does 
not apply to women: to stray too far from the general will is to put oneself at odds with the 
sovereign, and the fact that women, by long-standing common compact, have no representation 
whatsoever in the Contract means that they must be complicit with men or be destroyed, as both 
Corinne and Delphine ultimately are. 
Instead, Rousseau’s conception of political virtue discussed in Chapter one has become 
strangely warped when the women who that are held to it have no actual power: despairing of 
ever experiencing political or social liberty, they have learned to work within the avenues of 
power at their disposal, which include mastering and manipulating social and sexual 
relationships with both men and other women in order to establish and maintain a degree of 
control over their fate. However, judgment carried out on other women becomes merely another 
means for women to enter the public sphere and seize alternative forms of power by participating 
in its politico-social process. As a didactic meditation on the failure of Rousseau’s doctrine of 
political virtue, as well as the allegedly universally applicable liberté, égalité, fraternité, de 
Staël’s novel offers a multitude of portraits of socially enslaved women in order to illustrate the 
                                                 
4
 Rousseau’s political treatise excludes women simply, for the most part, by failing to mention them. Émile, in 
particular, however, dramatizes women’s lack of political presence and rights, via their exclusion from the public 
sphere, in its portrait of Sophie, in which the philosopher argues that women must, by the nature of their sex, never 
feel for a moment without “the most continual and the most severe restraint” (Rousseau 268).  
30 
 
forces that ironically closed avenues to their sex throughout the decade of the 1790’s.  Mme de 
Vernon—a kind of revolutionary-era Mme de Merteuil—is doubtless the most blatant example.   
 When Delphine confronts de Vernon on the subject of her falsity, she exposes the ways 
in which the lack of access to citizenship denatures women from the start, pushing them toward 
the very kind of manipulation and “boudoir politics” for which men condemn them: no one cared 
for her or her education as a child, and as a young girl she was brought up by a guardian who 
saw women “comme des jouets dans leur enfance, et dans leur jeunesse comme des maîtresses 
plus ou moins jolies, que l’on ne peut jamais écouter sur rien de raisonnable” (D, I, 340). Rather 
than being encouraged in her development, she saw that “les sentiments que j’exprimais étaient 
tournés en plaisanterie et que l’on faisait taire mon esprit” (340). Keenly aware that she is denied 
the right to reason yet expected to act with independence and virtue, she stifles her own feelings 
and in order to protect herself: “J’acquis de bonne heure ainsi l’art de la dissimulation, et 
j’étouffai la sensibilité que la nature m’avait donnée” (340). She then confesses the ways in 
which her duplicity became the political power that she was able to yield in order to manipulate 
people and events in the public sphere. She has exploited Delphine, for example, in order to 
assure her own dominion: “J’étudiais [votre caractère],” she relates, “pour y conformer en 
apparence le mien” (D, I, 344). By so doing, she identified Delphine’s weaknesses and 
capitalized on it: “dominée par vos qualités, la bonté, la générosité, la confiance, comme l’on est 
par des passions; [j’aperçus] qu’il vous était presque aussi difficile de résister à vos vertus, peut-
être inconsidérées, qu’à d’autres à combattre leurs vices” (D, I, 344). De Vernon then used this 
instinctive trust against her. When, early in the novel, for example, Delphine tries to tell her 
friend that she is in love with Léonce, the man who is destined for de Vernon’s daughter 
Mathilde, the mother impersonates her friend’s “bonté, générosité, confiance” in order to silence 
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Delphine: “Ma chère Delphine, je lis dans votre cœur aussi bien que vous-même, mais je ne crois 
pas que ce soit encore le moment de nous parler” (D, I, 75). By insinuating that generosity is 
what keeps her from letting Delphine speak, de Vernon effectively forbids her from doing so, 
and takes control of a discourse that should be Delphine’s to manage.  
With other examples of the feminine denaturalization that results from the lack of 
revolutionary freedoms being extended to women, such as Mme de Ternan, de Vernon’s 
daughter Mathilde, and Delphine’s sister-in-law Mlle d’Albémar, de Staël demonstrates that 
whatever the result of a woman’s forced perversion, it is women themselves who suffer the most 
from it: they must, first, endure the distance they are forced to take from their true selves in order 
to protect themselves in a world that grants them no subjecthood; and, second, they must submit 
to and be the victims of the policing that other women take it upon themselves to exercise in 
order to maintain the delicate positions of power that they have seized. The reality that the author 
unveils is one that philosophers and political theorists failed to foresee when promoting and 
supporting gender roles that relegated women to the status of children, forcing them to be forever 
in competition with one another “par calcul ou par goût” (D, I, 157) when there are no other 
avenues toward fulfillment. We see how incapable such women are of “heroinism” given that 
they are victims of both men and of members of their own sex. Delphine’s story proves, then, 
that the vast majority of women have few viable paths outside the extant power structures that 
obstruct their freedom, confine their destinies, and stunt their development.  
Indeed, the virtuous Delphine herself is the primary victim of this system in the novel: as 
punishment for her overthrow of absolutist social conventions through reasoned moral action, 
she becomes a sacrificial victim, like so many offerings to the guillotine. Indeed, her exercise of 
revolutionary freedoms—what she calls her “bonté fatale”— instead of leading to greater 
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personal freedom, much like the vacant promises of equality for all in the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man, slowly but surely condemn her to isolation, banishment, and death. Her acts of 
sympathy, like allowing the meeting mentioned above between Thérèse d’Ervins and M. de 
Serbellane in her home, ultimately cause her to be branded as a partisan of radical ideas and a 
fomenter of civil unrest, a title that forces her to the periphery of society. When she shelters M. 
de Valorbe from the Revolutionary Tribunal, the situation also disintegrates eventually: she flees 
the calumny in Paris and Valorbe takes his revenge upon her by permanently destroying her 
reputation. In short, we see that she is the necessary sacrifice that keeps the peace in the public 
sphere, but which, although Delphine can stand as a model of integrity for clinging to her 
personal principles, serves positively no good for women themselves, nor for the nation at large. 
The severe backlash to Delphine’s projects confirms how rapidly such reports travel in 
revolutionary-era society and beyond, where there is no such thing as privacy for women. 
Writing in the period that Foucault has identified as the moment of transition from bodily torture 
to torture of the mind and spirit, de Staël observes of how the theater of public execution has 
been gradually giving way to the more subtle spectacle of social ostracism.  As the state 
extricated itself from the visible role of executioner, leaving behind “the horrifying spectacle,” 
society’s elite filled in the periphery of the panopticon, the new carceral system that regulates 
society at large, to become the judges and executioners for social transgressions that threatened 
to upset the regime: “l’abominable théâtre […]; La méchanique exemplaire de la punition [avait 
changé] ses rouages.” (Foucault 15). “Criminals” like Delphine and Corinne, after a period of 
intense public humiliation (what Foucault calls hierarchical observation) are relegated to the 
prison of social solitude. In Delphine’s case, she must either surrender herself to public opinion 
by retreating to a convent, or surrender herself to an equally bigoted private opinion by marrying 
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Léonce and worrying for the rest of her life if he approves of her instincts to confound social 
convention by succoring to those who suffer from it.  
Furthermore, in Delphine, the heroine’s comprehensive plight as a woman proves to be a 
microcosm for citizens at large, as the author illustrates, writing fifteen years later: “The human 
race,” she asserts, “has exhausted itself for many centuries in useless efforts to constrain all men 
to the same beliefs. That end could not be attained: and the simplest idea, toleration, has been 
impossible” (RF 356). Indeed, the Revolution failed when it focused on wide-spread control 
based on new criteria (an effect of the paraître) rather than on wide-spread tolerance (what 
revolutionary doctrines suggested). And yet, de Staël argues, if other characters in the novel had 
managed to live by Delphine’s code, the vast majority of their suffering would have been 
avoided. However, by surrounding her Revolutionary Heroine with examples of fanaticism, 
weakness, and selfishness, de Staël continues her compelling analogy for how and why the 
Revolution itself failed twice—once when it was unable to create a successful political regime 
based on its doctrines, and again when it misunderstood its own principles to the point of 
excluding half of the population from its legislated ameliorations. Though de Staël is no radical 
social leveler—in her Considérations sur les principaux événements de la Révolution française 
(1818) she advocates replacing titles with peerage, for example, and admits, like her father, that 
some innate inequality is necessary and “productive of the movement of society” (RF 286)—she 
is a firm believer in the equality of potential happiness. She faults the aristocracy—particularly 
its emigrants—for refusing to acknowledge that “the wish of a great people ought to have 
influence in the choice of its government” (RF 288). Indeed, her summation of the justification 
and ultimate downfall of the Revolution perfectly parallels the rationality and yet ultimate failure 
of Delphine’s own moral code: Overthrowing “absolute monarchies [and all of the] defects and 
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vices [to which they must] give birth” is justifiable, de Staël asserts, and “so long as we allow 
ourselves to do nothing immoral, we are sure of never violently thwarting the course of things” 
(RF 312).  
Indeed, de Staël records the way in which the paraître-panopticon society itself doomed 
legislative ameliorations for women and the French Revolution itself through her portrayal of the 
question of sexual virtue in Revolutionary-era Parisian society in Delphine. While philosophers 
like Rousseau worked during the eighteenth century, as we saw in chapter one, to redefine virtue 
by attaching it to political silence rather than virginity, sexual purity is not entirely off the table. 
Ironically, the response to this overflow of the private (Delphine’s “secret” acts of social charity) 
into the public (the Parisian society that becomes aware of her taboo kindness) is, in most cases, 
to damage the woman’s reputation at the private, that is, the sexual, level. While there is as much 
talk and concern in de Staël’s novels about women’s sexual purity as there was in earlier works 
in the century, the focus has indisputably changed: rather than hinging on whether a woman will 
succumb to temptation and irretrievably lose her only and most-prized possession, the intrigue 
revolves around the question of whether or not other people think she already has. Lovelace the 
tempter, the beguiling serpent at the base of the tree, has disappeared, and a crowd of people who 
speculate and make snide pronouncements about Eve has taken his place. The narrative focus has 
moved from the woman’s actions to society’s perception of them, while presenting the truth of 
the affair—did she sleep with him or not?—as a matter of relative indifference to the reader. 
Rather than being freed from their worth being contingent upon their virtue (as sexual purity) in 
the first place, Enlightenment and Revolutionary doctrines, de Staël argues with her transcription 
of this phenomenon, have done little more than add additional criteria with which to judge a 
woman’s worth (her political silence). Because the punishment for challenging political virtue is 
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still the same as flouting sexual virtue, consensus, then, about a women’s intact hymen is still the 
ultimate frame of reference for her value. This failure to ultimately shift value in terms of 
women’s bodies, in turn, parallels the failure during the Revolution to make a similar shift in 
terms of class- and gender-oriented prejudice. 
This double bind in which the Revolutionary Heroine finds herself is the unavoidable 
outcome of the fact that women simply had no representation in philosophies of social equality 
during the Revolution. Indeed, for most thinkers of the era—Condorcet and a very few others 
excepted—women were not a legitimate disenfranchised group among the scores of subcultures 
who were seeking greater acceptance and freedom, such as minority religious or ethnic groups, 
or even the lower classes that had been gaining recognition in the march toward greater social 
equality. Rather, they were simply an inferior cog in the expansive, androcentric epistemology of 
the time. Catherine Larrère has argued that women’s status was not a question of equality, but 
rather of morality and of condition. While I disagree fundamentally with her attempt in her work 
to exonerate Rousseau from misogyny, I do agree with her assessment of the lack of political 
language in which to describe women’s citizenship: “The condition of women is not a matter of 
laws (and therefore not a question of rights) but of mores” (220), because, as Rousseau himself 
said, “Inequality is not a human institution—or, at least, it is the work not of prejudice but of 
reason” (Rousseau, Émile, qtd in Larrère 222). De Staël, however, refuses to accept raison as a 
justification for Revolution’s dogged misogyny. In her Considérations she writes, “It is because 
the French did not unite liberty to religion that their revolution deviated so soon from its 
primitive direction.” Plenty of Catholic doctrines are incompatible with liberty, she continues, 
“but Christianity has in truth brought liberty upon earth; justice toward the oppressed, respect for 
the unfortunate; finally, equality before God, of which equality under the law is only an 
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imperfect image” (752). And yet, that same source of unqualified liberty holds the very doctrines 
that doom women, the origin of their inferiority in western society being Biblical; and there is no 
way for de Staël to separate humanistic charity from Christian charity while at the same time 
arguing that Christian charity is the missing link in Revolutionary doctrines, other than with her 
Revolutionary Heroine’s own dogged persistence in living by her altruistic code, even though it 
leads to her downfall.  
The fact that Delphine actually lives by such a credo but its censured for it demonstrates 
dramatically de Staël’s belief that, despite the policyspeak of the Revolution—liberté, égalité, 
franternité—such constructs have little political value in the scheme of things, and even less 
credibility when practiced by a woman. Indeed, the furor caused by Delphine’s expressions of 
instinctive virtue (ie. goodness, pity, and human love) outside of the family circle— by that I 
mean human generosity exercised toward other members of society, but especially against the 
particularized injustice of political and social institutions—prove that society has made no place 
for such female generosity outside of the domestic sphere, where a woman’s total self-sacrifice 
to her husband and children is otherwise de rigueur.
5
 De Vernon, warning Delphine of the 
dangers of her unconventional behavior, insists: “Votre esprit, quelque supérieur qu’il soit, ne 
peut rien pour sa propre défense; la nature a voulu que tous les dons des femmes fussent destinés 
au bonheur des autres, et de peu d’usage pour elles-mêmes” (D, I, 86). Indeed, no matter what 
course Delphine takes, she finds only imprisonment: to respect prevailing opinions is to live a 
closeted life of self-abnegation and restraint, and yet, as de Vernon says, to kick against the 
                                                 
5
 As Nancy Armstrong has shown, it is only with the increased visibility of the bourgeoisie in the mid- to late-
nineteenth century, whose women defined themselves through their access to leisure time, that wide-scale charity 
projects began to be seen as part of women’s duties. With the financial security that allowed a household to employ 
a service staff responsible for the full gamut of domestic tasks, women began to organize service projects outside of 
the home since it was no longer appropriate for them to do so for their kin or for trade. While this transformation 
will eventually form the basis of the modern welfare society, Armstrong has argued, Delphine’s charity does not fall 
into this category because of her exclusion from the status of wife and mother and because of the interested nature of 
her actions, which often defy social and political mores.  
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pricks is to receive society’s censure, which ultimately amounts to the same; in her banishment, 
Delphine sacrifices herself and uses her gifts to protect those that she loves. They are indeed of 
little use to her, and she observes: “Je n’ai pas éprouvé une seule peine dont je ne doive 
m’accuser. Je ne sais pas ce qui me manque pour conduire ma destinée, mais il est clair que je ne 
le puis. Je cède à des mouvements inconsidérés, mes qualités les meilleurs m’entraînent 
beaucoup trop loin” (D, II, 228). That her best qualities have led to difficulties that she cannot 
comprehend highlights the degree to which her impulses—which, in this moment of self-doubt, 
she accepts as “inconsidérés”—run against the grain of convention rather than actual morality. 
Her inability to see how, through her insouciance of public opinion, she has dug herself into a 
kind of ideological hole, testifies of an innocence that the author wishes to illuminate: woman, 
by nature, has excellent, useful qualities, but the world being what it is, they can only lead her to 
difficulties when exercised beyond the bounds of socio-political convention (foreshadowing 
Burney’s “Female Difficulties”).  
And yet, in perhaps her ultimate act of radical assumption of autonomy and blatant self-
liberation from gender imperatives, Delphine refuses the one role society does offer her 
graciously: motherhood. In so doing, she claims women’s right to follow alternative paths and 
asserts that her capacity for citizenship is entirely independent of her capacity for biological 
procreation. Indeed, de Staël’s one blatant, pro-feminist statement on women’s issues in the 
novel is Delphine’s rejection of this historical totem of femininity, which infuriates her eternal 
judges because it runs contrary to the discourse of the republican mother that was in the process 
of cohering, itself based on Rousseau’s pronouncement that women’s talents—whatever they 
may be—should remain in the home and be of exclusive service to her family. In Emile he 
asserts of the woman writer and intellectual that  
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[i]n the sublime elevation of her fine genius she disdains all the duties of woman, 
and always begins by making a man of herself […], [but] away from home she is 
the subject of ridicule, justly criticized […], [and] if she actually had talents, 
showing them off abases them[…]. [Her] dignity is a retired life, her glory is her 
husband’s esteem, her pleasure is the happiness of her family (Rousseau 303).  
Thus, Delphine’s forays into public are rendered even more threatening to social mores because 
they depict her own neglect of her maternal potential for motherhood: Delphine expresses 
disinterest in remarrying and has instead chosen a married man as her “chaste” companion. The 
role, otherwise, is offered to her twice in the novel—first when Mme d’Ervins asks her to raise 
her daughter Isore, a task she initially accepts but then passes to M. de Serbellane; Mme de 
Celerbe raises the question a second time when trying to convince Delphine to marry M. de 
Valorbe in order to experience motherhood, “la récompense des sacrifices que la destinée leur 
impose, c’est le seul bien qui puisse les consoler de la perte de la jeunesse” (D, II, 31). Though 
de Staël promoted this very concept in her Lettres sur J. J. Rousseau, lauding the philosopher for 
teaching women to “retrouver dans leur enfant une seconde jeunesse, dont l’espérance 
recommence pour elles, quand la première s’évanouit” (LR 72), roughly twenty years later, her 
two heroines reject it entirely. Waging treason against this exclusive notion of women’s worth 
and fate, Delphine chooses death rather than adoptive and biological maternity, demonstrating 
the author’s rejection of the domesticating discourse a century in the making. Celerbe’s argument 
that, as a mother one’s “existence ne se repose plus sur  le succès, mais sur le devoir [dans 
lequel] on se sent tout à fait indépendant de [la] dépendance [des inconnus]” (D, II, 193), falls 
flat for the author and her heroine, who know too well that many husbands are virtual “inconnus” 
to their wives; the examples of controlling, abusive spouses in both novels signal de Staël’s 
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protest against the reductive doctrine of the joys of motherhood. Indeed, if Enlightenment 
equality proposes private motherhood as the complement to man’s citizenhood—a public life and 
responsibilities—the author wants no part of it.  
Instead, the author inaugurates Revolutionary Heroinism as an alternative to what de 
Staël called the narrow sphere of “the most absurd mediocrity”6 that men have reserved for 
women in the wake of failed social reform. Rather than saving herself and her talents for her 
husband and family, as Rousseau intoned, Delphine saves others, figuratively and literally: she 
rescues Léonce’s life from the vengeance of the revolutionary tribunal, an act that the other 
heroines in this study also undertake with men in their lives, and one that is fundamental to the 
definition of the Revolutionary Heroine as a fictional woman who refuses tired clichés of 
femininity. When Delphine presents herself before the president of the tribunal to plead for her 
lover’s pardon, she has recourse to her uniquely feminine gifts. When he will not listen to reason 
(that Léonce is not an enlisted soldier and was merely coming to the aid of a childhood friend), 
she realizes that “il n’existait pour elle qu’une resource, c’était de se livrer sans contrainte à toute 
l’émotion qu’elle éprouvait” (D, II, 312): she tries, therefore, to move the judge with pity—the 
trait that, as we have seen, the eighteenth century had already closely associated with women. 
Delphine, in turn, links this emotion to the spirit of the Revolution in its retrospective homage to 
the great republics of ancient history. Léonce is innocent, freeing him is the right thing to do, but 
that argument alone is not enough: “Ce n’est point une pitié commune que j’attends de vous, 
c’est une élévation d’âme qui suppose des vertus antiques, des vertus républicaines, qui vertus 
qui honoreront mille fois avantage le parti que vous défendez, que les plus illustres victoires” (D, 
II, 315). By so doing, she creates coherence between women’s strength, the nation’s subsequent 
                                                 
6
 De la Littérature, Part II, Chapter 4. 
40 
 
strength, and the antique model that the Revolution itself sought to recreate, as she once again 
steps into the public sphere and solicits intercourse with the government as a true citoyenne.  
Finally, Delphine’s willing death, rather than a resignation, symbolizes the full exercise 
of moral action to which her code must lead. Consequently, she does not fight this outcome—
instead she sees it as an inevitable conclusion to her crusade against arbitrary convention and its 
utter disregard for women’s overall welfare. Though the scourge of public opinion and society’s 
refusal to valorize her understanding of virtue condemn her to it, the sacrifice of Delphine’s life 
itself becomes the ultimate political and moral act; her willing demise protests the treatment she 
has received at the same time that it reflects an earnest amenability to personal subjugation—
once again, the basis of the Social Contract, and the historical hallmark of femininity, which de 
Staël maintains in her reformations: “Je n’hésiterai pas sur mon devoir,” proclaims Delphine.  
“L’opinion me persécutera, des malheurs de tout genre tomberont sur moi, je ne pourrais pas m’y 
dérober au présent. […] Que mes fautes perdent mon bonheur, mais qu’elles ne causent de 
peines à personne!” (D, II, 132). Moreover, as Angelica Gooden has observed, the communal 
scene that she chooses for her death empowers her further, fashioning death into “an opening-
out, an epiphany,” made all the more striking since “Delphine has chosen to go as no other 
heroine of the novel had gone before her: not privately like Rousseau’s Julie or Charrière’s 
Caliste, but in public space” (48). By opting for a public death at a time when the ruling body 
was making the experience increasingly more private in order to distance itself from it, as 
Foucault has shown, Delphine figurately points her finger at the persecutors who passed this 
sentence upon her, and who doom the reformation that she represents. The final sentence of the 
novel, in turn, confirms her accusation: 
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Léonce aurait dû braver l’opinion dans plusieurs circonstances où le bonheur et 
l’amour lui faisait un devoir, et Delphine, au contraire, se fiant trop à la pureté de 
son cœur, n’avait jamais su respecter cette puissance d’opinion à laquelle les 
femmes doivent se soumettre; mais la nature, mais la conscience apprend-elle 
cette morale instituée par la société, qui impose aux hommes et aux femmes des 
lois presque opposées? (D, II, 335)  
De Staël’s heroines are willing to die in order to confirm their ultimate respect for this power, but 
that does not stop them from questioning it with their every word and deed. What the author 
ultimately demonstrates with Delphine’s story, then, is that no Revolution—nor its heroes and 
heroines—can succeed when its principles are based on philosophies that are anchored in the 
paraître, as Rousseau’s and other philosophers’ were, because it is a civic foundation in which 
women are institutionally targeted, policed, and offered up as sacrificial victims when society at 
large trembles under the volcano of its own weighty imbalances of power. 
 
Corinne 
Begun before Delphine but completed five years after, the Baroness’ second complete 
novel reflects her growing weariness with exile and her increasing frustration with Napoleonic 
France. While the plot makes far fewer references to politics and political events than Delphine 
does, Corinne is nonetheless a product of profound political meditation, and continues de Staël’s 
work of mediating Enlightenment ideals and revolutionary and post-revolutionary realities, and 
of challenging gender tropes by displacing the expectation of feminine presence and activity 
from the home onto the socio-political realm. However, Corinne is a vastly different kind of 
Revolutionary Heroine than Delphine. She is kind, certainly, but pity and generosity are far from 
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the operative elements of her heroinism. Instead, she puts Delphine’s citoyenne’s intuition into 
tangible practice, I will demonstrate, and sets it within a framework of worldwide citizenship, 
resurrecting the eighteenth century’s cosmopolitan ideals promoted primarily by Voltaire, 
Franklin, Hume, and Kant. In so doing, she continues Delphine’s work of deconstructing the 
paradigms of womanhood in order to demonstrate how they speak to a larger refusal of the other 
that contributed to the failure of political reform in France. Moreover, by combining Corinne’s 
appropriation of civic rights and artistic prerogative, de Staël proposes her particular breed of 
revolutionary heroinism as an antidote to the misogyny and bigotry of Romantic heroes, many of 
whom are, themselves, masculinist fictional mediations on the failure of the French Revolution. 
With similar expositions as Delphine on co-gendered ideals of rationality and sensibility and the 
subsequent deconstruction of masculine duty that follows, Corinne’s more forceful politicization 
of her ideals critiques with greater urgency and stringency the masculine ontology that caused 
the Revolution to fail. Finally, in her attempt to make peace with the ways that she has suffered 
throughout the novel, I will argue, Corinne is the first Revolutionary Heroine in this study to 
paint an alternative future: spiteful of her own condemnation, she takes steps to ensure her own 
perpetuity and deliberately claims a narrative space for the re-writing of revolutionary outcomes, 
an exercise of which we will see echoes in subsequent chapters.  
Like Delphine, Corinne defies the era’s injunction against women in the public sphere 
and expresses her personal politics in the ways in which she enters and performs therein. 
Moreover, her very life story is predicated upon the Enlightenment’s revolutionary imperative 
that the crisis itself ultimately denied women: if a government is unjust, its citizens have the right 
to “secouer le joug […] car, recouvrant sa liberté par le même droit qui la lui a ravie, ou il est 
fondé à la reprendre, ou on ne l’était point à la lui ôter” (Du Contrat Social 45-6).  Indeed, 
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Corinne’s first choice as a citizen is the proactive decision to abandon one land and its 
accompanying political ideology for another, whose civil sphere she finds more hospitable to 
women in general and to her own artistic impulses, a move that allows her to “reprendre 
possession de mon imagination, de mon génie, de la nature” (C 385 emphasis mine). Indeed, in 
returning to Italy, a place where women are free from “les anciennes opinions sur l’obscurité qui 
convenait aux femmes” (C 77 emphasis mine)—that is ancien Régime opinions—she once again 
becomes natural, like Mme de Vernon in Delphine, like Edgeworth’s Lady Delacour, as I will 
argue in Chapter 3. Chantal Bertrand-Jennings has perceptively noted that the portrayal of 
England in the novel represents “l’expression prudente de la France napoléonienne et de ses 
valeurs viriles” (Bertrand-Jennings 37). I also argue, however, that it symbolizes the origin of 
those same values as they took shape during the Revolution in conjunction with the brutal 
rejection of women from the public sphere. In forfeiting her existence in England, then, Corinne 
assumes a new nationality and a new patrimony, rejecting Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
perversions for the contrasting naturalism of women’s participation. In so doing, she makes an 
overt statement not only about what she believes to be the ideal administration for fostering 
women’s happiness, but also for encouraging  women’s right, as citizens, to seek personal 
happiness at all, and to reject one political system for another, if necessary, in order to find it.  
 By setting her heroine’s artistic endeavors and political participation within the 
genealogy of masculine genius, in turn, de Staël offers women a very real alternative to both the 
feminized revolutionary iconography that denied women any genuine political participation as 
well as to the domestic imprisonment offered in its place. Indeed, Corinne’s success as an artist 
goes beyond the mere adulation of the masses; politicians, religious leaders, royals place her 
upon a throne with the nation’s elite: it is a senator who crowns Corinne in the midst of the rest 
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of the senate, the cardinals, the Academy of Letters, members of the royal family, and the most 
distinguished women in Italy, while the people look on. The most hallowed Roman poets chant 
odes and sonnets in her honor, “une agreeable réunion d’images et d’allusions à la mythologie” 
(C 54), that associate her talent with the long line of female poets from Sappho on. When prince 
Castel-Forte introduces her before the coronation, he classifies her as the union of all that is best 
in Italy: “nous nous plaisons à la contempler comme une admirable production de notre climat, 
de nos beaux-arts, comme un rejeton du passé, comme une prophétie de l’avenir” (C 57). This 
formal consecration of her talent as a national treasure valorizes her politically, authenticates the 
female artist, makes Corinne’s own artistic genius and production equivalent to that of male 
artists of the past and present, and thus inserts her into the masculine tradition of genius that 
forms the long line of the nation’s most prized literati, whose works inform its very identity.  
Indeed, in her new nation, Corinne’s talent is sufficient for her canonization, and through 
her very public performances, de Staël’s sets her Revolutionary Heroine up not as Dickens’ 
tricoteuse Madame DeFarge, not as real-life Amazone Théroigne de Méricourt, not as the 
salonnières “monsters” that Clarence Hervey will meet in Belinda, but rather as a new queen for 
a new era. Crowned and enthroned in the place of Marie Antoinette, who lost her head and 
throne because of her perceived unfeminine (or decidedly feminine) machinations, de Staël’s 
public woman is poised to bridge the gap between the very notions of masculine and feminine, 
public and private. However, it is at this same unprecedented event that she first meets Oswald: 
when she turns to look at him a second time, and “ce movement fit tomber sa couronne” (C 68), 
the reader is reminded that, though the heroine has fled England, the rigid gender doctrines that it 
represents will continue to follow her and will lead to even greater unhappiness—the loss of her 
talents and her eventual death— just as the promises that the Revolution appeared to make to 
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women in fact lead them into deeper forms of institutionalized oppression through the acute 
intensification of gendered exclusion. Corinne’s death, however, instead of being a sign of her 
submission to the destiny of the lovelorn, rejected woman represented in so many novels of the 
era, comes primarily as a sign of her artistic sensitivity, though threaded through with vengeance. 
Like iconic male Romantic predecessors and successors such as Werther, René, and Chatterton, 
Corinne cannot continue living after Oswald leaves her because “quand une personne de génie 
est douée d’une sensibilité véritable, ses chagrins se multiplient par ses facultés mêmes” (C 419); 
in other words, her artistry only causes her to feel pain more acutely, rather than providing a 
transcendent understanding of love and loss that gives comfort. Instead of suffering as a woman, 
then, she suffers as an artist, as a person of genius, and as such, loses the talents that define her as 
she withers away in despair. 
Written during the initial stirrings of French mal du siècle Romanticism, Corinne’s story 
appropriates a similar sense of doom and melancholy, but uses it to tell a particular feminine 
story that finds its arcs in the failure of Corinne’s redemptive and reconciliatory 
cosmopolitanism. By allowing her protagonist to explore the ways in which women were unable 
to profit from revolutionary doctrines, de Staël proposes her Revolutionary Heroine as a 
challenge to the egotistical insouciance of the male Romantic hero and points to his 
idiosyncrasies as the source of the failed Revolution and the continued oppression of the second 
sex.  Indeed, like the mediated concept of citizenship that de Staël proposes in Delphine, her 
portrayal of the Revolutionary Heroine in Corinne (as antipode to the Romantic hero) lacks the 
misanthropy, amorality, and ruthlessness that typify heroes in the early works of Goethe and 
Chateaubriand, and, contemporary to de Staël, those of Byron and Shelley. Moreover, such 
heroes—Oswald in particular, who embodies the alleged superiority and preeminence of 
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England, but also Byron’s Prometheus—often symbolize and promote nationalism or 
nationalistic pride. In contrast, Corinne deflects and even deconstructs such agendas by 
advocating a cosmopolitan tolerance through her dual nationalities, her polyglotism, her diverse 
education and expansive studies, her proficiency in several artistic media, and her general 
openness to all things foreign, obscure, and mystical—that is, the other ways of being, knowing, 
and feeling that women represented but which granted them no influence or sway in matters of 
public interest.  
De Staël’s fictionalization of the eighteenth-century cosmopolitan ideal echoes writings 
on the topic throughout the century, but particularly those of Kant and in England of Richard 
Price, two important thinkers whose humanistic political philosophies bookended the 
Revolution’s eruption in time and France’s own borders in geography. Kant’s vision of a 
universal civic society, “which administers law among men” (IUH7 5), permeates the novel, and 
what he calls “hospitality,” de Staël, in both novels, calls goodness and generosity. It is a 
universal political right, he argues in Perpetual Peace (1795), “that a stranger not […] be treated 
as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another” (Kant 7), a maxim that both heroines preach 
and practice in their interactions.
8
 Richard Price, in turn, argues in his Discourse on the Love of 
our Country (1789)—a justification of the French Revolution via a celebration of England’s own 
Glorious Revolution—that nation is “community” more than it is soil, and that the love of 
country “does not imply any conviction of the superior value of it to other countries” (something 
Oswald has gravely misunderstood) and has no relation to “love of domination, a desire of 
                                                 
7
 Idea of Universal History, 1784. 
8
 The OED records the word stranger as having the following definition as the most commonly used in the 
eighteenth century: “One who belongs to another country, a foreigner; chiefly (now exclusively), one who 
resides in or comes to a country to which he is a foreigner; an alien.” “stranger, n.” Oxford English Dictionary 
Second edition, 1989; online version March 2012. OED Online. Oxford University Press. 1 May 2012 <https:// 
www.oed.com+191250?rskey=HI8cC2&result=1#eid >. 
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conquest, and a thirst for grandeur and glory” (Price 2).9 He then asserts that a desire to educate 
is perhaps the greatest manifestation of love of country, for “ignorance is the parent of bigotry, 
intolerance, persecution, and slavery. Inform and instruct mankind, and these evils will be 
excluded” (Price 3). “Enlightenment” will certainly bring change, but to wish to improve parts of 
the nation that suffer from ignorance and inequality is not unpatriotic, a sentiment that Edmund 
Burke will later condemn in his response to Price’s speech, Reflections on the Revolution in 
France.  
Corinne’s heterogeneity, then, becomes the point of departure for a larger argument about 
the other, which receives greater valorization and plays out on a much wider political scale than 
it did in Delphine, thanks to Corinne’s influence in the public sphere. Her conversation, “un 
mélange de tous les genres d’esprit, l’enthousiasme des beaux-arts et la connaissance du monde, 
la finesse des idées et la profondeur des sentiments” (C 75), is a constant point of entry for others 
characters to consider the worth of Kant’s “strangers” and “strange” ideas. The dogmatic, single-
minded Oswald, once out of his native society and distracted from his melancholy, quickly falls 
under the charm of her captivating variety. “Où avez-vous pris,” he wonders, “tant de charmes 
divers qui sembleraient devoir s’exclure: sensibilité, gaieté, profondeur, grâce, abandon, 
modestie, êtes-vous une illusion?” (C 93, italics mine). The union of these seemingly opposing 
traits is the result of Corinne’s unique education—Price’s antidote to ignorance and 
intolerance—and the ideal outcome of increased egalitarian congress between nations, between 
sexes, and between classes.  
                                                 
9 While Oswald never considers conquering Italy militarily, his own domination of Corinne falls under this 
heading. He congratulates himself “quand il pouvait se flatter d’intéresser une telle femme” (C 166) and 
wishes her to compromise herself for him in order to subjugate her: “Il aurait souhaité qu’elle eût commis 
pour une grande faute selon le monde” (C 207). Later, he is “fier d’emmener sa conquête” (C 283) when he 
rides off with Corinne to Naples, though her close friends have tried to talk her out of it, knowing that traveling 
alone with a man, even in Italy, pushes the bounds of propriety too far. 
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In other words, it is the ideal outcome of what the Revolution itself could have been. As 
we listen to Castle-Forte on the day of her coronation, we understand that, through him, de Staël 
is speaking of the failed rebirth of the nation and the failed reformation and political integration 
of woman; Corinne, ou l’Italie, symbolizes both:  “Regardez-la, c’est l’image de notre belle 
Italie; elle est ce que nous serions sans l’ignorance, l’envie, la discorde, et l’indolence auxquelles 
notre sort nous a condamnés” (C 57). When her interlocutors, in turn, protest the mongrelization 
of culture that her life seems to suggest, wondering, for example, as the Count d’Erfeuil does, 
“que deviendrait le goût, l’élégance du style français après un tel mélange?” the prince Castel-
Forte, Corinne’s ally, asserts that a man who knows four languages is four men. If more people 
opened themselves to foreign influence, as Corinne has, rather than rejecting it, nations 
“conserveraient ce qui les distingue, et découvriraient ainsi quelquefois ce qui peut leur 
manquer” (C 177). After the Revolution, however, cosmopolitan ideals backfired in the same 
way that increased rights for women did. Yet de Staël persists in channeling cosmopolitanism 
through her extraordinary Revolutionary Heroines because, as women, they continue to be the 
fundamental expression of the other, whose alternative way of thinking, seeing, and being has 
been historically devalued. In short, many of the principles that de Staël introduces on the 
microcosmic level of society in Delphine, such as goodness and tolerance guided by the union of 
rationality and sensibility (Kant’s “hospitality,” in short) find a macrocosmic—that is, an inter- 
and intra-national—expression in Corinne.  
However, de Staël  not only fictionalizes the vestigial Enlightenment and revolutionary 
philosophies that she wishes to see played out further, she also transcribes the bilious rejection of 
them that followed the Revolution’s descent into violence and Napoleon’s ascension to power. 
Michael Scrivener has argued that while eighteenth-century doctrines lead to “strenuous efforts 
49 
 
to know the ‘other’” in the form of “Orientalist writing, [conducted under the assumption of a 
single humanity], that idealized places like Persia and China in order to criticize the failings of 
Europe,”, post-revolutionary “nationalism force[d] its decline and eventual marginalization” 
(Scrivener 8-9).The hyperbolic representations of national prejudice in Corinne, seen in 
characters such as Lady Edgermond and the Count d’Erfeuil, embody that vituperous 
nationalism and serve, narratively, to limit Corinne and Oswald’s options, continually reminding 
the hero and heroine of the disapproval that the parochial world will bestow upon their ill-
advised union, specifically because of the way it flies against the instinctive tightening of borders 
and classes that followed in the wake of the Revolution’s violence. Undertaking practices that 
promote alterity (such as Corinne does with her art and her lifestyle)—as opposed to striving to 
conform to the status quo (the fate to which she was condemned in England)—can erase the 
enmity between city and country, between rich and poor, and between one nation and another, 
and “semble promettre une manière nouvelle de sentir et de juger” (C 39), the doorway to the 
tolerance that the Revolution ultimately proved to be lacking. 
In her challenge to Oswald’s dogmatic absolutism in terms of the superiority of his 
nation, his reverence for his father and for the patriarchal model, and his attachment to traditional 
gender roles for men and women, that is, his belief that “la première destination des femmes et 
même des hommes n’était pas l’exercice des facultés intellectuelles, mais l’accomplissement des 
devoirs particuliers à chacun” (C 343), Corinne instructs Oswald in the feminine language of 
tolerance. Indeed, the emphasis on imagination and emotion that underscores this tutelage is part 
of the particular legacy of the Revolutionary Heroine, who, here continuing the work of 
Delphine, reifies it in more concrete political terms. Corinne undertakes the task of curing 
Oswald of many of his flaws of Romantic heroism that prevent him from seeing Italy’s value and 
50 
 
which stand in the way of their  union. The narrator tells us that Oswald “ne pénétrait pas le 
mystère de cette nation […] qu’il faut comprendre par l’imagination plutôt que par l’esprit de 
jugement […]. Il était bien loin de penser que ce pays […] serait bientôt pour lui la source de tant 
d’idées et de jouissances nouvelles” (C 48). His lack of exposure to the exercise of 
imagination—“il n’avait vécu qu’en France, où la société est tout, et à Londres, où les intérêts 
politiques absorbent presque tous les autres” (C 46), the reader learns of him—renders him 
particularly unfit to understand the nation, its people, and even the landscape. Corinne’s goal is 
to teach him to appreciate the great works of art, architecture, and ruins, “qui nous apprennent 
l’histoire par l’imagination et le sentiment” (C 91).  
Because she has mastered both masculine and feminine forms of knowledge and 
expression, the Revolutionary Heroine is the only character in the novel who can offer Oswald 
this unique tutelage that aims to cure him of his dogmatism. Independent of politics or society’s 
diversions, this is Oswald’s sentimental education: “All culture, art which adorns mankind,” 
Kant wrote, “[…] develop[s] the natural seeds to perfection” (IUH 5). Like Delphine’s attempts 
to bring Léonce back to a kind of masculine natural that can act independent of the conventions 
of duty and honor, Corinne draws upon art and the grand movements of culture in order to ease 
Oswald away from judgment, away from the distaste that he instinctively feels for women’s 
liberty and independence. While he “cherchait partout un sentiment moral” (C 116), she 
encourages him to let the surroundings rather than his moral judgments educate his senses while 
contemplating the value of the monuments that they visit. Through her enlightened exposés, she 
reveals to him “la grandeur morale des premiers temps,” which causes him to revise his opinions 
day by day as she contextualizes Italian art, music, literature, architecture, and religion through 
the conduit of her genius. “Vous me révélez les pensées et les émotions que les objets extérieurs 
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peuvent faire naître” he realizes. “Je ne vivais que dans mon cœur, vous avez réveillé mon 
imagination” (C 141).  
Through Corinne’s and Oswald’s artistic wanderings, de Staël exposes the ways in which 
women have suffered from the dramatic about-face in legislation following the Revolution 
through her Revolutionary Heroine’s ideal consensus between opposing gendered poles of 
Enlightenment thought and action—that is imagination and feeling (feminine) versus judgment 
and reason (masculine)—that would have saved her sex from further imprisonment. Through 
their conversations on religion, in which both characters reveal the degree to which their 
ideologies, from the underlying philosophy to the daily practice, embody these gendered acts, de 
Staël criticizes the absolutist emotional asceticism of Oswald’s religion which, for her, embodies 
the set of principles that that led to the failure of revolutionary doctrines.  
Oswald’s attacks on Italian Catholicism demonstrate his fear of the very kind of 
knowledge in which Corinne is trying to indoctrinate him, because he associates it with the 
corrupt power of Ancien Régime women, exemplified in the novel by Mme d’Arbigny, who held 
the hero captive in Paris with her sexual wiles and duplicity during his father’s illness. Italian 
Catholicism, he asserts, is rife with paganism, superstition, and a general lack of law, and its 
penitent devotees rely on regular, repetitive rituals that, by their completion, supposedly preserve 
their subjects from divine reprisal for sins committed out of passion, which are rampant in Italy: 
“[leur] habitude est d’attacher plus d’importance aux pratiques religieuses qu’aux devoirs” which 
he likens to “des rapports de courtisan mis à la place du respect qu’inspire le créateur” (C 270-1).  
The pagan model has long been associated with feminine knowledge and power, and when 
Oswald alludes to it, he is launching an unconcealed attack on the aspects of religion in Italy that 
most resemble this dangerous variety of scheming, aristocratic female (whom Madelyn Gutwirth 
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has called “social woman”), such as Mme d’Arbigny and Mme de Vernon in Delphine. In 
Oswald’s analogy, religious rituals stand in for the woman’s social performances—the regular 
acts and speeches that offer a façade of virtue but that are empty of genuine sentiment and that in 
fact hide deeply immoral lives. Such women are, essentially, God’s “courtesans,” in the language 
of his analogy, because they follow a virtuous formula to protect their reputations while 
otherwise delivering themselves to the orgy of pleasures that their master offers. Corinne, in turn, 
argues for the conjoining of reasoned morality and “les sentiments du coeur” (C 271), both in 
judging the other in whatever form, and in pursuing individual, social, and global peace, because 
“c’est le culte de sentiment et d’indulgence qui favorise si bien l’essor de l’âme vers le ciel” (C 
271).  The women that Oswald attacks—or the religion that he distrusts, in this case—are not the 
problem, Corinne argues with her valorization of “l’enthousiasme religieux,” “les beaux-arts, les 
grands monuments,” “la pompe” and even “l’inutile” (C 272-3) of Italian Catholicism’s 
demonstrative adoration of divinity, but rather a social system and an austere religious morality 
that prevents people from following their natural, generous impulses, as the author notes in her 
criticism of English Protestantism. 
In contrast to the more flexible position that the Revolutionary Heroine holds, Oswald 
favors an absolutist religious asceticism which stands in for the principles that, in de Staël’s 
opinion, caused the failure of revolutionary doctrines. De Staël herself was a protestant, a fact 
that makes it all the more clear that these scenes are meant to be read analogically. Rather that 
criticizing British Protestantism itself, then, she uses religion in these conversations as an 
ideological construct in order to show how revolutionary and counter-revolutionary dogma took 
on the same power and sway of religion during the crisis. Indeed, by portraying the minority 
religion in France, the one that has suffered historically as the object, for example, of violent 
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majority fury during the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacres in 1572, de Staël disconnects the 
state of oppression from the automatic right to retaliatory violence, an act that we will see 
repeated in Nanon. The pursuit of revolutionary ideals at all costs—the same belief that torments 
the Jacobin Costejoux in Sand’s novel, that is, his fervent belief that “la fin justifie le moyen” 
(Sand 281)—merely reproduces this absolutist ideology instead of replacing it with the active 
practice of the tenets of Christian humanism that the grand ideals of the Revolution originally 
represented.  For Corinne, English Protestantism suffers from this same unwillingness to 
consider individuals above principles: “[Votre religion] est sévère et sérieuse, la nôtre est vive et 
tendre” (C 269); the first recalls the Reign of Terror, the second, the utopian goals that all of 
society’s disenfranchised glimpsed upon reading the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen. In Italy, she counters, where religion speaks of love, devotion is woven into the most 
treasured aspects of life—“[elle] anime les arts, inspire les poètes” (C 269); in England, in turn, 
where reason reigns over imagination and where religion preaches only duty, “[elle] a pris un 
caractère d’austérité morale” (C 269). Because of this tendency to favor magnanimous feeling 
over a fixed set of principles, de Staël’s Italy remains free from “l’empire de la société” (C 82) 
that Corinne found so alienating in England, that drove Delphine to her death, and that allowed 
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary factions to foment to the breaking point post-1789.  
 The nations of Great Britain and Italy, so intimately tied to Oswald and Corinne 
themselves as well as to the religions practiced there, stand as embodiments of contemporary 
gender constructions that the author critiques as having contributed to the failure of 
Enlightenment and revolutionary ideals. In England, Oswald demonstrates, men are defined by 
their active pursuits and rigid ways of thinking. In necessary opposition to man’s active life, 
private submission is the logical destiny of women: “Il faut, pour que la nature et l’ordre social 
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se montrent dans toute leur beauté, que l’homme soit le protecteur de la femme protégée, mais 
que ce protecteur adore la faiblesse qu’il défend, [qui est] la divinité sans pouvoir [qui] porte 
bonheur à sa maison” (C 156-7). Here he again evokes the pagan model of the female deity, 
man’s porte-bonheur. However, he effectively renders her powerless by enclosing her in the 
domestic space of the protégée and by reducing her destiny to a limited scope of service-oriented 
tasks, or as Lady Edgermond describes it: “La femme [est] faite pour soigner le ménage de son 
mari et la santé de ses enfants; […] toutes les autres prétentions ne [font] que du mal” (C 365). 
Oswald fetishizes the modesty and virtue that this kind of limited domestic education cultivates 
in young women in England, but the Revolutionary Heroine identifies it as the very construct 
that breeds the women he despises, whose appearance of surface inactivity, or of private virtue, 
in fact hides a busy and nefarious mind:  “la réserve pleine de vertu des femmes anglaises, et 
l’art plein de grâce des femmes françaises, servent souvent à cacher, croyez-moi, la moitié de ce 
qui se passé dans l’âme des unes et des autres” (C 159). While aspects of Italy terrify him and 
threaten his masculinity, in fact, it is the women that he idolizes who suffer from these same 
flaws because of a society that offers their minds and bodies little more than “un rassemblement 
de commérages, une collection d’ennuis tout à la fois divers et monotones” (C 367). What makes 
Corinne unique and irresistible to Oswald is “un naturel sans contrainte qui laisse voir” (C 159). 
Absolute transparency in the place of obscurity and deception is the lifestyle that Corinne 
advocates and that de Staël sees as natural to women when social institutions and forces protect 
rather than destroy her natural goodness, as Delphine demonstrated. Though Mary 
Wollstonecraft was far from de Staël’s greatest fan, censuring her adulation of Rousseau’s 
misogynistic remarks on women,
10
 even she might appreciate the author’s penetration in 
                                                 
10
 See her Vindication on the Rights of Women, chapter V, “Animadversion on writers who have rendered women an 
object of pity, bordering on contempt,” in which she criticizes de Staël’s adulation of Rousseau and his summation 
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deconstructing Oswald’s analogy: Like Delphine’s objective analysis of Mme de R’s situation, 
Corinne begs Oswald to exercise a little perspective when forming his judgments on her nation 
(and on women themselves): Italy has had moments of greatness in history, she reminds him: 
“D’où vient donc que cette nation a été sous les Romains la plus militaire de toutes, la plus 
jalouse de sa liberté dans les républiques du moyen âge, et dans le seizième siècle la plus 
illustrée par les lettres, les sciences et les arts? N’a-t-elle pas poursuivi la gloire dans toutes ses 
formes!" If the nation and its women are weak now, “pourquoi n’en accuseriez-vous pas sa 
situation politique, puisque dans d’autres circonstances elle s’est montrée si différente de ce 
qu’elle est maintenant?” (C 160). Clearly, Corinne argues, her current faults are the result of 
political oppression, and not of the natural indolence of which Oswald accuses her. In other 
words, woman is not as she is because she was born that way—because she has clearly shined in 
moments of history—but because her lack of subjecthood, of basic rights, and of education (a 
state of being that the revolutionary turn of events merely exacerbated)—have given her few 
directions in which to grow and develop. Though de Staël has not received much credit in the 
history of feminism,
11
 she has, in this passage, unequivocally identified gender inequality as, in 
part, a social and political rather than a biological construct.  
Ultimately the reader finds consensus between the points of ideological friction in the 
novel’s bold dénouement: that Corinne and Lucile, both sisters and competitors for Oswald’s 
affection, rekindle their love and friendship, despite their shared object of desire, mitigates the 
damage that Oswald’s adamantine attachment to his father’s vision of Britishness has had on his 
                                                                                                                                                             
of woman as an assemblage of “charms, weaknesses and errors” (179).  
11
 It was only in the 1970s that feminist scholars such as Noreen J. Swallow and Madelyn Gutwirth begin studying 
the Baroness’ texts from a feminist perspective. Prior to that point, Swallow has indicated, scholarly criticism had 
characterized her novels as, at worst, “hysterical retaliation and posturing self-pity,” (65), or, at best, as an 
interesting example of the female artist. However, “to concentrate attention on Corinne as the portrait of an 
exceptional female,” Swallow asserts, “is to disregard Mme de Staël’s concerned interest in problems common to all 
women” (66). Within the intervening decades, the idea that de Staël’s novels offered a contribution to the resistance 
against patriarchal hegemony gradually became relatively commonplace. 
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marriage to Lucile. Indeed, once their relationship is reconstructed, Corinne instructs Lucile on 
her duties as Oswald’s wife—not on her moral duties, with which she is all too familiar, thanks 
to her education in England—but on her responsibility to continue to cultivate his imagination 
and sensibility, as Corinne would have done had she married him: “Il faut que vous soyez vous et 
moi à la fois,” she counsels her.  Oswald needs “une confiance spontanée […], plus d’intérêt [...] 
et de la gaîté” (C 578) to combat his melancholy and discouragement. In so doing, however, she 
ensures the continuation of her own legacy, the propagation of the specifically feminine way of 
seeing and feeling that the author valorizes in both novels. Passing her principles on to the 
couple’s daughter as well as forming Lucile in her own image, the Revolutionary Heroine in 
effect opens the narrative space for future Revolutionary Heroines who will offer alternative 
versions of the history that failed both Corinne and Delphine. “Mon seul désir personnel,” 
Corinne explains to Lucile, “est encore qu’Oswald retrouve dans vous et dans sa fille quelques 
traces de mon influence, et que jamais du moins il ne puisse avoir une jouissance de sentiment 
sans se rappeler Corinne” (C 579). By continuing to exert her influence from beyond the grave, 
she condemns both Oswald’s and the Revolution’s idiosyncratic tendency to resist true justice 
when it runs contrary to established patterns of behavior in the fatherland. In effect, Corinne has 
taught Oswald to feel pleasure and pain outside of his alternating patriarchal joy and melancholy, 
and his inseparable association of both with the Revolutionary Heroine will ensure that women’s 
influence will never again be discounted. The narrator, in turn, reveals that despite the vast 
deception of the Napoleonic promise and the devastating effects of exile, the author’s underlying 
doctrine of civic kindness has not changed since Delphine; “Faites du bien aux hommes,” a priest 
once exclaimed while comforting the mourners of loved ones lost to war, “pour que Dieu 
cicatrise dans votre coeur la blessure de la douleur” (C 276). There is duty to country, to family, 
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and to the cause of freedom, this phrase suggests, and it must be respected. But in the interim, 
foster tolerance and mutual understanding by doing good everywhere and to everyone, in hopes 
that no one will have to exercise “duty” to the detriment of another, as both Léonce and Oswald 
feel compelled to do in Delphine and Corinne.  
 
Léonce and Oswald 
Through both Revolutionary Heroines, de Staël identifies men’s unwillingness and 
inability to embrace the feminine syntheses that they propose as the source of the Revolution’s 
failure. Though both heroes give tactic consent to the justice of the heroines’ approach to 
citizenship, love, and gender, they are ultimately unable to integrate these new tenets into their 
respective codes of conduct. In fact, in many cases—and this is a theme we will see repeated in 
subsequent chapters—the men end up using the women’s own virtues against them, which 
further illustrates de Staël’s assessment that there will never be any kind of equality or balance of 
powers in society until the world begins to valorize the historically devalued feminine ontology. 
At the start of their relationship, for example, Léonce is perpetually begging Delphine to 
moderate her principles—which “réveillent tant de passions haineuses, et contre lesquelles, peut-
être avec raison, les personnes de votre classe ont un si grand éloignement” (D, I, 148)—as part 
of their commitment to one another.  And yet, when he sees that the same public opinion against 
which the heroine fights is beginning to truncate his own destiny, he calls upon her to exercise 
those same principles for his benefit and to the increasing detriment of her reputation: “Ce n’est 
pas Delphine dont l’esprit supérieur s’affranchit à son gré de l’opinion du monde?” (D, I, 374). 
By twisting her allegiance to generosity to serve him exclusively as a function of his proprietary 
love for her, he alienates her from her own convictions, which further isolates her in society. 
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Delphine is not one to reject “l’amour par un timide respet pour les jugements des hommes. Ton 
véritable devoir, c’est de m’aimer,” he commands her: “Ne suis-je pas ton premier choix ?” (D, I, 
374).  
Indeed, like the Revolution itself, both men follow Enlightenment with an abrupt about-
face: despite the moments of understanding and approval that they experienced in contrasting 
their masculine ontology with the feminine versions that the women attempted to teach them, in 
their trials, they inevitably return to the superiority of their own ideas—“[ce] dont [leur] 
existence s’était composée jusqu’alors” (C 447)—and no longer credit what they formerly 
respected because of the violence (in the Revolutionary sense as well) that they feel that it inflicts 
upon their character and their dogmatically-gendered world. Léonce, for example, troubled about 
whether to fight for the French army or the emigrant army, refuses Delphine’s enlightened credo, 
which intones that one’s loving impulses should dictate one’s actions. In the case of the former, 
the revolution  has the stronger party, and Léonce does not want to be “soupçonné de céder à la 
force” (D, I, 467), whereas the latter, while he is not “réelement enthousiaste” for the cause, 
might cause him to be accused “d’être determiné par votre intérêt personnel, en défendant les 
privileges de la noblesse” (D, I, 467). Since he is incapable of making a decision independent of 
public opinion, which “s’efforc[e] toujours de ternir l’éclat de nos sentiments les plus purs” (D, I, 
245), Delphine attempts to cure him of his moral turpitude by counseling him to opt out political 
action all together. “Votre devoir, dans votre manière de penser,” she insists, “c’est l’inaction 
politique” (D, I, 468). By encouraging him to behave as a woman and willingly choose political 
inactivity, Delphine denies the legitimacy of Léonce’s ability to act as a man by honoring his 
obligations, insinuating that masculine “duty” is in fact a construct of moral cowardice. Indeed, it 
is precisely because Léonce is a slave to public opinion, because he is unable to temper his 
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obsession with honor with rationality and sensibility, that he must not act. De Staël explicitly 
links Léonce’s unmanly refusal to decide on his own terms with revolutionary failure: to resist 
the tide of change that is fueled by the desire to share freedom with all of mankind is, as M de 
Lebensei explains to Léonce, “courir le risque de prêter son secours à des événements qui 
étoufferaient toutes les idées, que depuis quatre siècles les esprits éclairés ont travaillé à 
recueillir” (D, II, 188), that is, to impede the rolling forth of the centuries-long culmination and 
fruition of socio-political thought.  
Oswald’s volte-face, in turn, parallels the devastating post-Revolution intensification of 
separate-sphere gender roles in France that de Staël’s two novels condemn. Though he leaves 
Italy swearing his fidelity to Corinne, once in the bosom of his patrimony, where “la réalité d’un 
ordre social […] dominateur” (C 397) effaces his memory of “le vague enivrant des beaux-arts et 
de l’Italie” and of Corinne herself, “il reprenait une sorte de fixité dans les idées” (C 447). Only 
able to look upon his former lover with horror for her notoriety, he contrasts her endlessly with 
Lucile, the embodiment of “la pureté céleste d’une jeune fille qui ne s’est jamais éloignée de sa 
mère, et ne connaît de la vie que la tendresse filiale (C 450). In his country, where “le bonheur 
domestique est le lien du bonheur public” (C 447), Oswald abandons the undomestic, masculine 
woman Corinne for the promise of manly occupations and silently feminine women like her half-
sister, whose “timid, innocent” English heart is the very personification of British insularism and 
its accompanying Angel in the House view on the second sex. While Lucile exudes angelic 
innocence, Corinne exhales worldy knowledge, which includes an awareness of love—“Vous 
avez beaucoup réfléchi [à l’amour]!” (C 94), Oswald observes accusatorily—which dirties her in 
the eyes of those who believe that adamic knowledge is necessarily incompatible with domestic 
bliss. A relative of Lucile’s, M. Edgermond, cuts to the heart of the problem with Corinne when 
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he cites Walpole while inquiring of Oswald, “que fait-on de cela à la maison? Et la maison,” he 
continues, “est tout chez nous, vous le savez, pour les femmes, au moins” (C 204). The “cela” is, 
of course, especially illuminating in its refusal of Corinne’s gender and subjecthood. However, 
the verb “faire” is also a revealing choice, for it expresses the idea this thing, this cela, exists 
only to have something done with it. In other words, in England, and Edgermond recognizes this 
and laments it to some degree, Corinne could not exist on her own terms, but only according to 
what men there would determine as her use-potential. Because of her knowledge of love and her 
public, performative lifestyle—which Edgermond admires in the context of Italy (“Je la voudrais 
sur le trône d’Angleterre—” he insists)—English discourse ungenders and unpersons the heroine, 
because a woman has no value outside of the home, and her most prominent value therein is her 
exclusive sexual devotion to her husband and her maternity. Hence the completion of 
Edgermond’s perverse breed of praise: “—non pas sous mon humble toit” (C 204). When the 
heroine, with her improvisational poetry, her art, her theatrical performances and her music, 
creates both outside of procreation and outside of the home, she becomes a kind of dangerous 
chimera, precisely because cela, her alternative to biological procreation, cannot be contained à 
la maison. Oswald’s own father feared the effect that a woman like Corinne would have on his 
son, that of mollifying his instinct for masculine displays of vainglory and effacing the specter of 
xenophobia that his education had instilled in him. If Oswald marries Corinne, his father writes 
in a letter, he will lose his national character, that which makes “notre nation un corps;” and he 
would probably move to Italy, which “lui ravirait l’honneur de servir son pays” (467), in itself a 
primordial emblem of manhood. In short, her independence would swallow both his nationality 
(without which he has no civic presence) and his masculinity, and he would be left, in simplified 
terms: a woman. For Corinne, however this is no bad thing, since the tempering of excessive 
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nationalism and inflexible codes of honor is the very gender revolution that she is trying to bring 
about. 
The heroes’ ultimate refusal of compromise echoes the nation’s inability to find a non-
violent middle-ground between the partisan civil war that rocked the nation in the early 1790s 
and that eventually settled into the tyranny of the Terror. Bertrand-Jennings has made a similar 
assessment, that if “le ‘mal’ des héros masculins, Léonce de Delphine  et Oswald de Corinne, 
procède de leur écartèlement entre les modes de sensibilité ‘masculin’ et ‘féminin,’ le ‘mal’ des 
héroïnes provient, lui, de ce que les héros n’ont pu se convertir totalement au ‘féminin’ dans leur 
sensibilité et leurs choix de vie” (Bertrand-Jennings 43). I think the argument needs to be taken 
further, however. The men not only suffer from their inability to compromise, but they refuse to 
see how their masculine prerogative does harm both to the women they love and to themselves. 
They, in effect, betray their own idea of honor when they make promises that they become 
unwilling to keep, which condemns them to, if not death, at least eternal melancholy. Indeed, at 
the same time that the men’s ultimate rejection of feminine knowledge and being exemplifies the 
rejection of women in society at large, the heroes’ implacable regret parallels the downward 
spiral of both revolution and social progress. When Corinne levies her curse on Oswald, “qu’il 
ne puisse avoir une jouissance de sentiment sans se rappeler Corinne” (C 579), she predicts the 
very male malady that will characterize the conflicted, ambivalent, and unruly masculinity that 
trails in the shadow of the Revolution and dominates early nineteenth century literature and art.  
Indeed, it is the men’s dramatic philosophical backpedaling and return to their former 
reductive notions about women that both condemns the women to death and that allows the 
author to further emphasize her prescriptive deconstruction of Enlightenment gender tropes: if 
self-sacrifice is feminine—if it is, indeed, the very essence of womanhood—it offers proof of a 
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superior moral capacity, in the author’s opinion, because of the negotiation, the compromise, 
between reason and sentiment that it requires. As we see with Delphine, who more than once 
offers “de quitter Paris, d’aller m’enfermer dans une retraite pour le reste de mes jours, afin d’y 
conserver sans crime le souvenir de Léonce” (D, I, 158), what the women embody is the 
revolutionary imperative of sacrificing one’s principles for love, rather than the staid maxim to 
which both the men and the Revolution itself ultimately return, that of sacrificing love to 
principle.
12
  
And as I have suggested, women were not the only ones to suffer: de Staël fictionalizes 
the way that men, too, were victims of their own dogmatic thinking both inside and outside of 
revolutionary doctrines. In Delphine, Valorbe evades a duel, and his fellow soldiers torment him 
nearly to the point of death when they discover that he dodged this necessary ritual of machismo. 
However, perfect honor required of him both that he defend himself and that he protect a woman 
by not defending himself, by which de Staël reveals the inherent incongruence in the idea of 
masculine devoir that is unwilling to sacrifice principle for the human generosity that would lead 
to relativized judgment. Léonce, too, feels bound by a similar dilemma: is the most honorable 
undertaking to avenge himself for the gross offense of a marriage of chicanery, or to respect his 
conjugal vows and stifle his masculine prerogative in order remain with the wife that he does not 
love? Indeed, he suffers a number of humiliating blows to his masculinity throughout the novel, 
being tricked into a sham marriage and “renfermé dans ma maison” (D, I, 383) with a woman he 
doesn’t love—both literary truisms of the feminine experience in the eighteenth century. That 
Léonce and Oswald promise to make sacrifices—ideological and physical—that will challenge 
the hegemonic rule of masculine honor and duty, and then are unable or unwilling to follow 
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 In Nanon, George Sand will also identify this unfortunate reversal as one of the primary causes of the failure of 
the Revolution, particularly through the character of Costejoux. 
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through, is therefore a transparent criticism of a system that defines masculinity in terms of 
inflexible principles (honor) and physical violence (dueling and warfare). Indeed, when Oswald 
returns to England, he revels in the rediscovery of these totems of manhood: “il rentrait dans 
l’existence qui convenait aux hommes, l’action avec un but” (C 448) Neither course of “action” 
that the heroes undertake, however, can lead to happiness, because both ultimately refuse the 
humanistic maxim that Corinne and Delphine spend the span of the novels trying to teach to their 
lovers: that “il n’est pas donné à notre esprit de se convaincre sur un tel sujet par des 
raisonnements positifs; mais la sensibilité nous apprend tout ce qu’il importe de savoir” (D, II, 
421). Even the reasonable words of M de Lebensei, who states this same axiom in concrete terms 
specific to the masculine experience, cannot sway Léonce: “L’homme fier,” he argues, 
“l’homme vertueux ne doit obéir qu’à la morale universelle; que signifie ces devoirs qui tiennent 
aux circonstances, qui dépendent du caprice des lois, ou de la volonté des prêtres, et soumettent 
la conscience de l’homme à la décision d’autres hommes, asservis depuis longtemps sous le joug 
des mêmes préjugés et surtout les mêmes intérêts?” (D, II, 282-3). Recreating the self-same 
arbitrary and absolutist power structures in the place of those that were torn down at the start the 
Revolution is in part what doomed it to fail. And by the same token, because the new versions of 
masculine and feminine virtue that de Staël proposes seem to represent a rejection of traditional 
masculinity, both heroes ultimately prefer to return to the caprice des lois ou la volonté des 
prêtres rather than embrace the compromise and sacrifice that the possibility of true personal 
freedom would require.  
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Conclusion 
 Both Corinne and Delphine, as I have shown, seek to combine the two gendered poles of 
Enlightenment thought: emotion and sensibility versus reason and rationality. Both are entirely 
insouciant of public opinion, of tradition, and of conventional moral codes, structures that they 
identify as arbitrary because they run contrary to what reason, feeling, and experience tells them 
is in men and women’s best interest. In both novels, a feminized model of behavior, love, and 
intellectual inquiry overturns the reigning masculine tropes—traditionalism (the exclusionary 
conservatism of the Ancien Régime) and Romanticism (the destructive rebellion of the 
Revolution). That their reformations ultimately meet with a certain degree of failure, which 
includes the heroines’ deaths, suggests that de Staël herself perhaps had no larger goal than to 
exhibit the period’s intolerance and suppression of alterity. Indeed, scholars such as Simone 
Balayé have argued precisely from that point of view. She calls the author’s fictional works 
descriptive rather than prescriptive: “Mme de Staël,” she asserts, “qui a tant souffert de sa 
condition de femme, ne pouvait que créer des femmes incomprises, détruites par les préjugés. 
[…] Ses romans sont plutôt des constats: les femmes sont malheureuses et la société ne les admet 
que si elles se soumettent” (Balayé 23). In other words, they observe the unfortunate state of 
womanhood without purporting to propose a solution or to seek reparations from the individuals 
or institutions that might be responsible. Yet, as I have demonstrated above, both novels present 
an outright challenge to political inequality and make bold statements about women’s 
underappreciated talents and strengths that the nation has historically disregarded. While Corinne 
and Delphine may appear on the surface to be mere love stories exploring the way in which 
society preys upon the tragic flaws of women—or worse, simple romans à clef—the actions that 
her heroines undertake indicate more proactive intentions. And we must credit de Staël with even 
65 
 
more subtlety than that: her revolutionary protagonists, as I have proven, resurrect and rethink 
Enlightenment ideals of equality and deconstruct gender paradigms by engaging their heroes 
intellectually, and by inserting themselves into the burgeoning Romantic aesthetic, playing roles 
and moving in and out of literary tropes—such as the suffering artist or the social outcast—that 
are typically reserved for men. While both heroines appear to sustain universal stereotypes of 
female infirmity and sentimentality, they subvert these assumptions by experiencing weakness 
and emotion as an artistic or philosophical imperative, not as a necessary aspect of femininity—
that is, like Revolutionary Heroines rather than as women.  
In her exploration of gender roles and gendered traits, de Staël necessarily addresses the 
masculine and feminine forms of knowledge that played such a large role in Enlightenment 
philosophies, which themselves appeared poised to offer citizenship to society at large. In her 
fictional explorations, as I have demonstrated, the author slowly but surely hones in on the fact 
that excluding women from taking political action through the use of their particular traits of 
love, pity and sensibility, as well as their capacity to create unity with their very real intellectual 
and artistic powers, leads inevitably to social disintegration, since reason alone—historically 
masculine knowledge—can only breed dogmatism and intolerance. In her plea for a co-gendered 
model of citizenship, she calls upon Kant, a philosopher to whom she devoted many pages in her 
De l’Allemagne, whose cosmopolitan ideal underlies her every gesture of ouverture  and 
inclusion:  “Lorsqu’on veut se servir du raisonnement seul pour établir les vérités religieuses,” 
she writes of his theories, “c’est un instrument pliable en tous sens, qui peut également les 
défendre et les attaquer. […]. C’est au sentiment que [Kant] appelle pour faire pencher la balance 
[parce qu’il]  a reconnu le raisonnement pour insuffisant et pour contradictoire” (DA 450-51). 
Extraordinary women such as Corinne, Delphine, and Germaine de Staël herself, cannot flourish 
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in the domestic role alone because of its lack of access to a public world which gives richness 
and meaning to private life; on the other hand, ordinary women, such as Thérèse d’Ervins in 
Delphine, lack the education, life skills, and basic sensitivity to be receptive to the domestic 
life’s tender charms. “De quel secours me serait un esprit que celui de Thérèse? Delphine 
wonders. “La passion fait tourner  toutes nos forces contre nous-mêmes” (D, I, 137-8). Without 
some kind of legitimized public role for women, de Staël has shown with the slow death of her 
two heroines, society will continue to experience tremors (the revolutionary echoes of 1830, 
1848, and 1871). 
Indeed, in an eerie variation on a theme beloved to de Staël, Corinne takes Delphine’s 
dilemma to metaphysical levels: while her earlier heroine wonders how others can know a 
woman’s heart and character when she is prohibited from proactivity, Corinne inquires how a 
woman can know herself, when even in political liberty she remains a slave to the antipathetic 
need to love and be loved by another. “Chaque jour plus subjuguée par son amour pour Oswald” 
(C 438), she compares her impending death to that of a political prisoner: as Oswald’s departure 
for England approaches, “elle frémit de tous ses membres; et sûrement l’approche de l’échafaud 
ne lui aurait pas causé plus d’effroi” (C 440); and when she learns that he will marry Lucile, she 
is “une personne condamnée à la mort, mais qui ne sait pas encore quand sa sentence sera 
exécutée” (C 507). This gradual build-up to death—nothing like the sudden, cold, and mercifully 
brief slicing of the guillotine—mirrors women’s lengthy struggle for equality in the sense of 
civic recognition and value outside of sexual and biological criteria. That, in de Staël’s world, 
they go willingly and on their own terms to these interminable gallows testifies of their 
determination to seize create control of their fate—as the Revolutionary Heroines in subsequent 
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chapters will also do—despite what power structures, institutions, and social bodies try to force 
them into conformity. 
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Chapter III 
Belinda and the French Threat: the decent drapery of raison 
 
Maria Edgeworth was an advocate of women’s education and the regeneration of the 
nation via the shoring up of the family unit.  Some of her most influential non-fiction works, in 
which she lays out her ideas on women in the public sphere, family organization, and education 
include Letters for Literary Ladies (1795), a plea for reform in women’s education, The Parent’s 
Assistant (1796), a collection of didactic tales for children, and Practical Education (1798). Also 
the author of novels, plays, and treatises on a variety of contentious social questions, Edgeworth 
created heroines who too find themselves at the ideological intersection of the revolutionary 
period’s most profound debates. Though never an outspoken feminist like Mary Wollstonecraft 
or Mary Hays, nor an especially avid supporter of the French Revolution, the author nonetheless 
falls to the liberal side of the political dissension in Britain at the time, with her proactive 
intervention into education (for women and children) and her consistent discouragement in her 
writing of extreme performances of feminine delicacy and weakness. It follows from this, then, 
that much of the scholarship on Belinda (1801) has addressed similar topics, and has focused 
mainly on post-colonial readings of a scene, later withdrawn, of interracial marriage in the novel; 
on the status of Edgeworth’s feminist position; and on the text as an expression of Edgeworth’s 
pedagogical theories
13
. 
This chapter adds substantially to these conversations by arguing that that there is an 
unavoidable question that has yet to be asked about this novel. What is the cultural, pedagogical, 
and feminist significance of the proliferation of references to the French language, French culture 
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 Practical Eduction combines philosophies of knowledge from Locke and Rousseau with contemporary 
educational theories from Godwin, Macaulay and others, and favors a tactile, exploratory, and empirical education 
for the two sexes. 
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and French literature in the novel? This question also turns our attention specifically to Harriet 
Freke, the Frenchified “man-woman” in Belinda.  What do they, together, tell us about 
Edgeworth’s intellectual relationship with the French Revolution and its doctrines? Perhaps 
many do not realize it (because it is not revealed until chapter 26 of 31, and even then, only 
briefly), but the novel takes place during the early stages of the overthrow, when the conflict 
between extremists on both sides of the political spectrum was reaching its peak in Britain. One 
year before meeting Belinda, the narrator discloses, Clarence Hervey had been in France “just 
before the Revolution, when luxury and dissipation were at their height in Paris, and when a 
universal spirit of licentious gallantry prevailed” (362).14 It is no secret that the majority opinion 
in Britain expressed distaste for the ideals of the French Revolution, especially when they 
degenerated into the violence of the Terror, and therefore, with this backdrop in mind, we must 
read the characters’ conflicts—Harriet Freke and her vulgar “Rights of Women” assaults 
included—as part of the dialogue on both the pro- and anti-revolutionary platforms in Britain and 
the internal self-reflections that they provoked, despite the fact not a single revolutionary event is 
recorded or commented upon by the novel’s characters. 
The significance of French allusions in this novel leads us inevitably to the role that the 
Revolutionary Heroine—Belinda herself—plays in this text. If there is one consistent strain in 
scholarly work on the novel it is that virtually no one focuses their argument on the titular 
character herself. Indeed, Belinda has long been seen as a playful literary frolic centered around 
the dissipated socialite Lady Delacour, who must eventually succumb to the regenerative 
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 If “just before” means late-1788 or early- to mid-1789, prior to the storming of the Bastille, the novel must 
unfold during late 1789 (following the July storming of the Bastille), or in early- to mid-1790—probably after 
the women’s march on Versailles, which included the ransacking of the royal apartments and the “half-naked” 
fleeing of the queen (in Burke’s description), possibly after the seizing of church and noble properties, but 
most definitively before the September massacres, the execution of the king, and the civil war between 
Girondins and Jacobins, events that prompted the conclusive severing of the majority of British support for 
the Revolution’s goals and methods. 
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machinations of the initially colorless, passionless eponymous heroine. Heather MacFadyen has 
called Belinda “a tiresome distraction from the…irrepressibly witty woman of fashion, Lady 
Delacour” (424). Jordana Rosenberg, in a like manner, accuses the novel of “tediously beat[ing] 
down the fun of Lady Delacour in the name of an Enlightenment project” (583), a surmise with 
which Beth Kowaleski-Wallace agrees, arguing further that “Belinda seems condemned to her 
very tameness by the didactic purpose of the novel, a purpose which demands her unyielding 
perfection,” and which “precludes no real moral growth for the heroine” (242). While even 
Edgeworth herself admitted to having drawn “that stick or stone Belinda” (qtd in Montweiler 
347) as perhaps too steady for genuine likability, through this boring philosophical ambassador 
she has, in fact, crafted a Revolutionary Heroine, I will argue, who represents a cogent and 
strikingly liberal treatise on rationality and the necessary reformation of female manners, which 
defuses the fear of the French threat that so many anti-Jacobin novels of the era were continuing 
to foment. What’s more, Edgeworth’s treatise is much closer to Wollstonecraft’s version than 
anyone has yet to admit, and Belinda is as much at the center of the reformation as the rakish 
Lady Delacour.   
I will demonstrate, then, that within the pages of Belinda, Edgeworth attempts to 
counterbalance the virulent backlash to revolutionary events that took the form of a xenophobic 
nationalism, the condemnation of iconoclastic Enlightenment philosophies and the excessive 
reason and rationality that Britons saw as the origin of the revolutionary violence, and the 
increasingly narrow definitions of feminine propriety and destiny that followed—a topic I will 
pursue further in Chapter 4 on The Wanderer.  Indeed, because of the Belinda’s implicit 
awareness of Revolution, the fear of contagion is a palpable theme in the novel and takes the 
form of threatening and thinly-veiled references to French revolutionary philosophies and 
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ideologies.  However, Edgeworth addresses the concern about contamination in the first pages 
and promptly counteracts it: when young and socially inexperienced Belinda is sent to live with 
the debauched aristocrat Lady Delacour, it is not long before she observes the unhappiness into 
which her patron’s lifestyle and life choices have plunged her. Rather than allowing herself to be 
swept away by the blinding spectacle of Lady Delacour’s wit and the dizzying variety of her 
company, she makes the conscious choice to avoid contamination and “to profit by her bad 
example” (70), without, however, cutting off her intercourse with her. Instead, this 
Revolutionary Heroine eventually aids in Lady Delacour’s reformation through her good 
example and rational advice.  
This determination on the heroine’s part informs every other resolution in the novel, as 
the author continually calls into question existing conventions (such as female delicacy) and their 
radical revisions (“masculine women”). In each case her examples obscure thinly veiled 
ideological and political references to the threats that the Revolution allegedly posed to the 
British nation. Indeed, the points of ideological friction that the novel confronts exist primarily 
around the overturning of gender roles that revolutionary doctrines seemed to suggest. 
Edgeworth addresses both the fear of the manly woman (the sacrifice of feminine “softness” and 
docility to the boorish quest for sexual equality) and the womanly man (the dilution of masculine 
strength and prerogative by effeminate aristocratic foppery, a behavior typically associated with 
the French aristocracy.)
15
 She also considers the figure of the unnatural mother who abandons 
her children for worldly or self-aggrandizing pleasures, and the puerile theories of natural 
education that sentimental advocates of feminine submission proposed as her antidote. 
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 In his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau identifies wealth and the pursuit of frivolous luxuries—a 
byproduct of civilization itself—as a source of effeminacy in men. In his Lettre à d’Alembert he contrasts the 
effeminate Parisians with the robust, manly Genevois, due to women’s effeminizing influence and empire in the 
theater. In Emile, in turn, he argues that “The exaggeration of feminine delicacy leads to effeminacy in men” (263) 
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Edgeworth’s Revolutionary Heroine, in turn, effectively neutralizes transnational discord in each 
situation by orchestrating the (re)union of estranged couples and effacing threatening binary 
oppositions in the text, each with its implicit reference to France or to perilous French ideas. 
By debunking the domestic panic, then, that the French Revolution prompted, Belinda 
dismantles, piece by piece, long-standing misconceptions about the effect that revolutionary 
doctrines might have on the British character and traditional gender roles, themselves an 
important component of cohering national identity. In offering a vital response to the relevant 
political and philosophical questions of the era, Belinda makes great strides in reconciling 
opposing poles of political and social response to the Revolution. In so doing, she answers the 
primary proponents of both sides of the debate: the conservative Edmund Burke and the 
xenophobic strokes of burgeoning British nationalism in his galvanizing treatise, Reflections on 
the Revolution in France, the text that definitively wedded revolutionary principles to potential 
moral and economic decay in Britain, and the liberal Mary Wollstonecraft, who called for 
wholesale social change modeled on French ideals of equality in her two Vindications.  
However, by preserving the idea of separate spheres for men and women, which she 
nonetheless modernizes, Edgeworth helps to construct a new domestic woman who bridges the 
gap between conservative and liberal ideologies, and who shows, as Belinda does, that it is 
possible for humans to improve and progress, and, indeed, that a woman may improve herself 
and become more autonomous, while maintaining hierarchical relationships and social 
institutions that are profoundly British. At the heart of her reconciliation is the idea of 
rehabilitation, not only of the individual characters, whose strengths and weaknesses stand in for 
both traditional and unconventional class and gender behaviors under debate during the author’s 
lifetime, but a rehabilitation, I will demonstrate, of French-tainted reason and philosophy 
73 
 
themselves. When all is said and done, Edgeworth has, through her Revolutionary Heroine, 
reformed her characters, reunited estranged families and revised the marriage contract, 
reinterpreted masculine duty, and legitimized the female philosopher, all while keeping her 
characters swathed in a decent drapery all their own.  
 
Cross dressers and gender transformations 
At the time of the Revolution, native and foreign thinkers alike had long identified 
effeminacy—what John Brown, in his 1757 Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the 
Times, called “a gigantic French plot” (qtd in Newman 80)—as a slow French poison that was a 
source of national weakness and a scourge to masculinity in Britain. At the same time, the manly 
woman was cohering into a trope of revolutionary revolt, thanks to lower-class women’s 
participation in public marches, rallies and strikes, and upper class women’s discursive 
insurgency into subversive salon and theater cultures. Rousseau had condemned both phenomena 
years earlier, citing in Emile the pernicious effects of civilization in general as the cause of the 
first, and calling the second—the loathsome hybrid of a woman attempting to act as a man—a 
creature who “fall[s] short of [her] own possibilities without attaining ours” (268). Both specters 
haunted the British imagination in the early stages of the uprising in France, and eventually came 
to be personified by its fervent supporters. Indeed, any woman who dared endorse revolutionary 
principles in word or deed risked public humiliation at the hands of satirists, who skewered her 
allegedly masculine qualities when she left the domestic role to enter public debates. Mary 
Wollstonecraft, “whom no decorum checks” (Polwhele 61), probably more than any other 
feminist writer of the era, was mocked and parodied in literature and popular publications for her 
presumed departure from traditional femininity and for her gender-defiant iconoclasm, which the 
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public read as intimately wedded to French revolutionary platforms. It is no surprise, then, to 
find characters in novels of the revolutionary period like Edgeworth’s Harriet Freke—
transvestite rabble rouser, philosophizing rake, archrival of convention, enemy of female 
delicacy—that allow the authors to experiment with theories on gendered behaviors and the 
political debates that accompanied them in the 1790s.  
Those who have analyzed Belinda from a feminist point of view have been divided about 
the author’s degree of complicity with or resistance to patriarchal structures. Julia Douthwaite, 
Elizabeth Kowaleski-Wallace, and Kathryn Kirkpatrick, for example, have called Edgeworth's 
attempts to assert women's capacity for reason and self-regulation within the domestic 
framework as inherently conservative, whereas Claudia Johnson has characterized her as a mild 
reformer unwilling to confront patriarchal hegemony head-on. Harriet Freke—the novel’s 
raunchy advocate of women’s rights and porte-parole of French revolutionary ideas—is clearly 
at the heart of this debate about Edgeworth’s gender politics. Is she or is she not a parody of 
Mary Wollstonecraft? Scholars have almost unanimously answered in the affirmative, excepting 
Deborah Weiss, who reads the character as a deconstruction of the British nation’s fear of 
persons like Wollstonecraft, who threaten the status quo with their unorthodox theories and 
lifestyle. While I side with Weiss on her reading of Freke, I diverge from her and from other 
scholars in my interpretation of the character’s significance within Edgeworth’s larger project. 
Weiss identifies this anti-heroine as part of “an attempted reform of the prevailing understanding 
of differences between men and women” (449). In my analysis, however, she forms a part of 
Edgeworth’s wider goal to decontaminate French revolutionary ideologies from their threatening 
properties. 
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Indeed, in my reading it is Edgeworth’s Revolutionary Heroine Belinda, not Freke—the 
self-proclaimed “champion for the Rights of Women” (229)—who lives according the 
revolutionary individualist doctrines that liberal feminists like Wollstonecraft lauded, such as 
self-sufficiency, self-education, and self-control, without, however, falling into the “plot of 
revolution” or the “anarchic private sensibility” (Bannet 13) to which conservative feminists 
claimed that Enlightenment doctrines would lead. Indeed, upon a careful reading of 
Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Woman, it becomes obvious just how little Freke 
embodies the feminist author’s principles. For example, though Wollstonecraft lacked formal 
education, she read constantly in an attempt to bridge the lacunae in her understanding and was a 
great advocate of the importance of autodidactism through study. Freke, on the other hand, 
disdains reading, and has abandoned it in order to think “independently.” “Books only spoil the 
originality of genius,” she insists. “Very well for those who can’t think for themselves—but 
when one has made up one’s opinions, there is no use in reading” (227). What’s more, despite 
her claims to philosophy, and even Lady Delacour’s belief in her “masculine” understanding, 
Freke exhibits a far more stereotypically feminine mind than Belinda, whom she tries to free 
from the prison of feminine delicacy. Despite her manly clothing and pursuits, Freke’s ability to 
reason is, “in period terms,” as Deborah Weiss has observed, “entirely ‘feminine.’ She is 
illogical and irrational, capricious and emotional, vain and vainglorious (448). Freke’s attempts 
to contaminate Belinda with any of her seditious, allegedly Wollstonecraftian beliefs fails for 
this very reason, that is, her inability to follow through with rational argumentation. 
Indeed, when she at last has an opportunity to display her allegedly masculine 
understanding in an intellectual spar with Belinda and Mr. Percival, she proves to be lacking the 
necessary coherence of thought to carry an argument through to a convincing quod erat 
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demonstrandum. When Belinda attempts to engage her, challenging her assessment that “books 
are full of nonsense” (228) with the inquiry as to whether or not conversation, too, is not 
sometimes full of nonsense,  Freke evades the question by feigning interest, precisely, in 
Belinda’s reading. She then determines to draw Mr. Percival into an argument to display her 
genius, but fails at every turn. When she calls “all our politeness hypocrisy,” Percival answers 
that only she can know whether it’s true, because, naturally, only the person practicing politeness 
can know the degree of sincerity of his or her gestures. Rather than try to justify her view, 
however, she simply moves on to a larger, bolder statement: “all virtue is hypocrisy” (229). 
Mutually exclusive terms, Percival counters. After her next coup de pointe, “shame is always the 
cause of the vices of women” (229), Percival tries to qualify his answer, but she denies him the 
right by exclaiming incoherently “plump assertion or plump denial for me” (229). Her insistence 
on a binary view of morality only further distances her both from Wollstonecraft and from 
Edgeworth’s own complex ideas on the value of such practices as female delicacy, which 
Percival attempts to complicate for Freke, but is once again cut off: “I hate slavery! Vive la 
liberté! I’m a champion for the Rights of Women” (229), she cries in response. We could note 
here that though Freke is clearly alluding to Wollstonecraft’s treatise, Edgeworth has misspelled 
the title (Rights of “Women” for Rights of “Woman”) as a way of signifying that Harriet hasn’t 
even read the bible she supposedly quotes from.  That is, even for an alleged disciple, 
Wollstonecraft has been so thoroughly lampooned that corrupted phrases from her work are now 
simply raccourcis for inappropriate female pretensions. “A jumble of undigested phrases” as 
Kathryn Kirkpatrick has called her discourse, Freke—like the knee-jerk anti-Jacobin fear of of 
what would arise were women able to stray from their proper sphere—merely provokes with 
terrorizing assertions rather than engaging in any real debate.  
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Though her enthusiastic talk of the rights of women seems to justify scholars who have 
read her as a parody of Wollstonecraft, Freke’s objection to female delicacy is based on her 
understanding of it as hypocrisy (a fact she fails to prove, though Belinda and Percival challenge 
her several times to do so), which is, however, not the reason why Wollstonecraft condemns it in 
her Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Rather than a source of hypocrisy, female delicacy 
poses an obstacle to those who would develop any positive virtues: “If women,” she writes, “are 
in general feeble both in body and mind, it arises less from nature than from education. We 
encourage a vicious indolence and inactivity, which we falsely call delicacy; instead of 
hardening their minds by the severer principles of reason and philosophy, we breed them to 
useless arts, which terminate in vanity and sensuality (108). Fostering negative traits and 
rendering positive virtue impossible, delicacy is little more than a weakness that has become 
inevitable (and that appears “natural”) because “women are not allowed to have sufficient 
strength of mind to acquire what really deserves the name of virtue” (84). Moreover, because it is 
based in physical, mental, and moral weakness, Wollstonecraft argues, delicacy causes them to 
believe that they are unworthy or incapable of achieving intellectual independence, a state to 
which Freke believes she has ascended with her ability to “[haul] good people’s opinions out of 
their musty drawers and [see] how they look when they’re all pulled to pieces before their faces” 
(231), but which her philosophical misapprehensions prove otherwise; Belinda, who reads that 
she “may think” for herself (227), offers a stark contrast with this ill-informed, somewhat 
illiterate embodiment of gender terrorism. 
While Harriet Freke spouts revolutionary doctrines, Belinda and Percival have made it 
clear that she is not their representative. Indeed, it is primarily Freke who, of all the women in 
the text, is the most lacking in Wollstonecraft’s positive virtues; she may have shunned the 
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negative ones—the docility, meekness, servitude, and delicacy that radical feminists 
condemned—but without adopting a shred of character that would allow her to transform into 
one of the rational beings that the Vindication advocates that women become, that is, “prudent 
mothers and useful members of society” (24). Indeed, her transvestism only further distances her 
from any notion of virtue, masculine or feminine: rather than a conduit for behaviors that, while 
unbecoming to a lady at the time, were nonetheless honorable and decent for a man, Freke’s 
disguises merely allow her to imitate varieties of masculine debauchery, such as playing “the 
character of the young rake with such spirit and truth, that I am sure no common conjurer could 
have discovered anything feminine about her” (47). Harriet Freke, then, veers dramatically from 
the portrait that Wollstonecraft draws of a self-actualized woman who has reclaimed her rights, 
and is the antithesis of where the writer’s ideas were meant to lead; the ephemeral menace of the 
Rights of Woman (themselves an organic culmination of the Rights of Man that had been 
brewing since early in the century and that found their ultimate expression in the onset of the 
French Revolution) thus evaporates when the reader understands that it is the laudable heroine 
who embodies them, rather than the antagonist. Freke, then, proves to be a chimera that even 
Wollstonecraft condemned, a portrait of divisive, anti-Jacobin hysteria itself: “From every 
quarter have I heard exclamations against masculine women, but where are they to be found? If 
by this appellation men mean to inveigh against their ardour in hunting, shooting, and gaming, I 
shall most cordially join in the cry,” she professes, implicitly condemning characters such as 
Freke. She then continues by explaining her understanding of manly virtues which, the reader 
cannot deny, could stand in as an admirable description of Edgeworth’s Revolutionary Heroine:  
 
[B]ut if it be against the imitation of manly virtues, or, more properly speaking, 
the attainment of those talents and virtues, the exercise of which ennobles the 
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human character, and which raises females in the scale of animal being, when 
they are comprehensively termed mankind, all those who view them with a 
philosophic eye must, I should think, wish with me, that they may every day grow 
more and more masculine. (72) 
 
In contrast, Belinda takes a reasonable approach to love in refusing to sacrifice herself to 
feminine weakness in order to impress a man or to martyr herself to the magnetic pull of 
society’s base amusements. This Revolutionary Heroine, through her own 
experimentation and under the tutelage of Lady Percival, “as a most uncommon 
example” of “the calm, philosophic temper” (Edgeworth 425), consistently proves her 
devotion to the sensible, rational, intelligent femininity that Wollstonecraft envisions.  
In order to challenge further the concept of masculine understanding (defined as the 
ability to reason and the Lockean capacity to become more virtuous through enlarging one’s 
mind) Edgeworth follows Wollstonecraft’s lead in purposefully divorcing gendered behaviors 
(both physical and intellectual) from their usual hosts, and then allowing Belinda to play a role in 
reassigning them in configurations that defuse the fear of transnational and transgender 
contamination. Scholars have contended that within Belinda’s pages exists a serious critique of 
essentialized gender that aims to disconnect female-coded behaviors and habits from feminine 
“nature.” Katherine Montwieler, for example, has argued that events of the novel debunk a 
variety of typical turn-of-the-century assumptions about women’s “nature,” such as the belief 
that femininity itself a natural condition; the stories of the individual women in the novel, she 
asserts, prove instead that they are acting roles rather than behaving “naturally.” Deborah Weiss, 
in turn, identifies Edgeworth’s philosophical pragmatism as the underlying motor of the author’s 
“attack on her culture's debilitating gender codes[…], [in which she uses] theory to identify the 
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precise causes of social problems while at the same time employing the generic resources of the 
novel to put those theories into practice” (443). My argument, however, is that the novel 
embraces what were seen as Wollstonecraft’s  radical “French” tendencies insofar as Edgeworth 
suggests which aspects of traditional masculinity and femininity ought to be democratically 
reclassified into the feminist’s category of genderless ideals of virtue, and which ought to be 
purged, once again, always in a cadre of potential French contagion.  
Lady Delacour represents the most powerful neutralization of gendered heterodoxy: at 
the start of the novel, she appears to have the imbibed accounts of Amazonian women and 
preoccupied salonnières that floated across the Channel into Britain during the revolutionary 
decade, which painted the portrait of a nation of children abandoned by their politically and 
socially engaged mothers. From the stoic war of pride that the heiress wages against her 
acquaintances at the expense of her health, to her diseased breast that she contemplates having 
surgically removed (a sign of her own belief that it is necessary to divest herself of a certain 
natural part of her femininity to survive in the world), her perceived Amazonian qualities 
override her feminine instincts; she is accused throughout the novel of affronting accepted codes 
of womanly behavior because of her friendship with Freke and the dubious antics they 
undertake, as well as her vain attachment to worldly pleasures and universal acclaim, both of 
which distract her from her duties as a wife and mother. Indeed, Lady Delacour’s exterior, unlike 
Freke’s, exudes a gratuitous concern for beauty and the usual degree of self-obsession for a 
woman of her class and means—she is beautiful, graceful, ornately dressed, appropriately made-
up, and most often en route to or from an event of unmitigated dissipation. However, as the novel 
advances, her façade of coquettish behaviors reveals a multitude of cracks, within which the 
reader discovers a variety of masculine gestures. Without her make-up—one of her many 
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varieties of gender-specific “drapery”— “her eyes were sunk, her cheeks hollow—no trace of 
youth or beauty remained on her deathlike countenance, which formed a horrid contrast with her 
gay fantastic dress” (31). Rather than an embellishment, her make-up has become a mask, which 
must be constantly “repaired” when what is underneath it is no longer identifiably feminine. 
Furthermore, under her ostentatious costumery lies the diseased breast which, since it can neither 
be fondled nor suckled, and because it is poised to be removed altogether, becomes an 
unmatched symbol of the undesirable masculinity that has invaded her existence in conjunction 
with her seemingly Jacobinistic refusal of traditional wife- and motherhood.  
For her admirers, such as Hervey, she is a species of rare and wild fauna (rather than a 
rational domestic woman), to be ogled for its captivating beauty and mesmerizing habits, but one 
about whom Walpole would surely have said, as Mr. Edgermond did of Corinne, “que fait-on de 
cela à la maison?” (Corinne 202). Indeed, according to Mary Wollstonecraft, women like Lady 
Delacour are precisely the result of the sex being barred from the education that would develop 
their reason and encourage a rational approach to their duties and from the rights that would 
allow them to see those duties as a civic responsibility rather than a tiresome slavery. In A 
Vindications of the Rights of Woman, a plea to M. Tallyrand to extend revolutionary freedoms to 
women in the form of education and civic rights, she describes the path that ignorant members of 
her sex often take: “Seldom occupied by serious business, the pursuit of pleasure gives that 
insignificancy to [women’s] character which renders the society of the great so insipid. The 
[…]want of firmness […]forces them […] to fly from themselves to noisy pleasures, and 
artificial passions, till vanity takes place of every social affection, and the characteristics of 
humanity can scarcely be discerned” (120). However, Lady Delacour’s departure does not mark 
a successful contamination by the French Threat, but rather exposes the way in which fear of that 
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threat proved to be more socially disruptive that the hypothetical fruits of the alleged threat could 
ever be. 
Indeed, Clarence’s unwitting rapprochement between Lady Delacour’s life-threatening 
performances and women’s lack of education demonstrates that it is the absence of rational 
instruction and civic rights which threatens social stability, and not the other way around. This 
becomes abundantly clear when Hervey first meets the Percival family, the representatives of 
sensible education for women and men, to whom he first makes this animalic link between 
women, civic valorization, and society at large. During dinner with this model family, Hervey 
entertains the children with tales of exotic animals, scarcely realizing that he is speaking, in 
metaphoric code, of his friend Lady Delacour. Very much like the fish admired by Romans “for 
exhibiting a succession of beautiful colours whilst it is dying” Lady Delacour, too, with her self-
destructive and prideful pursuit of continued admiration, has allowed herself to become a kind of 
sacrificial offering, and is “suffered to die in the presence of the guests, as part of the 
entertainment.” The Roman aviaries that he describes to the children, which keep from the sight 
of the prisoner “the fields, woods, and every object which might remind them of their former 
liberty’” (100), also echo the prison that Lady Delacour has built around herself. When he strays 
into accounts of apocryphal animals, such as unicorn and, later, the “unfeeling mother” that Lady 
Delacour is taken to be in some circles, Clarence upsets the stability of the small group with 
which he is dining. Excusing himself, he explains, “my head was so full of the mammoth, that I 
blundered on without seeing what I was about before it was too late” (102). Britain’s fear, then, 
of the apocryphal masculine women has kept it from evolving in conjunction with emerging 
humanistic doctrines. Lady Delacour’s exposure to the reason, rationality, and philosophy that 
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Belinda and Percivals embody all predict her, and the nation’s, rehabilitation: “the period of 
enchantment will soon be at an end, and she will return to her natural character” (105).  
Lady Delacour’s emotional cross-dressing—infinitely more seditious, since no one can 
actually see it—leads the reader to even bolder conclusions about the worth of foreign doctrines. 
Though her dress conforms to exterior signs of femininity, she gradually unveils her ambivalent 
departures from normative gender behaviors to Belinda when the heroine is finally admitted into 
Lady Delacour’s strange somatic boudoir. By accident or design, she has gradually alienated 
herself from mainstream femininity, despite her superficial conformity. Unhappy in her 
marriage, she rapidly became the female counterpart to the absent husband who drowns his 
sorrows in drink and gambling. “I endeavored,” she explains to Belinda, “to console myself for 
my misery at home, by gayety abroad. After a series of devastating personal losses, in turn, she 
descended into a macho, pride-fueled game of chicken—a kind of emotional blinking contest 
(feigning indifference to her mother in law to avoid giving her the “satisfaction” of seeing Lady 
Delacour’s true emotions, dueling with “the odious Luttridge,” parading gaiety in public while 
suffering in sadness and remorse at home)—in which she continues to pit herself and her ability 
to mask her pain against the world and its alternating expectation of her gayness and its marked 
scorn of her refusal to submit to the natural feminine duty of acute feeling. Indeed, she reveals to 
Belinda the struggles and self-doubt that followed the stillborn birth of her first child, the early 
death of her second (after an unsuccessful attempt at breast feeding), and her eventual conclusion 
that she was unable to care for children, unable to mother; because of her inability to nurse, “[I 
was determined], à plus forte raison, not to undertake [a child’s] education” (42). While Lady 
Delacour frequently peppers her speech with French phrases such as the above; here, in the 
context of her maternal failure and refusal, the sudden linguistic switch symbolizes her desire to 
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emotionally disconnect herself from painful memories. Rather than truly feeling her failed 
maternity, she erects an alternate identity: the witty, cosmopolitan society lady, whose mask she 
wears when she wishes to conceal her own pain, and which is merely another example of her 
departure from what the world sees as natural feminine emotionality. Her use of the word 
“raison,” however, resonates with political significance. Almost fatally tainted by the blood 
spilled in its behalf during the Revolution, raison underlies Lady Delacour’s decision to pass her 
daughter’s education to someone else, namely Lady Percival, the novel’s portrait of enlightened 
wife- and motherhood and Belinda’s own mentor. In effect, the exercise of her reason has lead 
Lady Delacour to have her daughter educated in the completely opposite tradition from her own, 
that is, in the very manner that Edgeworth’s own pedagogical writings espoused. That she, once 
reformed through Belinda’s encouragement and influence, takes over Helena’s enlightened 
education herself proves that raison in fact never led her astray at all, and that it is, instead, the 
necessary counterpart to emotion, as de Staël’s heroines also argued. 
As the only male character in the novel to don the apparel of the opposite sex, Clarence 
Hervey, in turn, also proves to the reader that the fear of revolutionary doctrines tainting native 
gender codes is unfounded. He proves, above all, that a real man will always be a man, and that 
with a lesson in levelheaded reflection on his place in society, he can be a better man than any 
would have expected. His foray into transvestism takes place in Lady Delacour’s salon, when he 
bets her fifty guineas that, with his deft managing of a hoop skirt, he can fool the blind and aged 
Lady Boucher into believing that he is a woman. Edgeworth implicitly links this fear of confused 
gender traits to Gallic influence by giving her hero in drag the persona of a French emigrée by 
the name of the Countess de Pomenars: both a representation of foreign influence parading as 
domestic ingenuity and of bourgeois arrival passing for aristocratic birthright, the Countess 
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materializes at the narrative intersection of Britain’s greatest social and economic fears in the 
revolutionary decade. In the same manner that Belinda’s disarming of Harriet Freke’s 
“dangerous” discourse proved her ideas and acts to be harmless, Edgeworth will also 
deconstruct, with the blatant nonsuccess of Hervey’s female impersonation, the alleged 
effeminate threat to masculinity that French ideas pose. While at first Hervey appears to be have 
mastered both male and female gestures, effortlessly fooling the old dowager by managing his 
hoop “with such skill and dexterity, that he well deserved the praise of being a universal genius” 
(75), Lady Delacour quickly undermines his fragile virtuosity in feminine prowess. Taking a 
comb from Belinda’s hair and allowing her incomparable locks to tumble freely down her 
shoulders, Lady Delacour seeks purposefully to unhinge Hervey’s masculine desire, thus 
exposing the degree of sway that his innate biology has over his “civilized” mind. It works, 
rendering him speechless when faced with this erotic totem of femininity:  “the Countess de 
Pomenars was so much struck at the sight, that she was incapable of paying the necessary 
compliments.” When Lady Delacour then artfully drops the comb, Hervey’s disguise is wholly 
undone; he bends chivalrously and unthinkingly to pick it up, “totally forgetting his hoop and his 
character” (76), knocking over the music stand in the process and thus declaring his sex. 
Hervey’s inability to pass for a (French) woman, despite his “universal genius” and natural talent 
for mimicry blatantly lampoons the fear that French effeminacy could be capable of poisoning 
the British upper class. Indeed, it shows that the effeminacy is neither specifically French, nor 
does it necessarily oppose what Edgeworth sees as the biological momentum of sex. A certain 
masculine physicality, Hervey’s hoop skirt episode confirms, will always betray his gender truth.  
What’s more, the scene also allows Edgeworth to comment upon the accoutrements of 
femininity that, while they are seen as necessary hallmarks of the sex, in fact play no role in 
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determining its attributes. No matter how forcefully women are encouraged to cling to them, in 
order to protect themselves from the threat of masculine femininity that revolutionary ideals 
seem to suggest, they simply cannot replace biology. Upon winning the bet, Lady Delacour 
immediately begins chaffing Hervey for his inevitable failure by quoting Pope’s Rape of the 
Lock, insisting that his performance deserves a lock of Belinda’s fine hair. Her plan is 
forestalled, however, for lack of a “glittering forfex” with which to cut a lock, “as fine ladies do 
not now, as in former times, carry any such useless implements about them” (76). The irony, of 
course, is that the hoop is the new useless implement that women must carry.
16
 And yet, while it 
belongs exclusively to women and apparently cannot be successfully appropriated by men, it has 
no inherent link, Edgeworth argues with her joke, to what truly makes a woman, since Clarence 
is only able to perfectly mimic a woman’s management of it until the Revolutionary Heroine’s 
innate desirability causes him to betray himself. Over the course of the novel, the author suggests 
that a rational pursuit of complimentary duties ought to win out in the definition of gender, ahead 
of the useless implements that the world has required woman to carry and that it has used to 
denote her gender in public and private. 
The reader discovers, however, that beyond his sole cross-dressing escapade, Clarence is 
hardly a model of enlightened manhood—by ancient or modern standards—and must, like both 
Lord and Lady Delacour, like Léonce and Oswald in de Staël’s texts, undergo a kind of 
transformation at the hands of the Revolutionary heroine, wherein he discovers which of his 
society’s masculine behaviors and attitudes are being rendered obsolete as his nation evolves in 
                                                 
16
 Historians of fashion do not agree on precisely when the hoop skirt traveled from France, where it was a fixture in 
the court of Louis XIV, to England; however, most accounts place it around 1718, a few years after the French 
monarch’s 1715 death. W. B. Lord has found evidence of its appearance as early as 1713 in a letter to The Guardian, 
in which the author, a certain Tom Pain, condemned the hoop for “hurting men’s knees” and being the cause of 
“many other disasters” (qtd in Lord 110). Pope’s poem was written in 1712 and was based on an incident that took 
place in 1711.  It is therefore safe to assume that Belinda did not, in fact, wear a hoop, and that Edgeworth is 
satirizing the changing feminine accoutrements that continue to be so closely associated with a woman’s gender. 
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conjunction with humanistic doctrines emerging across the Channel. The difference from the 
heroes in chapter two, however, is that this time the Revolutionary Heroine’s corrections will 
stick. Prone to boasting and contests of strength, Hervey and his entourage personify the idling 
upper classes that focus their efforts on self-amusement and self-puffery instead of purpose and 
utility. Betting his friends on who is the better inebriated walker, racing turkeys against pigs to 
incense some local farmers, or trying to prove that simply reading a treatise on swimming is 
sufficient to have mastered the skill, Hervey is “perpetually taking the lead in those trifles which 
were beneath his ambition, and exactly suited to engage the attention of his associates” (91). He 
begins to reevaluate his own understanding of men’s roles in society in conjunction with his 
exposure to Belinda, an uncommon woman who “judges and acts for herself” (111), and who 
does so with great approval from both the men and women around her, as well as to that of the 
Percivals, whose “expression of happiness” he finds so contagious. Together they introduce him 
to a mediated version of masculinity that hinges on the necessity of channeling desire and talent 
into personally and publicly useful enterprises.  
The supposedly incendiary “French” teachings of Wollstonecraft, once incorporated by 
Edgeworth, allows the author to employ this same discourse of public utility in order to usher 
Lady Delacour into a life of useful domestic prosperity. Dr. X wonders why Clarence would 
“choose to be nothing—should waste upon petty objects powers suited to the greatest,” content 
to be “the evanescent amusement of a drawing-room?” (116). Shortly after, Lady Delacour to 
begins to lament her own wastefulness when she realizes the degree to which her pursuit of 
“petty objects” has kept her from joy, honor, and success in her realm. However, the “contest[s] 
of frivolous superiority” in which the two engage, and which keep them from “honorable pre-
eminence” (116) among the first of their sexes in Britain, are a result of the gendered power 
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cycles which they both perpetuate—the same that Enlightenment doctrines sought to eradicate, 
but which Britain, so perpetually, so hysterically anti-Gallic, refuses to heed. It is Lady 
Delacour’s aunt who first diagnoses the problem:  “If there were no Clarence Herveys,” she 
asserts, “there would be no Lady Delacours” (101), and vice versa, surely. Expectations of class 
and gender, as they currently stand, breed a certain kind of man, one who flocks to a certain kind 
of woman, whose power and interest are fed by the man’s attention, and who, in turn, becomes a 
force to create more of such men who are drawn in by her power and influence. These men gain 
their entry into her world through flattery, and thus continue to advertise space for such women 
to come into being whenever they complement a pretty young girl.  
In identifying this baneful cycle of mutually destructive frivolity, Edgeworth has once 
again opened the debate of the French Revolution and its willful razing of social hierarchy that 
was so threatening to British political and social tradition. By setting up discourses, however, 
through the novel’s morally and philosophically superior characters,  the author demonstrates 
that it is possible to find inspiration in another nation’s rebellions determinations , because, at 
their root, they have humanistic impulses with the potential to improve many lives and, 
therefore, to strengthen any nation. Much like the Prince Castel-Forte’s estimation in Corinne 
that intellectual congress with other nations can only operate to their mutual benefit, because 
they “conserveraient ce qui les distingue, et découvriraient ainsi quelquefois ce qui peut leur 
manquer” (C 177), Edgeworth consistently points to the value of revolutionary ideas and 
philosophies that have been rejected out of knee-jerk xenophobia. Indeed, she exposes Clarence 
Hervey to Lady Delacour’s “Amazonian” dissipation, to Phillip Baddley’s macho chest-
thumping exercises, to Belinda’s burgeoning rational sensibility, and to the Percivals’ 
enlightened domesticity. However it is ultimately the Revolutionary Heroine’s consistent 
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correction that leads the hero to develop into a hybridized representative of Edgeworth’s socio-
political credo: Britain is and will remain a hierarchical society that culls its leaders from the 
upper classes. The credo comes with a clause, however--the nation still ought be the object of 
Enlightenment social and moral reform. In other words, Hervey’s story proves that, rather than 
overturning the hierarchy, it is more important to ensure that the social order’s leaders actually 
deserve the homage that their class automatically affords them, hence the bold and extensive 
reformation of Hervey and Lady Delacour via scenes, language, and images that make explicit 
reference to France, such as the mystery of her secret boudoir, the Frenchified womb where her 
gender transformations gestate, and his failed experiments in French theories of natural 
education. 
Belinda, in turn, has learned by the end of the novel to complement her agreeably 
feminine exterior with a virago-like spirit in the form of Wollstonecraft’s “manly virtues,” which 
both men and women, Wollstonecraft and Edgeworth agree, should strive to cultivate, despite 
anti-Jacobin fears of gender anarchy. This virtuous female spirit advertises the rational 
humanism that the feminist author espoused, at the same time that it proves not only the 
harmlessness but the undeniable advantage of the female philosopher figure that anti-Jacobin 
texts lampooned. Thanks to her reliance on rationality, Belinda has become the perfect blend of 
the most admirable masculine and feminine gendered behaviors, and yet she remains faithful to 
codes of feminine propriety. Her eventual dissolution of her engagement to Mr. Vincent, an act 
that apparently was perceived by readers as somewhat scandalous, is recuperated by the joint 
exercise of reason and sensibility that lies behind the decision, and which the novels of 
Revolutionary Heroinism in this study valorize. Convinced, upon reflection, that the general 
prejudice which pressures women into marrying their first loves—for which the only criteria is 
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“fancy,” since “men have it in their power to assume the appearance of everything that is 
amiable and estimable, and women have scarcely any opportunities of defecting the counterfeit” 
(240)—does “not add to the happiness of society (255), Belinda’s refusal of Vincent becomes an 
act of heroic rationality rather than fickleness, coquetry, or inconstancy.  
The conclusion that we must draw from all of these characters’ experiments in cross-
gendered behavior is that, while the weight of biology will override ambient discursive threats to 
it, the combination of biology and social inertia has not always produced the most laudable forms 
of masculinity or femininity. Indeed, Edgeworth places a new emphasis on cultivating usefulness 
in both sexes and the role that reason and rationality play in accomplishing that goal, as they 
allow an individual to preserve what is most desirable in his heritage while adopting from 
foreign sources—particularly from French doctrines of equality—what is lacking therein. That 
she advocates this same creed to men and women—to be lived to the fullest in their separate but 
conjoined spheres—is her ultimate homage to Mary Wollstonecraft’s vision. 
 
Undressing and re-dressing 
Clothing—whether it is transgendered, giving way (such as Harriet Freke’s upcoming 
unreliable fastenings), or being purposefully adjusted—plays an important role in revolutionary 
gender politics in the novel. However, Edgeworth also uses her cross dressers and their 
explorations of habiliment as a point of entry into a much deeper debate on the function of 
tradition and hierarchy in the evolving British state, in an attempt to signal the benignity of 
foreign influence and the malignancy of hysterical insularism. She borrows her vestimentary 
analogy from Edmund Burke who, in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, was the first to 
refer to social institutions and national beliefs, customs, and prejudices as a necessary drapery to 
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civil society, that is, the social hierarchy and its accompanying attitudes toward so-called natural 
imbalances of power. Regarding the threat of French revolutionary principles fundamentally 
altering his nation’s culture, he wrote  
But now all is to be changed. All the pleasing illusions which made power gentle 
and obedience liberal […] are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire of 
light and reason. All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off. All the 
superadded ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which 
[…] the understanding ratifies as necessary to cover the defects of our naked, 
shivering nature […], are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated 
fashion. (87) 
European manners resulting from the effects of chivalry have grown in conjunction with the 
history of European superiority, Burke argues. While he recognizes that they are illusory, he 
argues for their maintenance because such drapery “ennobled whatever it touched, and under [it,] 
vice itself lost half its evil by losing all its grossness” (87). In other words, it masks human 
carnality, which threatens civil stability if able to flourish unrestrained. Mary Wollstonecraft, in 
turn, piquantly responds to Burke in her Vindication on the Rights of Man, in which she argues 
that the drapery to which he refers above is not only a mirage, but serves primarily to conceal 
systemic abuse and inequality; it is little more, she insists, than “sentimental emotionality as the 
language of the powerful about the powerless” (xxvii). She likens his principles to a gorgeous 
garment whose finery distracts the onlooker from the hideous truth that it “enwraps,” very much 
like the gay dress that disguises Lady Delacour’s wounded breast and the heavy make-up and 
feigned delight that obscure her internal torment in Belinda. Edgeworth, joining Austen and 
Charlotte Smith as one of the many authors to address the debate between custom and novelty in 
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the revolutionary period, ultimately stakes out a middle ground between the conservative 
preservation of tradition at all costs and the liberal abandonment of it. Rather than tearing the 
beloved illusion away and leaving her fellow characters naked and full of defects, the 
Revolutionary Heroine gradually denudes them of a drapery that is self-destructive and socially 
harmful, and subsequently reclothes them in robes of rationality and reason trimmed with 
tradition. As she re-dresses the players in her tale, she also redresses the various wrongs that they 
have perpetrated and sets them on the path to a very real rehabilitation.  
Neutralizing and redressing the wrongs of Harriet Freke’s fraudulent actions requires 
stripping her—quite literally—to the bone, in order to expose the fallacy of her allegedly 
revolutionary reasoning. At the close of her argument with Belinda and Mr. Percival, wherein 
she proposes “tearing away what has been called the decent drapery of life,” she stands and 
stretches herself so violently “that some part of her habiliments gave way” (230). Indeed, the 
character who takes such delight in “demolishing and unrigging” people’s prudent opinions is 
the only one in the novel who is ultimately publicly “unrigged.” Like other wayward characters 
in the text, it is Belinda who sets her to rights. Later, after Freke has made several failed attempts 
to interfere in Lady Delacour’s business and poison her reputation, she follows her former friend 
and Belinda to Twickenham in order to spy on her, in hopes of discovering some compromising 
information. Instead this serpent in the garden is caught in a mantrap set by the gardener—a 
thoroughly appropriate reprimand for an impersonator of “masculine understanding”—and soon 
finds herself undressed by the surgeon, who must regretfully inform her that “the beauty of her 
legs would be spoiled, and that she would never more be able to appear to advantage in man’s 
apparel” (312). Twice exposed to the reader, therefore, as a failed threat of revolutionary sedition 
and a feeble embodiment of the usurpation of masculine prerogative, Freke disappears from the 
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narrative once her lack of substance is unmasked. Only able to haunt the gullible, Freke, like the 
threat of French ideas of equality, can only exist when able to feed on irrational fear and panic. 
Both Lady Delacour’s mind and body, in turn, eventually become narrative sites where 
Edgeworth may unmask the fallacy of masculine understanding and of determinate gender codes 
in general, as well as the fear that French revolutionary dogma, by encouraging women to 
unfeminine displays of equality and by offering them political and intellectual pursuits in the 
place of domestic ones, denudes women of their maternal instincts. Following Edgeworth’s 
vestimentary metaphor, then, Lady Delacour’s rehabilitation rests upon a very real disrobing: she 
must open l’espace français —her secretive boudoir—to her husband and show him the state of 
her injured bosom. From this moment, the bond is rekindled between them and they gradually 
make peace with the ways in which they must submit to each other for their collective happiness. 
Edgeworth’s redresses continue after Belinda has convinced lady Delacour to let Dr. X examine 
her diseased breast. When she is eventually disrobed, the doctor discovers that the breast—the 
symbol of her maternal refusal and the radical defiance of domesticity that her aristocratic 
negligence suggests—is, in fact, not cancerous at all. Moreover, her treatment is internal, 
spiritual, emotional—she must be cured of her drug addiction, of the wild habits that weaken her 
constitution, and of the hysteria-inducing reading that has proved detrimental to her mental state; 
it is neither an amputation nor the razing of a foundation that she and, in the political sphere, 
opponents to the Revolution feared. Belinda’s support, encouragement, and continual insistence 
on a rational approach to all of life’s complications acts as the final push toward Lady Delacour’s 
reformation from dissipation, a lifestyle which, not unlike Mme de Vernon’s learned duplicity in 
Delphine, “she had followed from habit, and into which she had first been driven by a mixture of 
vanity and despair” (Edgeworth 322). Indeed, preceding the operation she mistakenly believed 
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that she needed, she promised Belinda: “If I survive this business, it is my firm intention to 
appear in a new character, or rather, to assert my real character. I will break through the spell of 
dissipation—[…] I will, in one word, go with you, my dear Belinda! To Mr. Percival’s!” (292), 
that is, to the bastion of rational, egalitarian domesticity that she fears because it points to all of 
her failings as a wife and mother. The physicality of the verb “appear” reinforces the analogy of 
appearance that Edgeworth’s has constructed to respond to Burke’s fear of national nakedness—
Lady Delacour, thanks to her ability to equilibrate feminine sensibility and masculine reason will 
now dress her mind and body in rationality (symbolized by the Percival household, a fountain of 
reason where Belinda has made many discoveries about her own mind), and will redress the 
wrongs done to her abandoned daughter who currently resides there.  
In short, it is underneath Harriet’s dress, not Lady Delacour’s, that Burke’s fear is 
realized: beneath the layers of historical cultural precedent the reader finds the potential 
grossness of human interactions and behaviors in the form of Freke’s stubborn ignorance, her 
malevolent spite, and the ultimate inconsequentiality of her social disruptions. That the other 
characters in the novel quickly see through her, while rooting for the preservation of Lady 
Delacour’s particular brand of irreverent vivacity, proves Edgeworth’s belief that Britain has 
survived the revolutionary decade—despite continued congress with France and its literature, 
customs, and culture—unscathed, while remaining thoroughly, uniquely British. Though Lady 
Delacour eventually gives up her public role, for example, she is still at the center of the novel, 
and still as incorrigibly kinetic as ever. “I have been won by kindness,” she insists of her 
reformation—“won, not tamed!” Still thoroughly recognizable as the vivacious wit she always 
was, despite the drastic change in her lifestyle, she remarks to the dowager Boucher, who is 
surprised by the lack of physical change in the allegedly reformed Lady Delacour: 
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And what alteration, my good lady Boucher, did you expect to see? Did you 
think, that, by way of being exemplarily virtuous […] I should […] let my 
sentences come out of my mouth only at the rate of a word a minute? […] Or did 
you expect that, in hopes of being a pattern for the rising generation, I should hold 
my features in penance? (353) 
By gradually transforming this significant character into an individual who personifies 
both autonomy and self-sacrifice, Edgeworth pacified liberal and conservative readers in 
matters of traditional gender roles and their proposed reformation. At the same time, she 
“denounced the aristocratic woman’s social intrigues as destructive to domestic 
happiness,” thus agreeing with revolutionary-minded social reformers, and “affirmed the 
independent spirit her great resources made possible” (Kirkpatrick xviii), thus defending 
the value of social hierarchy. In short, Edgeworth admits of social deformity, whether 
natural or adopted, with her characters’ various flaws, but assures her readers that it is not 
beyond correction, contrary to what representatives of either side of the debate on social 
reform would have them believe. Indeed, Belinda strikes a balance between the two 
camps when, refusing to be terrorized by Harriet Freke’s threat to kidnap her from the 
Percivals’ for her own good, she assures her assertive suitor that  “she was neither a 
prisoner, nor a distressed damsel” (226). Thus, women and men, she maintains, are 
neither as denatured and oppressed as thinkers like Wollstonecraft, Paine, and Rousseau 
would paint them, nor as docile, helpless, and impressionable as Burke and conduct book 
writers would argue.  
 
 
96 
 
Philosophy, reason, and “French” ideas 
Edgeworth begins her recovery of reason, rationality, and philosophy from their post-
revolutionary tarnish with the Revolutionary Heroine’s philosophical approach to individual, 
familial, and social transfiguration, itself based on the eighteenth-century belief that the family is 
a microcosm of greater government, or “the private origin of the public good” (Bannet). Unlike 
Burke, who relied on chivalric gender roles, rigid class structures, and inheritance laws that 
protected property holdings, Edgeworth believed that the key to a healthy and robust nation was 
a strong familial structure underlying the management and care of individual citizens, from the 
spousal relationship to the education of the children, from the administration of finances to the 
distribution of work and resources. Such management would be impossible without mother who 
was at least a bit of the female philosopher that Edgeworth has been advocating through 
Belinda’s personal transformation in the novel and of which Lady Anne Percival offers the most 
complete portrait. Indeed, the Percival family in Belinda embodies the intersection of 
enlightenment political ideals that, distilled into a set of domestic bylaws, take the form of a 
balance of parental powers and a wide educational berth for the children. The marriage between 
the Percivals reflects not only a respect for each parent’s sphere of influence and responsibility, 
but a union of interests and of intellects. Because of his wife’s vast and “accurate knowledge” 
and her “taste for literature” (216), and an ability to philosophize that equals her husband’s, Mr. 
Percival “was not obliged to reserve his conversation for friends of his own sex, nor was he 
forced to seclude himself in the pursuit of any branch of knowledge; the partner of his warmest 
affections was also the partner of his most serious occupations” (216). By setting up Lady Anne 
as a woman who has her own interests, pursuits, and passions and, therefore, as a mother who 
bequeaths such traits in the education of her children, Edgeworth echoes Mary Wollstonecraft’s 
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portrait of rational motherhood, which, in stark contrast to Rousseau’s pronouncements on 
women’s education in Emile, enjoins egalitarian marital partnerships but insists also upon a 
woman’s right to independent thought and enjoyment outside of her domestic duties.  
We initially observe this textual rapprochement when Clarence Hervey visits the Percival 
family for the first time. Both Wollstonecraft’s portrait and Edgeworth’s depiction of the 
Percival children focus on intelligence and health—children brought up to use their capacities for 
reason and judgment will be intellectually active, and those allowed to pursue their interests and 
exercise their bodies will be physically robust. Wollstonecraft writes of such children that “[t]he 
intelligent eye meets [their mother’s], whilst health and innocence smile on their chubby cheeks, 
and as they grow up the cares of life are lessened by her grateful attention” (119). Upon entering 
the Percival home for the first time the reader witnesses a strikingly similar scene: “They found 
Lady Anne Percival in the midst of her children, who all turned their healthy, rosy, intelligent 
faces towards the door the moment [they arrived]” (98). The perceivable rapport of intelligence 
that exists between mother and child is the defining element of these domestic tableaux. What’s 
more, her ability to clearly perceive or percevoir the value of her duties but also her own innate 
civic worth is embedded in her very name, Percival. 
Beth Kowaleski-Wallace has called this model—based on reason, cooperation between 
sexes, and the non-coercive exercise of authority—“new-style patriarchy.” In it, she argues, 
Edgeworth imagines “a particular domestic world which depends for its stability on the ideal 
performance of a ‘perfect mother,’ or a woman who lives exclusively for and through her 
children and who finds fulfillment in the very act of forming her children into certain kinds of 
individuals” (244). In my estimation, however, Kowaleski-Wallace’s terminology does not take 
account of Edgeworth’s insistence upon a woman’s education being just as much for her own 
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enlightenment as for her ability to raise her children as well-rounded individuals. As the 
Revolutionary Heroine, Belinda, in turn, becomes the spokesperson for this domestic New Deal 
many times in the novel, but perhaps with the most inflammatory effect when she, in her rational 
self-assuredness, inquires of Lady Delacour: “Surely your ladyship does not think, that a wife is 
a being whose actions are necessarily governed by a husband” (121).  Wollstonecraft’s own 
account seeks, in particular, to directly counter Rousseau’s education reserved for girls.17  A 
Sophie, Wollstonecraft argues, will never be reproached for being masculine, like Freke, “or 
turning out of her sphere” (117); people will call her a “good kind of woman,” but she will be 
unable to fulfill her duties in educating her children. Seeing her daughters as rivals, she will only 
be able to make copy-cat coquettes of them. The rational mother, in turn, is reasonable and well-
educated to begin with, and her children absorb these traits during their tutelage. Since few 
homes actually existed in Britain that successfully imitated such incarnations of domestic 
felicity,
18
 it is therefore of undeniable importance to recognize that Edgeworth, writing in 1801 
with almost a decade of perspective on how revolutionary ideology affected both France and 
Britain, continues to promote political and domestic patterns that run contrary to much of the 
reigning political discourse in her native land.  
Edgeworth’s rehabilitation of reason and philosophy, however, goes beyond the public’s 
wariness of French doctrines of equality to dig deeper into the long-standing distrust of 
transnational influence. Gerald Newman has argued that in the eighteenth century “to be truly 
English was to live up to a stereotype generated in anti-Frenchness” (124), the basis of which 
                                                 
17
 Edgeworth will attack this same subject directly in the Virginia St. Pierre episode discussed below, but in 
the meantime is content to shadow Wollstonecraft in her promotion of the ideal educator-mother. 
18 Eve Tavor Bannet has argued that, while the 1790s has always been seen as decade of material upheaval 
and reform, in practice little changed in homes across the country until the second or third decade of the 
nineteenth century, when the “cult of domesticity [began to] become normative […] for the middle classes” 
(Bannet 15). Many novels of the revolutionary period advocated benevolence and the pleasure of domesticity, 
but statistics from the period show abuse, neglect, unhappiness, and spousal desertion.  
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was rooted, in part, in Britain’s ambivalent relationship with French literature and its pervasive 
presence in British culture. Though translations of French romances dominated the British 
popular literary market for most of the eighteenth-century, more erudite readers complained of 
the “literary levity” of the French model. Indeed, Newman continues, “the resistance to French 
fiction in some British writings was largely based on the perceived immorality of the French 
novel, so that Frenchness was just as much a name for worldliness and urban cosmopolitanism 
as it was for national character” (124).  
One cannot, however, overestimate the importance of increased anti-French sentiment in 
the 1790s. The Revolution’s potential influence was such a polarizing social debate, in fact, that 
most novels necessarily fell on one side or the other of the dissension. Edgeworth, for her part, 
tackles the question of anti-French sentiment with Belinda’s curious blend of francophobia and 
francophilia. British citizens are drawn to the glamour or apparent superiority of foreign ideas, 
she observes, and the novel’s aristocratic characters display this interest with their almost non-
stop insertion of French words and phrases into their conversation. Repulsion for French ideas, in 
turn, also permeates the pages of the book, but, as I have argued, in each case the threat proves to 
be hollow, as Edgeworth consistently defuses the fear that cosmopolitan interest and 
philosophical penchants transform women into Amazons, emasculate men, and lead mothers 
away from their families, and as she tirelessly nullifies French-infused characters like Freke and 
Lord Delacour’s French valet Champfort.  
But Belinda is particular in its response to the threat of Gallic culture, with its allegedly 
hazardous philosophies and immoral romances, in that Edgeworth undertakes a meta-criticism of 
the French novel itself within a book that deals with anti-Frenchness. With Hervey’s Virginia St. 
Pierre experiment Edgeworth constructs a realm where French ideas—in particular, the literary 
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intersection of ideals of philosophy and pedagogy—can be played out in a British space, with a 
British subject, in an attempt to see what kind of hybrid result will be born from the cross-
breeding of cultural knowledge, and to determine, indeed, if the ideas are as pernicious as some 
have made them seem. As this experiment unfolds, Edgeworth is able to comment implicitly on 
the perceived licentiousness of not only the French novel, but of the influence of French ideas in 
general. 
The origin of Hervey’s Virginia St. Pierre experiment lies in tangled reactions to French 
culture itself: the monstrous women that he meets in pre-revolutionary Paris, “full of vanity, 
affectation, and artifice, whose tastes were perverted, and whose feelings were depraved,” 
coupled with his subsequent admiration for a partner like Rousseau’s docile, innocent Sophie, 
cause him to conceive “the romantic project of educating a wife for himself” (362). Indeed, his 
confidence—or rather his masculine hubris—in the almost alchemistic potential for transforming 
raw female material into something of value fools him into thinking that he might, like some 
kind of deity, pluck an ignorant and impecunious woman from her humble surroundings and 
insert her in a luxurious pedagogical sphere of his own fantasy, in order to beget his ideal 
companion. To undertake this project is to make a direct graft of revolutionary scions onto 
British seedlings: his subject is meant to be a child of nature such as St. Pierre envisioned his 
Virginia, a being Hervey will in turn educate as Rousseau did Sophie. Having found an innocent 
creature—not merely one ignorant of history, arithmetic, or science, but, more importantly, one 
entirely unaware of the power of her sex—he seizes on the opportunity to conduct his own 
educational experiment. Free of knowledge that as Rousseau saw as breeding vanity and 
duplicity outside of the domestic sphere,
19
 this young woman is poised to become Sophie, the 
                                                 
19
 This belief is woven throughout Rousseau’s oeuvre, but we see a few particularly piquant examples of it in Emile, 
including one in which he tells the story of a little girl who abandoned the useful task of learning to write upon 
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ideal companion to Rousseau’s own revolutionary offspring, Emile. When Hervey finds Rachel 
at her grandmother’s cottage—a tidy, cultivated homestead amidst “the wildness of the 
surrounding scene” (363)—he discovers what he thinks is a blank canvas in the form of a 
woman, one who might be brought up entirely according to Rousseau’s pedagogical plan, one 
who had already been formed by St. Pierre’s vision of nature as first teacher. He comes upon her 
in that “terrestrial paradise” like a hubristic Adam discovering his Eve—he even seizes the 
prerogative of naming her—when she has scarcely ever seen a man, let alone been exposed to 
narratives of romance and love. She is, consequently, thoroughly unaware of the effect that her 
beauty might produce. When her grandmother dies, Hervey whisks her away to Windsor, where 
he sets her up in relative luxury with an older woman as her caretaker, guardian and educator, 
but where she is, otherwise, “secluded from all intercourse with the world” (370). Like Sophie’s 
instruction, Rachel’s education on this strange island is simple, almost non-existent. Indeed, 
Hervey’s plan seems to consist of merely sheltering her from the outside world and its 
knowledge, thus ensuring that she never develops a capacity for rationality.  When she expresses 
a desire to read, he sees little harm in allowing her to practice by reading romances, as they 
exude “a spirit favorable to female virtue, exal[t] the respect for chastity, and inspire[e] 
enthusiastic admiration of honour, generosity, truth, and all the noble qualities which dignify 
human nature” (380), the very attributes that, through her rebuttal to Burke, Edgeworth has 
proven to be insufficient for women’s (and society’s) happiness and productivity.  
Indeed, Hervey quickly discovers that Rousseau’s pedagogical plan, one which relies on 
the cultivation of “negative virtues,” as Wollstonecraft calls them, and which consists of 
                                                                                                                                                             
catching “a glimpse of herself in the mirror […] and thinking that the cramped attitude was not pretty,” after which 
she abandons any further writing. Her awareness of her ability to please has created a vanity that prevents her from 
being able to undertake useful work, and Rousseau purposefully makes a distinction between her brother’s response 
to the same activity in order to underscore this result as a specifically feminine problem: he “was no fonder of 
writing, but what he disliked was the constraint, not the look of the thing” (268). 
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withholding information while giving only a bare minimum of practical knowledge bolstered by 
a long list of don’ts, is an educational approach that leads to bewilderment and dependence rather 
than any kind of noble innocence. For example, while at first Hervey is moved by Virginia’s 
indifference to riches, he soon discovers that her upbringing has not made her free of avarice, 
just ignorant of economy. Having no context for the value of the diamonds he shows her, she 
finds them as useless to her “as guineas were to Robinson Crusoe, on his desert island” (372). In 
fact, the more he stunts her education, the more she appears to resemble the women he claims to 
disdain, for even Lady Delacour, unique and heterodoxical as she is to mainstream femininity, 
has been accused of being ignorant of economy, a verity that allowed her husband to steal her 
fortune out from under her.  
This point of comparison between women of vastly different means serves to support 
Edgeworth’s thesis that what most makes a woman a woman in Britain is her lack of relevant 
education. “I should be glad that my wife were ignorant of what every body knows,” Hervey says 
when first impressed with Virginia’s lack of understanding. “Nothing is so tiresome to a man of 
any taste or abilities, as what every body knows. I am rather desirous to have a wife who has an 
uncommon, than a common understanding” (373). In the end, however, Virginia proves to be 
ignorant of what both men and women know—that is, of both what everyone knows and what no 
one knows. A curious foil to women like Belinda and Lady Delacour, who adopt behaviors 
(positive and negative) associated with both genders, Virginia seems destined to adopt neither: 
she is too innocent to coquet, too ignorant to reason. This realization opens Hervey’s own mind 
to what he believes a woman is and ought to be, and to what he most desires in the woman that 
he will eventually marry: “In conversing with Lady Delacour, his faculties were always called 
into full play; in talking to Virginia, his understanding was passive; he perceived that a large 
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proportion of his intellectual powers and of his knowledge was absolutely useless to him in her 
company, and this did not raise her either in his love or esteem.”  
When contrasted with the Revolutionary Heroine, Virginia seems insipid and childlike, a 
creature who could never be more than “his pupil, or his plaything” (379)—indeed, the very 
words that Wollstonecraft uses to describe the state in which the typical woman finds herself 
after her “education.” In Book V of Emile, Rousseau lays out his complete plan for female 
education, in which women are to be formed “to please [men], to be useful to them, […]and to 
make life agreeable and sweet to them” (263), are taught to “conquer all their whims, in order to 
subject them to the wills of others” (268), and, “as they are not in a condition to judge for 
themselves,” to defer judgment to “fathers and husbands” (276). All of her reflections, he writes, 
“ought to be directed to the study of men and to that pleasure-giving knowledge,” since works of 
genius are “out of their reach” (281). Mary Wollstonecraft, however, targets such objects of 
education as worthy of “a seraglio” (95), not of a marriage between two rational, consenting 
adults. However, Hervey’s approach has all but guaranteed that Virginia will become just such a 
woman, which explains why she is willing to “defer” her happiness to Hervey rather than tell 
him about the object of her romantic hallucinations, that is, about the man she once saw a portrait 
of, whose face she has inserted onto the bodies of the heroes in her novel reading. When he 
presses her to explain her confusion, the lack of education that would have developed her ability 
to reason, which would in turn allow her both to understand her emotions and order her 
discourse, leaves her, quite literally, speechless: “’I think, sincerity is not always, in our sex, 
consistent with—I mean—I don’t know what I mean—what I say—or what I ought to say;’ cried 
Virginia, and she sunk down on the sofa in extreme confusion” (400). Hervey finally concludes 
that “the virtues of Virginia sprang from sentiment; those of Belinda, from reason” (379). Reason 
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and philosophy, Edgeworth has shown, do not make for masculine women, nor absent, 
disobedient wives, but for the enlightened man’s ideal companion. 
Indeed, the very idea of “natural education” proves to be an oxymoron, and Hervey’s 
cosmopolitan project once again unmasks the fear of French ideas as a source of resistance to 
national evolution rather than a threat to national hegemony. For a time, Virginia’s romantic and 
sexual awakening threatens to unravel the novel’s apparent ideological project: Clarence, 
increasingly in love with Belinda, can see no honorable way to disengage himself from her. 
However, such a marriage, Edgeworth and her readers know, would be a failure on many 
levels—Hervey could never be happy with a wife so unprepared to live in the society that he 
frequents, and little good would come from so thoroughly upsetting the obligations that he has to 
his class. Although the text is incredibly democratic, and Edgeworth clearly advocates a certain 
reordering of the social hierarchy when she writes, for example, of interracial marriage between 
acquaintances of the Percivals, she pointedly does not advocate disrupting hierarchy in a 
situation where no possible common good can come from it.  
And this is her exact application of French Revolutionary ideals in the novel: she 
encourages British citizens to be open to embracing foreign ideas and applying them, with the 
clause that, like Belinda’s and Percival’s determination of female delicacy, they “must be judged 
by the test of utility” (255). For Hervey to marry an uneducated, impoverished woman whom he 
stumbled upon in the woods (and whom the rest of the world believes has been his mistress for 
some time) would surely jeopardize the realization of his future ambitions as much as it would 
his happiness. At the same time, however, Hervey has come to understand, through his 
experiments with Virginia, that while the prerogative of his birth has always whispered to him 
that he should be master—of people and of things—his moral research and self-reflection unveil 
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a greater desire: he no longer wishes for a wife who will offer innocence (which he now 
understands is merely a synonym for ignorance) and reverence for and obedience to his 
masculine authority, but one that will offer true intellectual companionship. Indeed, Edgeworth 
seems to be making a winking reference to Rousseau’s own unhappy partnership with Thérèse 
Le Vasseur, a barely literate seamstress, a union of such vastly different intellects, that while 
romantically libertarian in theory, led to the abandonment of five children to the state.  
That Lady Delacour ends up discovering Virginia’s mystery man, who, having spied on 
her day after day in the forest without knowing that she possessed his portrait, and that Hervey is 
ultimately able to arrange her marriage to him and his own to Belinda, is further proof that 
Edgeworth simply does not believe in the threat of foreign ideas tainting British culture and life: 
Hervey’s experiment merely succeeded in proving the lunacy, by British standards, both of 
educating a woman in total isolation and of marriage so far below one’s own intellectual and 
educational echelon. Moreover, by creating subtle links between Virginia and other British 
women, Edgeworth is able to point out the fact that the native system for educating women and 
arranging marriages is already predicated on a certain irredeemable madness, and that there is 
more to be learned than feared from ideas filtering in from extra muros.  
Finally, by inserting the novel Paul and Virginia—one that contains the pedagogical 
model for creating and maintaining innocence—into a work dealing with the fear of contagious 
French immorality, Edgeworth offers an ironic commentary on the fear of foreign ideas: in the 
same way that a system of education meant to keep a woman illiterate (in literal or figurative 
terms) will not stop her from falling in love and forming romantic fantasies, a system of 
government meant to keep a nation ignorant of foreign ideas will not prevent its citizens from 
developing their own weak determinations. 
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Conclusion 
By the novel’s close, Edgeworth has succeeded in proving to her readers that the fear of 
foreign ideas—particularly doctrines that have emerged from French revolutionary politics—are 
based on little more than “superstitious terror” (222). Like Vincent’s manservant Juba who falls 
ill when, night after night, he witnesses a frightening, glowing figure in his room, the public need 
only be shown that the threat that they have imagined consists merely of images drawn in 
figurative phosphorous. “Familiarized by degrees with the object of [its] secret horror” (222), the 
British nation, too, will swiftly recover its sense of self, discovering in the process that the 
menacing specter of the powerful woman—Juba’s Obeah-woman who, he believes, exercises 
sorcery over him—vanishes in the light of reason. In the place of her nation’s fear of powerful, 
masculine women, through Belinda, her Revolutionary Heroine, Edgeworth proposes a 
Wollstoncraftian revision of female manners that encourages women to exercise their minds in 
choosing which strictures of femininity have genuine import for their success and happiness in 
the world; without the test of utility, “we should run into romance, and error, and misery, if we 
did not constantly refer to this standard” (255), Belinda learns. Edgeworth joins with this new 
criterion of judgment in matters of feminine behavior an unrepentant critique of the ways in 
which the nation has adopted a circular means of reinforcing feminine helplessness and 
excessive sensibility. Novels, she argues, promote the image of such women who make for 
interesting heroines, but, Percival wonders, “would any man of sense or feeling choose to be 
troubled with such a wife?” (256). At the same time that men and women absorb such models 
from their reading, they act them out, and therefore continue to cause them to be transcribed and 
refined in fiction writing.  
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Edgeworth’s Revolutionary Heroine, however—in stark contrast to Virginia’s insipid 
romantics—makes a definitive break with such novelistic paradigms of ideal womanhood with 
her continued and impenitent refusal to “[use] any of the terms in the heroine’s dictionary” (452), 
to “condescend to act like almost all other heroines, that is to say, without common sense” (133), 
and with her determination to open her eyes, “which heroines make it a principle never to do—or 
else there would be an end of the novel” (83). Balking at the necessity, as novels teach, of 
“tumbl[ing] into a river to make herself interesting,” Belinda systematically purges herself of any 
typically “heroinic” mentalities, which she replaces, in turn, with the exercise of reason and 
philosophy that the novel valorizes. When Vincent encourages her to engage with Freke, who is 
threatening her from afar, she retorts, “I will not run into danger on purpose to give you the 
pleasure of defending me” (250). Indeed, Belinda’s unwillingness to lose her head in matters of 
love marks Edgeworth’s caution to her nation that “nothing is more unlike a novel than real life” 
(36). When women take to envisioning themselves as heroines of their own love adventure in the 
wake of reading too many romances, such as Virginia did under Hervey’s tutelage, they distort 
the experience of reality. It is a lesson that even the independent-minded Lady Delacour must 
learn as she perpetually casts herself at the center of opium-hazed melancholic reveries inspired 
by her own “dangerous” reading.  
Belinda instead proves that a woman can “make herself interesting” (250), as a woman 
and a literary heroine, without any reference whatsoever to a man, by becoming a Revolutionary 
Heroine who chooses integrity and autonomy over the romantic flattery of love. Like 
Wollstonecraft’s pragmatic approach to love, which advocates the use of reason over passion in 
the choice of a partner,
20
 Belinda’s, too, recognizes the sensation of passion as impermanent and 
                                                 
20
 She writes in in the Vindication against the bombast of romantic love, arguing that women must “endeavor 
to restrain this tumultuous passion, and [not let it] dethrone superior powers, or usurp the scepter which the 
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the social institution that buttresses it as ill-formed for women’s long-term happiness. In the past, 
love was woman’s only prerogative; Edgeworth replaces it, like Wollstonecraft does, with not 
only the possibility of self-respect and self-actualization independent of the marriage state, but 
with a certain level of newfound autonomy in matrimony, meager as it may seem to modern 
readers. Once she has made this realization, Belinda becomes convinced that “matches of 
interest, convenience, and vanity […] diminished, instead of increasing happiness” (138), and 
that nothing could ever tempt her “to marry from any of the common views of interest or 
ambition” (213).  
Indeed, Edgeworth has used Belinda to distinguish clearly between reason and romance 
in the role that women play in love relationships which, she believes, the public has confused, a 
state of affairs that is continually perpetuated when women remain uneducated and under the 
severe restraint that Rousseau recommends. When Belinda refuses to marry Philip Baddely, and 
her aunt Stanhope accuses her of “mak[ing] childish or romantic difficulties” (201) with her 
denial of his 15,000£ a year, the reader understands categorically that it is actually intelligent 
conduct to refuse a partnership that promises certain misery, and romantic difficulty, on the other 
hand, to marry a wholly unsuitable individual solely for his money and for the privilege of being 
able to say, as Lydia Bennet does in Pride and Prejudice, “Ah! Jane, I take your place now, and 
you must go lower, because I am a married woman.” For Edgeworth and her heroine, and indeed, 
for Mary Wollstonecraft, love must find its origin in esteem, which cannot exist, as Hervey’s 
experiment and Belinda’s short engagement to Mr. Vincent prove, between two individuals of 
radically different educations, temperaments, and moral inclinations. 
                                                                                                                                                             
understanding should ever coolly wield” (93). While she advocates marriage in the form of long-term 
partnerships based on mutual respect and admiration, she finds that passion is disruptive, temporary, and 
unstable. “[Women]”, she concludes “ought not to indulge in those emotions which disturb the order of 
society, and engross thoughts that should be otherwise employed” (96). 
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Belinda’s approach to marriage marks Revolutionary Heroinism as having a particular 
connection to Edgeworth’s thesis about nationalism, domesticity, and economics, a theme that 
will also be important in Fanny Burney’s The Wanderer, which I will discuss in Chapter 4.  
Indeed, Belinda’s clear-headed choice of a husband is a decision that holds economic weight 
because of the manner in which she chooses to dispose of the value that her future domestic 
contribution represents in her choice of a partner. Part of her transformation in the novel—and it 
is one that we will see in forthcoming chapters as well—is her path as a woman from commodity 
to consumer. While her body, that is, her marriageability, and her potential as a spouse, mother, 
and childbearer has value early in  the novel, after she has been “hawked about everywhere,” by 
her matchmaking aunt Stanhope at Bath, “as well-advertised as Packwood’s razor strops” (25), 
she soon comes to realize that her selection might affect her community as well has herself. Her 
choice of the West Indian Mr. Vincent makes a statement, firstly, about her capacity to disrupt 
the flow of property through English patriarchs in favor of her personal happiness, and, secondly, 
about her ability and willingness to displace the tangible value of her future from the English 
economy to the West Indian one in her choice of life partner. The reader, however, soon learns 
that such a marriage would likely have represented a financial loss, given that Vincent has 
gambled away the entirety of his fortune. When she ultimately rejects Vincent for Hervey, she 
places a better bet, this time on a man who will play a respectful and admirable role in the social 
and political sphere in the decades following their marriage. In doing so, Belinda endorses a 
potential for social evolution in the man that she has determined to support with her domestic 
production, a decision that she could only make in conjunction with the intellectual, 
philosophical, and political awakening that she has had over the course of the novel. 
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Indeed,  the path of discovery the Belinda follows through the novel is one of refinement 
that Edgeworth wishes to see realized at the level of the nation, and which she links to 
Enlightenment theories of knowledge:  as her heroine moves from object—“a puppet in the 
hands of others” (10)— to subject—a being who “judges and acts for herself” (110)—she 
personifies both the potential for women’s rationality and the ability of a nation’s citizens to 
adequately judge for themselves what worth foreign ideas might have for them. In both cases, it 
is the value of tradition that is under scrutiny. How far, Edgeworth has asked through her 
heroine, ought we to trust the systems in place merely because they have, thus far, stood the test 
of time? And what role should reason and rationality play when one chooses to reject given 
models? When Belinda arrived at Lady Delacour’s home, she was positioned to follow the path 
that numberless concourses of women before her had followed: an introduction to the 
fashionable world by a veteran coquette who would train her up in the ways of husband-hunting 
and introduce her to an admirable pool of bachelors, eventually allowing her, through toying 
manipulation and much financial negotiation, to secure a marriage for herself.  But Belinda, 
almost childlike in her unfamiliarity with the world, chooses instead to rely on her Lockean 
ability to observe her surroundings and, using her capacity to reason, to distill from the data 
collected a revised code of conduct that takes into account the very real dangers of the path that 
her class and gender suggested, nearly irrevocably, to her. It is a skill that she continues to refine 
from her moment of realization at the bad examples set before her to the very last page of the 
book.  
When Harriet Freke, for example, persecutes Belinda for her good sense and respect for 
reasonable propriety, she finds that even though she answered her inquisitor with the confidence 
of one who defends honest beliefs, it was necessary to deeply examine “the habits and principles 
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which guided her conduct. She had a general feeling that they were right and necessary; but now, 
with the assistance of lady Anne and Mr. Percival, she established in her own understanding the 
exact boundaries between right and wrong” (232). She also must, in her trajectory toward self-
sustaining rationality, battle her aunt Stanhope—intent upon forming her according to accepted 
patterns, as she had Belinda’s cousins—as well as the prejudices of those around her who 
assume, as Clarence Hervey initially did, that she has as little sense and as few independent ideas 
and desires as other young women in her position are taught to have. She first realizes the effect 
of her cumulative reasoning when she chooses to skip a coveted opportunity to appear at court, 
and finds that she doesn’t regret it in the slightest:  
Is it possible, that I have spent three hours by myself in a library, without being 
tired of my existence? How different are my feelings now, to what they would 
have been in the same circumstances six months ago! I should then have thought 
the loss of the birthnight ball a mighty trial of temper. It is singular, that my 
having spent a winter with one of the most dissipated women in England should 
have sobered my mind so completely. […] Now I can judge from my own 
experience, and I am convinced that the life of a fine lady would never make me 
happy (126). 
Rather than the life of a fine lady, Belinda has chosen the life of a fine philosopher. In short, 
boring though she may be, “cool” though her ruminations on love might appear, Belinda emerges 
strikingly triumphant from the various tests of character to which the novel subjects her, as an 
advocate of women’s capacity for reason and judgment, of the reformation of female manners 
and the marriage contract, of the potential fruitfulness of new ideas and foreign interests, and 
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with a ringing and truly heroic portrait by the novel’s most beloved character, Lady Delacour, 
who says of her: 
She has saved my life. She has made my life worth saving. She has made me feel 
my own value. She has made me know my own happiness. She has reconciled me 
to my husband. She has united me with my child. She has been my guardian 
angel. (335) 
 
Once again, the Revolutionary Heroine has a saved a life, despite expectations of women’s 
flighty frivolity and weakness of mind and body.  Her magnificent rehabilitation of the much-
maligned raison has proved to be the salve for all women. 
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Chapter IV 
Juliet among the anti-Jacobins: propriety, economy, nationality 
 
In her final and much anticipated (though ultimately much maligned) novel, The 
Wanderer: Or, Female Difficulties, Fanny Burney joins the chorus of responses to 
Enlightenment and revolutionary definitions and redefinitions of gender and class, with roughly 
two decades of perspective on the failings of both. Written over approximately fifteen years and 
published at last in 1814, this momentous tale of a Revolutionary Heroine who dons “a […] 
disguise, from virtuous motives” (Burney qtd in Doody xvi) unfolds during “the dire reign of the 
terrific Robespierre” (Burney 11) but appeared in public during the fruitful initial stirrings of 
Britain’s capitalist commercial transformation. One of the greatest obstacles to the novel’s 
success was what the reading public perceived as its untimely appearance on the literary scene. 
After decades of on-again-off-again war with France between 1689 and 1815, Napoleon had 
finally been defeated, and the last thing the celebratory British population was seeking was 
criticism of its great nation coupled with sympathy with the long-standing enemy across the 
water, which summarizes, in very short hand, the bulk of Burney’s wondrous novel. Her story of 
the virtuous Wanderer, Juliet, not only deconstructs with a bold hand, just as Belinda did in 
Edgeworth’s novel, the long-held belief in the “French Threat” to British hegemony, but also 
unmasks the anxiety as symptomatic of the governing doctrines of anti-Jacobin politics—
“engaged in the process of establishing new middle-class values [and attempting] to review the 
limits of gender propriety” (Grenby 3)—having come to represent mainstream political views in 
Britain. Skeptical of the other in the form of all foreigners, members of the lower classes, 
women, and, indeed, any individual who deviated from total conformity to upper class social 
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convention, reigning political doctrines represented, for Burney, a kind of Terror that was merely 
the opposite side of the coin of the one in France from twenty years earlier. 
Unsurprisingly then, criticism of Burney’s novel has, since the 1980s, tended to focus on 
the author’s attempt to expose or figuratively disempower various patriarchal structures inside 
and outside of literature. Suzie Park and Patricia Meyer Spacks argue, for example, that The 
Wanderer challenges prescriptions of privacy for women, both within the male-dominated 
Romantic tradition and in the conduct book literature meant to educate women on their roles in 
society. Julia Epstein, Tamara Wagner, and Pam Perkins focus their readings on Burney’s 
skepticism of anti-Jacobin platforms and Burkean reactions to the French Revolution. Others 
have taken more explicitly feminist approaches to the novel, such as Nora Nachumi and Kristina 
Straub, who examine gendered power relationships and definitions of femininity to prove 
Burney’s radicalism, while Claudia Johnson, on the other hand, does the same to show the very 
opposite, arguing that “Burney takes back with one hand what she gives with the other,” and that 
the female characters’ “excess of submission” thwarts any possible feminist reading (169). 
Scholars who read the author as politically ambivalent, such as Darryl Jones and Stephanie 
Russo and A. D. Cousins, in turn, still assert her relative sympathy to radical ideologies through 
her portrayal of a violent world “far removed from Edmund Burke’s grossly sentimental 
depiction of a chivalric social order” (Russo & Cousins 86).  
The overarching theme of criticism that identifies Burney as a radical sympathizer, 
however, is expository, and by that I mean that it grants Burney’s heroine little agency and relies 
instead on the author’s expositions of injustice that surround Juliet in order to argue for her 
disapproval of it; Elinor’s rights-of-man discourses (which Burney refused to temper in 
subsequent editions), these scholars concur, fill in the ideological holes of what the author herself 
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cannot or will not say. While I have interpreted many of the narrative elements of The Wanderer 
with a similar feminocentric approach, my reading departs from the above critics in that I insist 
on recognizing the significance of Juliet’s individual action, which often takes the form of 
deliberate and meditated inaction, as essential to the novel’s ideological project. Indeed, 
Burney’s Revolutionary Heroine is not merely an inert canvas, despite her silence and reticence. 
I will demonstrate in this chapter that her action takes the form of an ironic passivity that strikes 
at the very core of the illusory, yet shared, values of anti-Jacobin social prescriptions in which 
the nation had been reveling since the Terror’s onset in 1793: grace and modesty as natural to 
women, the chivalric sexual roles that had historically served to protect and preserve women and 
the nation itself, and the superiority of Britain’s modern political system, which Edmund Burke 
canonized in his 1792 work Reflections on the Revolution in France, to everything that French 
revolutionary doctrines had to offer.  
From this jumping off point of irony, Burney is able to closely analyze the effect of 
around twenty years of conservative post-revolutionary legislation and cultural inscription of 
women’s roles, criticizing the contemporary doctrines of propriety that found their justification 
in anti-French platforms. They have become so exaggerated, she argues, that they are in a state 
of perpetual backfire, and it is not only women who suffer from the doublespeak of doctrines of 
feminine delicacy: the nation as a whole experiences a kind of economic self-sabotage, I will 
demonstrate, when women are so far removed from the world of material production. Inserted 
into the economic sphere, Burney’s Revolutionary Heroine discovers the degree to which the 
work that women do has been denuded of economic value as the women themselves have seen 
their representation in the politico-economic realm shrink, a topic that George Sand will resurrect 
and rewrite in Nanon and that I will discuss in chapter 5. Finally, interwoven within these 
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critiques Burney stages a reevaluation of many of the revolutionary ideas and theories that the 
virulent backlash condemned, both through her anti-heroine Elinor Joddrel and her 
Revolutionary Heroine Juliet. On the whole, despite the protagonist’s apparent passivity—or 
rather through her purposeful passivity—I will show that Burney calls for a return to women’s 
agency and a resurrection of doctrines of Enlightenment social equality that would close the gap 
between Britain’s antagonistic class relationships.  
 
Proper Appearances 
The story of Juliet—a truly infuriating heroine for her apparent unwillingness to speak or 
take action against her tormentors—offers the reader an ironic look at female submission and 
delicacy that explicitly deconstructs anti-Jacobin prescriptions of femininity. As Mary Poovey 
has observed, the plot structure of many novels written by women around the turn of the century  
duplicates for the reader the claustrophobic situation of the heroine in society. 
Forbidden by convention to declare their desires, the heroines must struggle, often 
ineffectually, to communicate by indirection or even deceit, and the interest of the 
plot lies in the nuances of frustration and achievement that mark their efforts. 
(Poovey 43)  
Frances Burney indeed reconstructs this sense of imprisonment in The Wanderer, but uses the 
literary device of irony to give it far deeper meaning than a simple condemnation of a restrictive 
social hierarchy. Her Revolutionary Heroine, a woman whose experience with claustrophobia 
takes very real forms as she is frequently immured in closets, in chambers, and behind screens, is 
not only unable to declare her desire, but even chooses not to utter her own name, and in that 
sense, she differs from the heroines that Poovey describes above: rather than struggling to 
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communicate, she exposes how a woman’s very survival hangs in the balance when she refuses 
to communicate. Deliberately going overboard in her adherence to the conduct book injunction 
that women stay out of the public eye and “avoid all behavior that would call attention to 
themselves,”  displaying their chastity “only indirectly or—even more precisely—negatively by 
not speaking, by not betraying the least consciousness of her essential sexuality” (Poovey 21, 23-
4), this “timid deer” (Burney 772) Juliet is self-effacing to the point of becoming virtually 
invisible; she begins the novel, after all, as a disembodied voice, crying out in distress, “Oh, hear 
me! For the love of Heaven, hear me!” (11); later, because her physical presence has been so 
elusive, Riley recognizes her as the demoiselle from the boat only because he “caught the sound 
of her voice” (252). In turn, when she responds to the vast majority of the interrogatories 
launched at her in the novel, she merely “blushed, but was silent” (57); and to most offers of aid, 
particularly those made by men, she answers, “it is impossible I should accept” (66). Indeed, her 
silence, “impelled by necessity” (75), precludes even the smallest degree of transparency in her 
person.  
Selflessness and privacy are the preeminent qualities of the retiring domestic woman in 
the discourse of the Angel in the House, the social doctrine that anti-Jacobin proponents 
embraced in order to control women’s supposedly exaggerated appetites—seen to be ever 
increasing with the feminized violence of the Terror’s tricoteuses and Amazones—via a narrow 
domestic sphere of action and influence. However, Juliet’s extreme devotion to it—her radical 
propriety—while in exile from all forms of domesticity instead demonstrates Burney’s desire to 
parody the doctrine itself by showing how little it conduces to the feminine transparency that 
anti-Jacobin politics called for: rendered identity-less by both her modesty and her devotion to 
feminine self-sacrifice, Juliet appears to the other characters to be able to adopt any identity that 
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she pleases, theoretically for her own gain. What then, separates her, in the eyes of the world, 
from a woman such as Laclos’ Madame de Merteuil, who also hid her machinations behind a 
virtuous façade, and who was the very object of feminized horror that the Revolution sought, in 
part, to destroy?  
Indeed, perceived initially as a French woman, Juliet’s gradual but nonetheless drastic 
changes in appearance early in the novel demonstrate how those around her interpret her 
hyperbolic conformity to gender doctrines—her tendency to “display no vanity, no passion, no 
assertive ‘self’ at all” (21), as Mary Poovey has written of the idealized “angel”—as 
revolutionary subterfuge rather than virtue. Mrs. Ireton, marveling at the still nameless heroine’s 
transformation from “the blackest, dirtiest, raggedest wretch I ever beheld” into “quite a belle” 
(43), inquires what other “metamorphos[es]” she has in store, wondering “what they are to 
exhibit” (44 emphasis mine). While the heroine’s situation is extremely unorthodox, she has not, 
thus far, transgressed a single boundary of feminine conduct, since nowhere is it explicitly 
written, in eighteenth-century conduct books, for example, that a woman must necessarily have a 
name and a story. That Mrs. Ireton interprets her changing exterior as an exhibit, then, the very 
thing from which the anti-Jacobin discourse claims that modesty and retirement will protect 
women, marks the beginning of Burney’s deconstruction of the value of defining women’s 
nature by a social construct, one, moreover, that is based almost exclusively in the rejection of 
French revolutionary principles. When Mrs. Ireton continues by asking “how many coats of 
white and red you were obliged to lay on, before you could cover all the black” (44), she spares 
Burney the work of building an explicit argument against the paradoxes of British feminine rules 
of appearance: the “coats” of color—whether clothing, manners, self-abnegation, or feigned 
virtue or ignorance—serve to cover a “black” nature, which, in itself, proves that a woman’s true 
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character is other than what she necessarily presents to those around her. Moreover, Burney 
allows the choleric old woman to defuse the fear of what woman’s biological nature might be 
when, as the heroine’s facial bandages fall one by one, she discovers that “neither wound, nor 
scar, nor injury of any sort occasioned the patch to have been worn,” and that all Juliet’s 
“features” were in fact “free from any cause for having been bound up” (44, 45). Rather than the 
perceived “near anarchy” (Gutwirth 244) bubbling under the surface of Paris’ revolutionary 
women, Juliet reveals with her gradual jettison of disguise that the “collection of bandages and 
patches […] and of black and white outsides” (45) merely represent the ways that women have 
been forced into “maiming or defacing” (45) themselves in order to conform to social 
expectations of gendered behavior and appearance. The author then entirely confounds the 
question for her readers when the elderly lady, leaning on her interpretation of feminine disguise 
as a material euphemism for both criminality and sexual depravity, sarcastically excuses herself 
for “diving too deeply into the secrets of your trade” (46). Unqualified as the word is here, 
“trade” necessarily refers to prostitution. Juliet’s radical modesty, which translates as a refusal to 
reveal herself—to give a name and a story that would insert her into the social hierarchy and 
allow others to identify just what kind of woman she is—ultimately points out the most blatant 
inconsistencies in anti-Jacobin doctrines of propriety: first, women’s “nature” as the 
domesticating discourse teaches it is in fact an amalgam of “coats” that she must apply, and 
therefore not natural at all; indeed, it is no more natural than Mme de Vernon’s feigned love for 
Delphine or Mme de Merteuil’s false sexual virtue. The second and subsequent inconsistency in 
Britain’s prescriptions of femininity that Juliet unmasks in this scene with the silent “resolution, 
not awe” (46) with which she actively bares Mrs. Ireton’s insinuations, is that a woman with 
disguises (that is, every woman who follows feminine dictates, as we have determined) uses 
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them as part of her “trade” and is therefore necessarily a woman of ill repute who specializes 
in—whether for a husband’s wealth and the security of married life or simply to secure her daily 
bread—“man hunting.” Juliet’s refusal to reveal herself actively shatters the fragile glass of 
propriety itself, demonstrating that it immures women in performances of virtue that in fact 
identify them as dissimulators, the very aspect of femininity that the anti-Jacobin discourse on 
women sought to eradicate in response to the same women of Paris that Clarence Hervey saw on 
the eve of the Revolution, who were “full of vanity, affectation, and artifice, whose tastes were 
perverted, and whose feelings were depraved” (Edgeworth 362). Juliet’s dissimulations, then, 
become especially significant because they spring both from modesty and from revolutionary 
heroism, insofar as she hides her identity in order to preserve the life of her guardian; “I give no 
false coloring,” she explains, continuing Burney’s chromatic analogy, “I am only not open” 
(340), exactly as a woman should be in the presence of strangers, according to contemporary 
expectations. But the dramatic absence of identifiable signifiers instead makes her actions seem 
blatantly performative, leading others to take gross liberties with her because of the era’s typical 
association of performance with sexual levity. 
Indeed, Burney’s establishment of propriety as an impossible and self-destructive code of 
conduct based on a circular argument sets a pattern that further conflictual encounters between 
the Revolutionary Heroine and other characters in the novel will follow: Juliet’s surfeit of 
modesty, which takes the form of silence and self-denial, rather than ensuring the her protection 
that nationalist doctrines promise her, exposes her to harassment and near harm. However, the 
men and women in the novel respond to her radical modesty differently, which gives the author 
the opportunity to dig deeply into the machinery of doctrines of propriety in order to expose the 
way in which they reflect both a misunderstanding of French ideals of equality as well as the 
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harm they do at all levels of society: men’s responses, we shall see, expose the failure of the 
chivalric sexual roles that Edmund Burke lauds in his Reflections on the Revolution in France,  a 
revelation that exonerates women from the accusations of social disorder that the anti-Jacobin 
discourses of propriety sought to contain, while women’s reactions expose the class prejudice 
and economic disinterest inherent in dictates of feminine delicacy, renewing revolutionary 
arguments of  the Rights of Man. 
From the departure point of the breakdown of “natural” feminine propriety, Burney 
debunks the national myth of chivalric gender roles, thereby unraveling the Knight-Damsel 
cultural fantasy of sexual relations that anti-Jacobin assertions claimed would protect the nation 
from the taint of revolutionary upheaval. She introduces the theme of Burkean chivalry within 
the first pages of the novel, when Elinor Joddrel, fascinated but also irritated by Harleigh’s 
interest in the bandaged Incognita, insinuates that he experienced hallucinations when he insisted 
they bring this “tattered dulcinea” aboard. “You are such a complete knight-errant,” Elinor chaffs 
him, “that you would just as willingly find her a tawny hottentot as a fair Circassian” (12). 
Indeed, as the novel progresses, Harleigh’s visions continue as he weighs others’ assumptions of 
her—“You must resign your demoiselle […] for a heroine; […] Her dress is not merely shabby, 
‘tis vulgar. […] She can be nothing above a house-maid” (17)—against his own observations of 
“her language, her air, and her manner,” all of which convince him “that she had lived the life of 
a gentlewoman” (75). Though the general opinion is against him, the quixotic hero spends the 
rest of the novel trying to save her, as any honorable British man naturally would, since, as the 
Admiral, the embodiment of English traditionalism, explains, “an unprotected female, provided 
she’s of good behavior, has always a claim to a man’s care, whether she be born amongst our 
friends or foes” (32).  
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However, by taking to extremes conservative injunctions to remain unseen, Juliet 
demonstrates that not only do the sexual politics of concealing by negation fail to protect her, 
they expose her to unwanted male attention that is very nearly as gross, ruthless, and dangerous 
as that of the French commissary, the illegitimate husband that the Terror has foisted upon her. 
Indeed, respecting “the long-beaten path of female timidity” (343) exposes Juliette to even 
greater danger, for the attention that the heroine’s distress (that is, her namelessness and poverty) 
attracts, rather than “saving” her, proves to be consistently fatal to her reputation and hazardous 
to her person.  
This is most powerfully evident in her attempts to repel the libertine Sir Lyell Sycamore, 
whose attentions reveal that, rather than freeing the nation from the contamination of foreign 
ideas, the conservative doctrines of propriety to which Juliet adheres merely increase the degree 
to which domestic women are forced into “sexual bondage, [into] slavery to their reproductive 
lives, [and the] unfreedom to act” (243), as Madelyn Gutwirth has described the women of Paris 
who had the courage to claim égalité in response to their own low condition. Seeing “her modest 
mien, and evident embarrassment” at the blind Welsh harper’s concert, Sycamore finds her 
predictably irresistible and begins to pursue her around the room. In return for all the attention he 
pays her, “she sought to employ her own [attention] another way” (242-3); however, without a 
friendly face in the room (none of the women condescends to acknowledge her), there is, indeed, 
nothing upon which she might “employ” it, which forces her to withdraw her own 
consciousness—her attention—further and further from the scene. In short, the “unfreedom to 
act” that Gutwirth describes, endemic to a creature whose whole existence is defined in sexual 
terms, merely increases. Each time Sycamore corners her, she sits back down again, stripping 
herself of any action that would appear to her pursuer as an invitation, thus making herself, 
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consequently, more and more irresistible both to Sir Lyell and to other men in the room. In 
effect, the merchant Mr. Tedman soon comes to engage her with a handful of cakes. Though no 
sexual predator, he is unable to perceive how suspicious it is for a young single woman to be 
sitting alone with not one but two men attending her. In a desperate attempt to fight being boxed 
in by male attention, she exercises her freedom to be less and less, endeavoring “to avoid looking 
either to the right or the left” (245). And yet, moments later, “an elderly gentleman, who was 
walking up and down the room, now bowed to her” (245). Her silence and immobility are 
starting to draw quite a crowd, and the scene ultimately ends, not with the salvation that anti-
Jacobin tenets promise, but with the spiteful women present unmasking her for the demoiselle in 
the boat, effectively ruining any chance she had of supporting herself as a harp teacher to the 
daughters of the quality. Indeed, the more she attempts to pass unnoticed, the more the heroine’s 
exhibition of worth increases; the tighter she adheres to strictures of propriety, Burney ironically 
shows, the more others take advantage of her “dainty delicacy” (509) to violate her privacy and 
threaten her safety, because she appears to be “asking for it” with the very act of, essentially, 
playing dead, that is, with the most hyperbolic manifestation possible of a sexual object’s willing 
“unfreedom to act.”  
Harleigh is perhaps the grossest offender in this trend, and his reactions to the heroine’s 
hyperbolic adherence to feminine delicacy unmask the cruelest side effect of the chivalric sexual 
roles that the nation is trying to preserve in the face of perceived gender anarchy across the pond: 
the same men who so deeply value her self-effacement and modesty, citing it as the definitive 
sign, despite her poverty and mystery, of her high birth and her undeniable education, end up 
mocking her for her devotion to it and relentlessly pushing her to abandon it. He is the only man, 
for example, to actually seize her in the frenzy of his desire. After several hundred pages of 
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examples of Juliet’s same “unfreedom to act”—that is, her inability to reveal her name and story 
and her refusal to give him any sign of returning his affection—Harleigh finally confronts the 
Wanderer in her small apartment in order to dissuade her from performing in the public concert 
that would finally ease her pecuniary distress. Encouraged by her blush upon his arrival, he 
seizes her hand, and she attempts, like in the scene analyzed above, to retreat: “Mr. Harleigh, 
forbear! Or I must quit the room!” (335). Her attempt to physically remove herself, however, 
only further encourages him, because “the blushes which still tingled, still dyed her cheeks, 
betrayed,” he believes, “that all within was not chilled, however all without might seem cold” 
(336). The more she displays this “impenetrable […] incomprehensible” (337) femininity, the 
more violent and wild his advances become: “’You distract me! You distract me!’ He caught her 
gown, but, upon her stopping, instantly let it go” (339). In the wake of this menacing physical 
gesture, Juliette finally cries, “persecute me no longer!” (341), linking Harleigh’s tyrannical 
persistence to the French commissary’s very pursuit of her, which she attempted to escape in her 
flight to England. 
Such words (“impenetrable,” “incomprehensible”) to describe the actions that Harleigh 
cannot understand, but which are completely in line with the behavior that contemporary 
conservatism required of women, make pointed reference to Britain’s own grave misreading of 
revolutionary doctrines. Propriety is supposed to protect women and, in the larger sense, the 
nation, from the so-called French threat, but instead it merely turns aggressive xenophobia 
inward, on the domestic other, as woman’s increasingly polarized displays of gender have made 
her alien to her male counterparts.  
Harleigh’s continued renewals, in turn, merely serve to alienate Juliet doubly, after he 
undertakes, as a friend, to remind her of her feminine duty, thereby using her own propriety 
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against her as a weapon with which to battle what he perceives as her Jacobin illegibility. Is it not 
true, he inquires, “that your accomplishments should be reserved for the resources of your 
leisure, and the happiness of your friends, at your own time, and your own choice […] in 
accordance with that word, which your own every action, every speech, every look bring 
perpetually to mind, propriety?” (338). In the typical vein of jealous literary heroes, with their “if 
I can’t have you, no one can!” attitude, Harleigh, in the above quotation, rather than saving the 
damsel Juliet, turns her own modesty against her, simultaneously cutting her off from intercourse 
with the rest of the world (since she has no friends for whom to reserve her accomplishments) 
and condemning her to starvation by turning the only scheme that would remedy her pecuniary 
distress into a matter of sexual purity, all in the name of “that word…propriety.”  
The final blow that Burney deals to Burke’s paradoxical chivalric gender roles finds root 
in the male characters’ own unwillingness to believe that Juliet’s circumstances are truly as grave 
as she paints them. Indeed, even when Harleigh, Lord Melbury, and Sir Jaspar finally learn her 
story in its entirety, the three men call her prudence and scruples “chimerical,” “exaggerated,” 
“false,” and “of fancied refinement,” despite the genuine threats to the Wanderer of physical 
harm, of attempted rape, and of such life-threatening danger that before fleeing France she was 
forced to hide for a week in a closet so tiny that she could not sit down. And all of this 
independent of her guardian, the bishop, whose life she is trying to protect with her silence. This 
disavowal of her narrative credibility clearly renders the gentlemen unfit knights errant, for how 
can they come to her aid when they do not even believe in the dangers that threaten her, when the 
menace, to them, is merely “some right, stretched, by false reasoning, or undue influence, nearly 
to wrong” (348), as Harleigh sees it? But this is very definition of knight errant and damsel in 
distress which Burney is working to deconstruct in the first place: that women, by definition, 
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experience illusions of danger from which men must rescue them, and that, if these roles “should 
ever be totally extinguished, the loss I fear will be great” (Burke 87). The dangers are real, 
Burney argues through Juliet’s sufferings, and they stem from the very “homage paid to the fair 
sex” (87) that Burke lauds, and that the men in The Wanderer insist on pursuing, even when they 
are unable to even understand from whence the threat comes.  
Male reviewers of the novel at its publication fell into the very same misreading of 
Burney’s heroine and her situation as the men in the pages, thus perfectly echoing for the author 
the very point that she intended to make: a national identity anchored almost exclusively in 
aggressive anti-Frenchness does little more than refine pre-existing national flaws into nearly 
pathological hyperbole. “The difficulties in which [Burney] involves her heroines,” William 
Hazlitt acerbically wrote, “are indeed ‘Female Difficulties;’—they are difficulties created out of 
nothing” (qtd in Johnson 170). Both Hazlitt and Juliet’s narrative cohorts, then, equate feminine 
scruples with hallucination and non-entity, that is, the creation of something (fear, spectacle, 
theatrics, even value) out of nothing (the woman herself, a negative being). Their assessment of 
her scrupulosity as the byproduct of hallucination plays right into Burney’s hand, however, for if 
the men inside and outside of the novel think that Juliet’s fears of her criminal husband’s 
“French revenge” are “of fancied refinement,” then surely Britain’s own fears of the same are as 
well.  
Burney reiterates, in turn, how one need not look to France for the only example of 
tyranny and terror when Juliet, in a rare moment of categorical speech that frees her from her 
perceived hallucinosis and that definitively exorcises Harleigh’s influence from her life says, 
“You must let me pursue the path that my affairs, that my own perceptions, that my necessities 
point out to me, without interference, and without expecting from me the smallest reference to 
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your opinions, or feelings” (337). Harleigh, in turn, can only respond by attacking both her 
rationality and her sense of justice: “I must now practice the hardest lesson to the stubborn mind 
of man, submission to undefined and what appears to be unnecessary evil” (emphasis mine). 
There is scarcely a more accurate definition of tyranny than the one that Harleigh has attributed 
here to Juliet’s compunction, and by relating her femininity, her perceived irrationality, and her 
sexual domination to the Revolution that he sees as a political charade and an affront to history, 
honor, and religion, Harleigh, Juliet’s knight in shining armor, effectively identifies woman as 
vessel of illusion, madness, and instability that threatens to deconstruct men’s empire, but one to 
which he is bound in respect and service by the chivalric obedience of which he, as a man, is the 
very creator. A product of the sexual roles that Burney has already exposed as illogical and 
counterproductive because they are based on a definition of femininity that is both false and self-
destructive, feminine delusion evaporates in Juliet’s unwavering declaration of independence 
with “no reference” to Harleigh’s wishes, a position that she holds “to be completely understood; 
and to be definitive” (346).  If her knight respects her wishes after this conversation in the novel, 
however, it is only to go behind her back later, effectively undermining the chivalry that he 
lauds, in order to uncover her identity without her permission and forcefully “save” her, as he 
must do in order to reinstate the balance of sexual powers; ultimately he rescues her from little 
more than the dreadful scourge of the French antipatriarchialism that her revolutionary 
namelessness seems to espouse while, in the process, merely increasing the danger of her 
situation by making inquiries that expose her to those that hunt her.  
That Juliet, then, is ultimately widely perceived as a hysteric confirms Burney argument 
that without freedom from the impossible propriety to which women are enslaved, and in which 
men have cast themselves in the constantly alternating roles of predator and savior, woman’s 
128 
 
ability to develop independence and fortitude will be forever stymied. The nation’s fate, in a 
similar fashion, bound to its exclusive identity as all that is not France, will stagnate if it cannot 
find a way to incorporate mediated versions of the same extra muros socio-political doctrines 
that proved to be so valuable to the establishment of peace and prosperity in Belinda. Juliet’s 
ironic parody of these anti-Jacobin doctrines, in turn, works to constantly to expose these very 
truths about woman and the British nation as a whole. Indeed, Burney’s Revolutionary Heroine 
will continue her iconoclastic performances of feminine delicacy all the way to the end of the 
novel, fleeing “towards the beach to secure her safety by joining her uncle” (853) when all has 
been resolved and there is literally no danger left, and ultimately fleeing the terror of female 
submission in Britain for the apparently less terrifying climate of revolutionary France at the 
peak of the Terror. 
 
Proper economics 
The response of the women of Brighthelmstone to Juliet’s silent submission, however, 
reveal the degree to which the French threat is an economic as well as social bogie. Though her 
demureness and reserve reflect textbook (or conduct book, rather) examples of womanhood, the 
local female elite quickly teaches the heroine that in Britain such feminine behavior is a privilege 
of class rather than an imperative or an essential manifestation of gender, and that notions of 
propriety themselves are inextricably interwoven with the social hierarchy that Britain fears to 
see disrupted by the revolutionary rumblings of its neighbor. For example, when Juliet displays 
typical expressions of delicacy, such as protesting that she needs rest or that she is unable to 
receive company, the rich women around her swiftly brand the act as “airs,” a shocking 
performance from “a person nobody knew any thing of” who acts “just as if she were a fine 
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lady” (352). Indeed, any act that falls outside of what the women imagine as the Wanderer’s 
narrow sphere of action, the one suited to unwanted foreigners and “people that have their living 
to get, and that a’n’t worth a farthing” (384), represents an economic assault to their class by a 
pseudo-parvenue.  
Such reactions to Juliet’s behavior made by the ladies of Brighthelmstone serve to show 
the degree to which, in Burney’s observation, the reinforcement of femininity itself as a class-
contingent ontology reflects the irrational fear of Jacobin calls for class equality that supporters 
of the French Revolution advocated for Britain in the early 1790s. Indeed, counter-revolutionary 
responses that explicitly linked class and gender found much of their justification in Burke’s 
Reflections, in which he argued that French revolutionary principles of égalité would corrode 
England’s economy because trade and manufacture “too […] may decay with [the death of 
chivalry]” (90).  The terror that the Brighthelmstone women experience when Juliet appears to 
be acting “the fine lady” that they are sure she is not highlights this anxiety over the mixing of 
social classes, which were historically defined by manners and appearance, but which were 
losing their distinctiveness thanks to the gradual bourgeoisification of Europe as a whole. That 
gender might also go the way of class was a favorite anti-Jacobin subject of hysteria, and was 
especially apparent in the condemnation of radical “unsex’d” women such as Mary 
Wollstonecraft, “whom no decorum checks” (Polwhele 61).  
In response to the perceived economic insurgency that Juliet’s gendered manners 
represent, then, women rely upon the anti-Jacobin conjoining of gender, class, and economics to 
respond to the threat of Wanderer’s inscrutable existence with appellations that degender the 
usurper and reinforce her socio-economic inferiority, while highlighting her dangerous French 
connection. In an attempt to shore up what they see as the necessary hierarchization of class and 
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gender, itself based on, in Burke’s words, “the generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud 
submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart” (86), which he canonized 
as the source of British cultural and economic wealth, the women of Brighthelmstone fall into 
the most dehumanizing and defeminizing epithets possible when naming Burney’s Revolutionary 
Heroine: thing; this body; that grim thing; the vagabond; that black insect; a stranger; a nobody, 
if not worse; a mere nothing; the mystical; an adventurer; the Frenchified or the illegitimate 
stroller; a poor straggling pauper. When Mrs. Ireton, in turn, treats this nobody as her 
“vanquished vassal” (513), she attempts to revive a feudal model that was struggling, even in 
Britain, for self-justification after the Revolution. Indeed, a heroine who not only keeps her 
speech, the details of her life story, and many of her opinions to herself, but also her very name, 
the most basic level of codification that would insert her into the fabric of social life, who is a 
signified with no signifier, represents an unheard of dilemma in Burney’s time, one that speaks 
particularly to Burke’s accusation of the French Revolution as an assault on language. A 
nameless heroine whose race, religion, nationality, and parentage cannot be identified presents a 
challenge to the feudal nomenclature that Burke strives to preserve, and which relies on strict 
classification based on exterior signs. That these signs fail in respect to the Revolutionary 
Heroine, who beneath her nameless wanderings is impeccably honest and virtuous, deconstructs 
the very associations that Burke puts forth, and upon which Britain’s growing national identity 
depends. 
The nation of Great Britain proudly countered the French Revolution with its own 
capitalist boom, but Juliet’s attempts to maintain her dignity while surviving her lack of socio-
economic signifiers in fact expose the national economic disadvantage of twenty-plus years of 
the radical, anti-revolutionary domestication of women. Leading up to, but especially in the years 
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follow the crisis in France, the sex’s own economic value had been displaced from its potential 
material production onto its signifiers of class, “as literal bearers of their husbands’ or fathers’ 
wealth” (Poovey 11). This shift replaced middle-class women’s material economic contribution 
with “the conspicuous consumption practiced by middle- and upper-class women” and the 
“sympathetic, non-judgmental affection” that they were to offer their husbands, helping “offset 
the frustrations and strains a man suffered in his workplace,” and therefore “renew[ing] his 
energies” (Poovey 11, 10), both of which allegedly stimulated the British economy by creating 
higher individual production and consumption. However, exempt from the security of family and 
matrimony, Juliet’s necessary, yet extraordinary, exertions toward acquiring “that sort of 
independence, that belongs, physically, to sustaining life by her own means” (Burney 146) 
instead demonstrate to what bad economic policy the anti-Jacobin radical domestication of 
women has lead: any attempt to produce on the part of her heroine results instead in others’ 
attempts to buy her, thwarting any chance of material increase on either side. As Jill Heydt-
Stevenson has observed, “novels have long been associated with consumer culture and the 
escalation of a middle-class female readership. Much of the recent work tends to critique […] 
female characters’ material profligacy” (52), a critical assessment that she complicates 
significantly with her study on women’s both complicit and subversive uses of headdress in 
Burney’s novel. Indeed, it is no secret that novels composed during the rise of European 
capitalism tended to put the emphasis on women’s consumption rather than production, but 
Burney criticizes this trend by firstly creating a heroine who is destitute and therefore cannot 
consume, and secondly by demonstrating, through her subsequent attempts to support herself, 
that even women who need or who wish to work can no longer realistically do so because of the 
increasingly narrow sphere which they are meant to inhabit. Even though Juliet’s “many 
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accomplishments invited her industry, and promised its success,” bringing them “into use” (146) 
and earning a living from them proves to be nearly impossible, primarily because of others (but 
women especially) refusing to recognize the economic value of her labors.  
This breakdown in counter-revolutionary economic policy is nowhere more clear than 
when the heroine attempts to teach harp lessons and discovers that she cannot do so without a 
kind of procurer, whom she finds in the form of the tyrannical Miss Arbe. The disquieting 
relationship between the two women, in which Arbe capitalizes on Juliet’s talents, pushing her 
further and further into performances that risk branding her forever as a public woman, begins to 
resemble more and more the one between a Madame and one of her prostitutes. She first forces 
Juliet to “look” the part when she says that “this little hole will never do: you must take the 
drawing room,” though she knows full well that Juliet has not a dime. “And then you must buy 
immediately, or at least hire, a very fine instrument. […] You must dress, too, a little… like other 
people, you know” (223). Brighthelmstone’s musical pimp usurps the money that Aurora 
Granville loaned the heroine, adds her own and Miss Bydel’s, putting the harp mistress, who is 
“paid to give pleasure” (320), deeply into debt before she’s even begun to work. And since Juliet 
earns only “the very moderate price at which Miss Arbe, for the purpose of obliging her own 
various friends, had fixed her instructions” (233), her handler has essentially ensured that she 
will never be able to escape this business arrangement, which comes with the added perk of 
regular “freebies” (harp lessons, or “musical regales,” as Arbe euphemistically calls them) for 
the Madame.   
Once again, anti-Jacobin gender strategies have not resulted in women’s protection and 
preservation, but rather in their further ostracism as the definition of woman itself has narrowed; 
the particular suggestion of prostitution, which we have now thrice seen embedded in the novel’s 
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exchanges, further reinforces Burney’s argument that neither women, the nation, nor, in this 
particular scene, Juliet and Miss Arbe, are able to profit from the bizarre economic enslavement 
of the second sex. Further purchases are made on Juliet’s behalf, a concert is arranged (which 
Elinor spoils, which means that Juliet owes the attendees the price of their tickets as well), and 
though all of the money spent is eventually reimbursed when Juliet’s fortune is restored at the 
end of the novel, the simple fact remains that not a single lady in Brighthelmstone ever pays 
Juliet for the lessons she has given, effectively signaling that women’s own notions of acceptable 
feminine behavior and gendered economics sabotage both themselves and their community by 
prohibiting the flow of money rather than encouraging it. Indeed, the reasons the women give for 
refusing to remunerate the harp mistress—that “one should not pay folks who follow such light 
callings, as one pays people that are useful” (324)—show just how deeply counter-revolutionary 
doctrines of propriety affect the economic health of society at large, not just women who dare to 
step outside of prescribed roles.  
But it is not only British women and the nation as a whole, Burney argues, who suffer 
from the ideals that we have been analyzing in this chapter: certain segments of the male 
population, too, rather than becoming more masculine with the increasingly polarized gender 
taxonomy, find themselves emasculated when they undertake certain kinds of work. Unlike the 
noble feminizing that Corinne and Delphine attempt to exercise over their heroes, with the goal 
of freeing them from dogmatic constructs of duty and honor, male artists and performers in The 
Wanderer are shut out of the male totem of financial increase. Indeed, since society places 
women outside of the economy, any activity that they undertake falls automatically under the 
rubric of “leisure pursuit,” even if it requires great skill and has the potential to be lucrative 
(meaning, at the very least, that there is a demand for it). The areas in which women theoretically 
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excel, thanks to their education—art, music, and dance—consequently are stripped of economic 
value, even when men perform them. In other words, when women undertake pursuits that have 
become codified as feminine leisure and therefore as a sign of anti-production, no one is willing 
to pay for them, even if they have already consumed the product; and when men attempt them, 
even though they bring pleasure and amusement, they receive the appellation of “lazy dancers, 
and players, and painters; who think of no one thing but idleness, and outward shew, and 
diversion” (324) (as the ladies of Brighthelmstone have christened them). Such a description 
coincides all too well with the conduct book models of femininity that ill prepare women for 
domestic life and that counter-revolutionary gender discourse lauds, as Mary Wollstonecraft and 
other feminist writers of the era observed
21
.  
Juliet’s essays, however, at working at a greater distance from so-called feminine leisure 
pursuits further proves the degree to which women’s de facto small sphere sabotages the nation’s 
own economic growth while in fact increasing interest and fascination with forbidden doctrines, 
in this case, France, the very source of the alleged threat. In the milliner’s and mantua maker’s 
shops, Burney tellingly reveals, the newest French fashions, Juliet herself, “one of [the] young 
ladies just come over from France” (429), and the choice of a ribbon or the set of a cap all 
“appeared of higher importance [than] the good of a nation, the interest of society, the welfare of 
a family” (426 emphasis mine). Indeed, the doctrines that the author critiques in her final novel 
have created an economic system that panders to frivolity—itself a French import, “a sign of 
corrupt foreign taste [that] threatens to disrupt the gender balance” (Perkins 79)—at the expense 
of the nation’s health, while refusing to acknowledge the economic value of that same 
“frivolity,” creating, in essence, new categories of slaves: those who produce frivolity without 
                                                 
21
 She writes in the introduction to her Vindication on the Rights of Women that their education “tends to render 
them vain and helpless, and the unfolding mind is not strengthened by the practice of those duties which dignify the 
human character. They live only to amuse themselves” (73). 
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proper remuneration, and those whose “conspicuous consumption” has become an inextricable 
part of their gender identity. Juliet’s ontological diaspora in the country around Salisbury, in 
turn, confirms Burney’s thesis by exposing what a small percentage of the British population is 
truly a part of the nation’s capitalist transformation. Both men and women there “struggle but to 
eat and sleep, may be saved from solicitude, but cannot be elevated to prosperity (699). The fatal 
misconstruction of rural happiness that Burney deconstructs through that whole section of the 
novel brings her economic argument back to the Rights of Man, whose echoes permeate 
discussions of the value of labor, masculine or feminine. Shut out from both varieties, the 
Wanderer can do little more than voice her creator’s contempt for “the total absence of feeling 
and equity, in the dissipated and idle, for the indigent and laborious” (427), a sentence that 
echoes the very origins of the Revolution itself. 
Finally, the fact that the arcs of Juliet’s story are punctuated by the regular loss of her 
money—first at Dover, then through uncollected payments, and finally at the inn near 
Fairfield—highlight the ironic failure of anti-Jacobin doctrines of propriety that alienate women 
from the nation’s means of production. Channeling Edmund Burke’s famous vestimentary 
analogy analyzed in Belinda in Chapter three, Sir Jaspar attributes Juliet’s exasperating and 
continual misplacement of funds to the over ornamentation of  
modern female drapery; which prefers continual inconvenience, innumerable 
privations, and the most distressing untidiness, to the antique habit of modesty 
and good housewifery, which, erst left the public display of the human figure to 
the statuary; deeming that to support the female character was more essential than 
to exhibit the female form. (762) 
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Ancient styles of women’s habiliments, he argues, see to the body’s needs with convenient and 
practical drapery, rather than to its exhibition potential; by favoring such clothing—and the 
values associated with it, that is, modesty and good housewifery—a woman and her body will be 
protected (“supported”) from various kinds of loss and privation, just as, in Burke’s analogy, the 
cultural drapery of time-tested institutions and prejudices will protect the body of the nation from 
the cultural and economic dislocation of the French Revolution’s iconoclastic, exhibitionist 
principles. But there is a fundamental problem with Sir Jaspar’s association: Juliet has not lost 
the money within the folds of her enormous gowns. She is no Pamela, after all, who stashed a 
novel’s worth of letters in her bottomless skirt pockets and amongst her petticoats. Rather, it is 
her workbag that she has twice lost, and her work wages that have been denied. Moreover, the 
very idea that she would lose her means of living within the folds, essentially, of her own body, 
is problematic. Indeed, Jaspar’s misinterpretation reveals the cultural belief that the woman’s 
body itself is incompatible with work and with money, because, despite the disconnect between 
Juliet’s body, dress, and the actual cause of her lost money, even if the old baronet were able to 
categorize her dress as “antique,” it is clear that the “tattered old garments” in which she spends 
much of the novel have in no uncertain terms exposed her to harm rather than protected her. By 
confounding the simple associations between ancient and modern, self-display and self-
concealment, and economic loss and economic, if not gain, stability, at least, Burney condemns 
the anti-Jacobin romance with a chivalric, hierarchical tradition that, ultimately, has made it 
more difficult for women to survive by prescribing them doctrines that, rather than “supporting 
the female character,” compromise it via wide-spread socio-economic exile.  
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Proper revolutions 
Like in Edgeworth’s Belinda, France and French ideas are ultimately redeemed in 
Burney’s novel, for as Harleigh says confidently of Juliet when he first meets her disguised as a 
bandaged, penurious Creole on the coast of France, “the whole, the all-together, carries with it an 
indescribable, but irresistible vindication” (30, emphasis mine). The references to Wollstonecraft 
and later to Burke are no coincidence; the novel is deeply steeped in both the ideology and the 
feeling of the revolutionary period. Burney scholar Margaret Doody has argued that for a novel 
set during the Terror there is surprisingly little outward reference to revolutionary dates or 
executions, and “no King Louis’s head haunting the pages” (xiv). And yet, the feeling of terror, 
as we have seen, positively permeates the The Wanderer. Indeed, references to the Revolution’s 
violent machine, the guillotine, abound, such as with the vicious commissary who gets his just 
deserts, losing his head as the illegitimate “head” of his forced marriage with Juliet, and Juliet 
herself who, after spending the novel protecting her head under her headdress, finds herself in 
the power of that same commissary, who “rudely lifts up her bonnet, to examine her face” (726) 
and “publicly vow[s] that [she] should be made over to the guillotine […] for an example” (742). 
Moreover, the rabid francophobes—indeed, xenophobes—such as the libertine Mr. Ireton, the 
two-faced Selina, the unbending and suspicious Mrs. Howel, the choleric Mrs. Ireton, and the 
uncharitable overlord Mrs. Maple find themselves positively exiled from the Wanderer’s 
eventual home, as they exiled her from the larger sense of home upon her return to her native 
land. In most of its forms, in short, tyranny is squelched.  
In the interstices of these examples revolutionary claustrophobia, however, Burney 
executes a reassessment of the appellations of terror and tyranny themselves by resurrecting 
revolutionary platforms at the same time that she disconnects them from the violent events to 
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which history has thus far bound them. She instead reassigns them a role in the destiny to which 
women seem inevitably condemned, through the perpetual markers of her characters’ 
“misreading,” from the misconstruction of Juliet’s “double face” to the compulsive 
mispronunciation of Robespierre’s name. As “Mr. Robertspiere,” “Signor Robespierre,” “Mr. 
Robert Speer,”  “Mounseer Robert Speer,” and simply “Bob Speer,” the “demon of an attorney, 
that now rules the roast in France (257) becomes a parody of himself, much like Juliet’s 
exaggerated “scruples” parody the nation’s dramatic overcorrection in its rejection of 
Robespierre’s policies. A jaunty executioner who “mow[s] down his hundreds, like as to grass in 
a hay-field” (93), Bob Speer is a kind of Punch and Judy distillation of the Terror. Both the 
manifold names given to the Wanderer and the imprecision of Robespierre’s own name in the 
mouths of local folk demonstrate their own gravely mistaken assessment of terror as a uniquely 
French phenomenon, and of the doctrines that led to it as irremediably terrifying in themselves. 
It is through Elinor Joddrel, a disciple of “that light nation,” that Burney crafts her most 
potent reanimation of revolutionary ideologies—but not for the reason that one might think. 
Indeed, like Edgeworth, Burney resuscitates Mary Wollstonecraft in the figure of her anti-
heroine, but we must ask to what end, since, though the outspoken rebel claims to be Juliet’s 
advocate and shows occasional sympathy for her plight, she actively works against the Wanderer 
in many ways. For example, it is clear from the first pages that Elinor has grossly misinterpreted 
Enlightenment and revolutionary philosophies of natural equality. As an advocate of the Rights 
of Women, she has little sympathy for the actual material sufferings of her fellow sisters: when 
the boat crew first encounter Juliet on the coast of France, Elinor declines helping this woman in 
need. Moreover, she is the very one who initially opens the floor for the contemptuous 
conversation that fixes Juliet as the object of “the vivifying food of conjecture” (12-13) for the 
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rest of the passage across the Channel and, indeed, the rest of the novel. All too ready to side 
against the desperate Juliet, the alleged advocate of women’s emancipation calls Harleigh’s 
sympathy for her “fine sayings,” and immediately agrees with the others that, due to her 
traveling “so strangely alone [and] so oddly without resource” (30), she is surely female fortune 
hunter. When she finally consents to help the Wanderer, it is, like many other of Elinor’s 
apparently “revolutionary” undertakings, only to vex her hyper-conservative aunt, Mrs. Maple, 
or other members of her narrow-minded community that, even “if the whole world were 
revolutionized, [could never] conceive a new idea” (153).  
Even in her own tyrannical attempts to control others, she ironically misreads the 
revolutionary effect of her own undertakings. When she determines to produce a version of John 
Vanbrugh’s The Provoked Husband, for example, she gives various parts in the play to local 
servants, stewards, and footmen, “for the pleasure of giving a lesson of democracy to Aunt 
Maple” (70). And yet she is entirely blind to the opportunity of extending democracy by helping 
Juliet, and instead, and in truly ironic form, forces her, through the tyrannical stranglehold of that 
same immovable Aunt Maple, to perform the lead part in her “revolutionary” play. At the same 
time, however she fails to realize that she has in fact cast a revolutionary heroine (both a survivor 
of the Revolution and its favorite daughter for her iconoclastic refusal of categorization by the 
dreaded aristocratic imperatives of name, family, and class) in the lead role of her allegedly 
insurrectionary play. In fact, she is so caught up in her own performance that she does not even 
observe the degree to which Juliet’s talent succeeds in democratically closing the gap between 
namelessness and innate value with those of the spectators who know how she came to be with 
Elinor’s family.  
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Elinor’s misreading of the revolutionary platforms of égalité and fraternité, as well as 
Wollstonecraft’s call for a revision in female manners, makes explicit Burney’s bold 
disassociation of French revolutionary ideals and violence. Having mistaken Wollstonecraft’s 
female ideal of autonomy for the reclamation of the right to usurp masculine courtship rituals, 
Elinor constantly casts herself in her exchanges with Harleigh as the heroine subject to love’s 
tyranny in a sentimental novel. Indeed, her determination to “speak and act, as well as think and 
feel for myself!” (154) merely succumbs to the powerful sway of other received ideas, and 
instead involves falling into the most threadbare platitudes of heterosexual love rituals; Harleigh, 
who is critical of Elinor’s actions because of their association with French revolutionary ideals, 
should look to her reading instead: “Elinor gently sunk upon her chair,” after exhausting her 
frame in passionate declarations, “yet let him full possession of her hand” (175-6). Her letter to 
him offers Burney’s most powerful reassignment of terror to the same chivalric sexual roles 
analyzed above, rather than to the ideologies embodied in the French threat. In it, Elinor 
abandons the principles of individual liberty that she previously lauded, all for a love that she 
believes liberates merely because she has the courage to declare it: “To you, my free soul, my 
liberated mind, my new-born ideas, all yield, willing slaves, to what I conceive to be your 
counsel. […] How sovereign is your power! More absolute than the tyranny of the controlling 
world; more arbitrary than prescription; more invincible than the prejudices of the ages!—You, I 
cannot resist!” (190 emphasis mine). Love has essentially resurrected all of the forces that the 
Revolution itself fought to destroy, and which Elinor herself claims to abhor. Her choice of 
romantic hallucination over reason, then, reveals the fact that the real tyranny here, the one to 
which she falls prey, is the narrow sphere of existence that is available to women in the wake of 
anti-Jacobin radical domestication. The French commissary, in contrast, the one tangible 
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representative of the Revolution itself and of its violence, does not terrorize via what Britains 
would have been able to label as Jacobin ideals, but rather out of pure avarice: he forces Juliet to 
marry him in order to secure the 6000£ that her uncle has promised to her future husband; and 
Burney has already amply displayed her skepticism of the popular view of capitalist growth as 
nationalistic proof  that Britain promotes neither tyranny nor terror of its own. Finally, though we 
cannot know for sure whether or not Burney read de Staël’s novels, the Revolutionary Heroine, 
an evolving construct in the political, social, and literary ripples of meaning that followed the 
Revolution, has spurred an evolution in female characters in general that offers a definitive 
answer to Corinne and Delphine: that Elinor survives her suicide attempts and “moderate[s] her 
passions,” while “her eccentricities […] ceas[e] to absorb her whole being” (873) confirms for 
women at large that unrequited love is not really worth dying for in the first place. Burney’s anti-
heroine, despite her initial misreadings, ultimately draws a more apt conclusion from 
Wollstonecraft’s Vindication than either de Staëlien heroine was able to do.  
The answer, then, to the question of Burney’s goal in presenting a Wollstonecraftian 
figure with, however, highly ambiguous implications and what appear to be a host of mixed 
messages lies in the fact that while Elinor is unorthodox, she is not really a threat, and, therefore, 
neither is the nation whose ideologies she so imperfectly represents. Similar to Edgeworth’s anti-
heroine, Harriet Freke, Elinor’s her perpetual misreading both of Rights of Man doctrines and of 
the novels that have filled her mind with romantic shibboleths consistently neutralize any actual 
social disruption or hierarchical overturn that she might have caused. Like Freke’s provocative 
stunts, Elinor’s self-serving displays present a portrait of Britain’s collective fears of the 
Wollstonecraftian figure rather than of the ideas contained in her writings or of the feminist 
herself.  
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And similar to Edgeworth’s valorization of Belinda, Burney deflects Wollstonecraft’s 
philosophical agency onto her Revolutionary Heroine who, as we have seen, forces similar 
feminist conclusions about the ruse of feminine delicacy as a set of behaviors meant to protect 
women that in fact weaken and expose them to harm, and which has far deeper political 
significance than the mere question of women’s behavior or role inside and outside of the home. 
Indeed, it is Juliet, not her outspoken foil, who truly defies convention, taking genuine risks in 
the name of her sex. For despite her gender and her high birth, she works and receives money, 
she attempts to live independently, and, alienated from the mainstream existence that she 
observes around her, she purposefully withdraws from society in the same manner that male 
wanderers before her have done, which makes her actions vastly more subversive than Elinor’s 
because of the deep challenges that they pose to men’s economic, political, and literary 
hegemony. Moreover, like Revolutionary Heroines before and after her, she too, through her 
diaspora and exile, saves the life of a man, her guardian the bishop, and her language of noble 
self-sacrifice is utterly categorical on this point: “No hardships of adversity […] nor even any 
temptation to happiness […] no consideration that this world can offer” could possibly tempt her 
to abandon her promise to preserve her guardian at all costs. While Elinor makes no real sacrifice 
for her principles, offering instead farcical expositions and empty gestures of romantic formulae 
calculated to illicit pity and eventually love, Juliet lowers herself to the level of the poorest and 
the most despicable in society, even making an attempt at genuine vagabondage, in order to 
remain faithful to her ideal of honesty, integrity, and propriety, thereby exposing the paradoxes 
within counter-revolutionary expectations of feminine conduct and gendered economics. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly of all, Juliet refuses love as a refuge, thereby thwarting the trap of 
tyranny and terror in which Elinor found herself caught, that, as Pam Perkins has argued, 
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“women might be strong, rich, and intelligent, but they still will risk all for love” (70). Juliet, in 
what is surely the greatest coup executed in the name of her silence and her scrupulosity, turns 
this paradigm on its head. Surrounded by admirable men who offer to save her honorably by 
taking on her burdens through matrimony, Juliet never once considers love as an escape from her 
torments, even though her own virtuous arguments on the sanctity of marriage “were insufficient 
to convince her that her [forced] marriage was valid” (845). Indeed, she entirely avoids the 
centuries-old assumption that the feminine body exists solely for and by male adoration by being 
consistently (and realistically, thankfully) unconcerned about holding the interest of potentially 
acceptable suitors while on the lam. 
And yet, Burney’s anti-heroine is a much fuller character than Harriet Freke, and unlike 
Edgeworth’s boorish “man-woman,” Elinor’s Rights of Man speeches include “a striking degree 
of rigor, coherence, and theoretically enlightened optimism” (Mack 44); we must remember, not 
a single voice in the novel attempts to confute the logic or objective justice of her propos, even if 
the characters are critical of the actions she takes on their behalf. Burney’s intent then, is 
different than Edgeworth’s: while Belinda neutralizes Freke and nearly the entirety of her 
irrational and unsupported discourse,  in The Wanderer, Elinor’s viable speeches serve to 
articulate Juliet’s experience in the political language that the narrative denies the heroine 
because, as Victoria Kortes Papp as observed, “Had [Juliet] been outspoken, she would not have 
been a very viable heroine, her delicacy being too deeply valued by all” (103),22 the 1814 reader 
                                                 
22
 And indeed, how could Burney have done otherwise? If Juliet had a criminal interior to match her 
duplicitous exterior, or an angelic exterior that mirrored her exemplary interior, if she had, moreover, no 
secrets, no contingencies, nothing to cause those around her to question her worth, how could the author 
possibly expose the paradox of propriety, a doctrine entirely based on binary dictates? As Jill Heydt-
Stevenson has indicated, “the only identity that exists for any woman who lives outside the context of family 
and marital security,” such as Juliet clearly does at the start of the novel, “is that of the criminal adventurer or 
prostitute” (59). As such, Juliet would have met with a criminal’s  or a prostitute’s fate, while as a model of 
womanhood, the heroine may have had Romanesque struggles and trials, but without misconception of her 
virtue, no one would ever have questioned her value as a woman. Indeed, presenting the paradox of propriety 
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included.  By disconnecting Elinor’s speeches from her actions, of which the anti-heroine’s 
blatant inability to live by her own precepts is powerful proof, Burney successfully defuses 
Elinor’s “revolutionary” threat by eventually reigning in the character while still valorizing the 
ideologies that she preaches, and leaving the Rights of Man (and Woman) discourse perfectly 
intact for her readers to absorb. Indeed, we can scarcely say that the novel makes no political 
statement through Elinor, or through any other character, for in the totality of the words and 
deeds therein, a harsh portrait of the author’s native land emerges, one that calls for reform on 
many levels. And though Burney lived quietly, she was fiercely protective of her work and of the 
ideas contained therein. When preparing revisions for a new edition of The Wanderer which was 
ultimately never published, the author refused to attenuate the radicalism contained in Elinor’s 
speeches, which she called “of deep interest […], on the whole excellent […], altogether the 
best” (qtd in Mack 45); despite major amputations and rewrites to the rest of the novel, she left 
almost the entirety of Elinor’s passage therein untouched.  
However, Elinor’s misreading of equality and fraternity is meant to parallel the nation’s 
own erroneous belief that tyranny is necessarily a French phenomenon, one that could 
contaminate British liberty. The author echoes Maria Edgeworth’s conclusions on this matter, 
that, quite simply, French ideas are no more dangerous than British ones, and that the categorical 
condemnation of foreign philosophies only causes domestic politics to veer dangerously into 
extremism, as Burney displays both with Juliet’s ironic self-mummification in the name of 
propriety and Elinor’s madness in the name of “revolutionary” love. Indeed, Burney’s 
Revolutionary heroine has made great strides in fusing the feminist and cosmopolitan doctrines 
that we have seen so far in Corinne, Delphine, and Belinda. I agree with Scott J Juengal, that 
                                                                                                                                                             
with its own paradox—a woman who appears depraved but who is actually a paragon of innocence—is the 
only way to short-circuit the anti-Jacobin dogma of delicacy. Putting Elinor’s revolutionary speeches in Juliet’s 
mouth would have entirely undermined Burney’s quest in writing The Wanderer. 
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“there is something of a Kantian novel tucked within the sprawling narrative of Burney’s The 
Wanderer” (66). The infuriating portraits of xenophobes—parodies of anti-Jacobin literary 
patriots—who take such pleasure in their terrifying attempts to short-circuit Juliet’s alterity, find 
a peaceful resolution in the scene where the Admiral discovers his friendship for the French 
bishop, a startling surprise for a man whose “creed is to look upon your nation as little better 
than a cluster of rogues” (858). Upon being reunited with his charge and striking up a friendship 
with the old sea captain, the Bishop exults in “Thanksgiving […], thanksgiving and prayers for 
“UNIVERSAL PEACE” (857), seemingly a call for the universal hospitality and perpetual 
peace that Kant espoused in his political writings and that were so fundamental to the growth of 
Enlightenment cosmopolitanism. 
 
Conclusion 
The author’s frequent allusions to the dueling representatives of French revolutionary 
debate—Edmund Burke and Mary Wollstonecraft—reveals that, for her, the conversation is not 
over; indeed, using the hyperbole of Juliet’s femininity, the complex responses that it provokes, 
and the novel-wide misconstruction of much of French revolutionary ideologies, Burney 
resurrects Enlightenment issues of class and gender equality and demonstrates that they are more 
relevant than ever, even if the 1814 British population is unwilling to return to 1790s political 
concerns. Patricia Meyer Spacks reads the constant tug of war between Juliet’s stubborn silence 
and flight and the other characters’ pertinacious interrogatories and pursuits as Burney’s claim 
for “the urgency for women of preserving some intact inner realm as a vital preliminary to any 
sense of control or autonomy” (526). While I agree that this is true, I also see the juxtaposition of 
these acts as a comparison that the author courageously draws between social politics in her 
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native country and the two back-to-back periods of despotism that shook its neighbor across the 
Channel. The military dictatorship under which Burney lived in France for ten years and the 
revolutionary period which she observed closely with her French husband Alexandre d’Arblay 
shared the quality of state intervention into citizens’ private lives taken to the extreme. Both 
included bloody suppression of dissension and secret or mock trials and executions. And, of 
course, we mustn’t forget the infamous lettres de cachet from the Ancien Régime through the 
early 1790s that had characterized France as a bastion of tyranny before the Revolution even 
began. But life is scarcely better in Britain, Burney demonstrates, for someone who does not in 
every way conform to upper class social convention. When Mrs. Howel, after imprisoning Juliet 
in Arundel castle, assures her that “You will be properly watched” (571), and when Lord 
Denmeath later promises that if the Wanderer does not return to France willingly, “You may else 
make the voyage less pleasantly!” (616), the threats that the heroine faced in Revolutionary 
France no longer seem extraordinary, nor foreign, and Britain begins to resemble the near-fascist 
state from which it worked so hard throughout the 1790s to differentiate itself. In effect, the men 
and women of Brighthelmstone who hunt her, and who offer the reader “portrait[s] of English 
insularity and meanness [distilled to] near pathological intensity” (Mack 22), cling so 
compulsively to their narrow vision of Britishness that they become indisputable proof that 
England’s insular breed of anti-Jacobin nationalism is, at bottom, not so different from 
Robespierre’s hyperpatriotic suppression of political alterity, nor from Napoleon’s own jingoistic 
nation building campaigns.   
Peppered throughout the novel, however, and within the interstices of the Revolutionary 
Heroine’s “excess of timidity” (776), are moments when she steps outside of her ironic role to 
reclaim the liberty that her performances reveal as otherwise inaccessible to women, such as 
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when she forcefully recovers her right to subjecthood from Mrs. Ireton after months of degrading 
and dehumanizing working conditions: “Who told you to go?” Ireton screeches when she begins 
to leave: “A person, Madam, who has not the honor to be known to you,--myself!” (526). It is 
telling that when she finally determines to quit Mrs. Ireton because of her abuse, it is to her own 
power as a subject that she assigns the task of liberating her nameless body in a supreme act of 
radical, subjective privacy, the very state of being that anti-Jacobin discourse feared because it 
promulgated “a notion of exquisite individual sensibility which, although called into play by the 
outside world, was essentially self-authorizing rather than produced through subjection to any 
social structure” (Watson 24). Such a moment in the novel offers more explicit proof of Burney’s 
identification of the Revolution as a source of civil rationality, despite the fact that it spiraled 
into epic bloodshed and civil war. Through Juliet’s friend Gabriella she links it to the potential 
for change in the way that the upper classes evaluate goods and services—including women 
themselves—and in the way they view the work done by their supposed inferiors: “The French 
Revolution has opened our eyes,” Gabriella explains to Jaspar Harrington, “to a species of 
equality more rational, because more feasible, than that of lands or of rank; an equality not alone 
of mental sufferings, but of manual exertions” (639). Harleigh makes a surprising and similar 
justification of the Revolution when he attempts to convince the Admiral and Lord Melbury that, 
despite the bloody outcome, beneficent reformations have also resulted, and have been 
responsible, in part, for creating the woman that they have all come to love: Juliet.  “[Its] 
observant and suffering witnesses, have been formed by it to fortitude, prudence, and 
philosophy; it has taught them to strengthen the mind with the body; it has animated the exercise 
of reason, the exertion of the faculties, activity in labor, resignation in endurance, and 
cheerfulness under every privation” (870). These summaries have little to do with the “dreadful 
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synthesis of assaults on queens, killings of kings, of priests hanging from lamp-posts, streets 
deluged in blood, and of cannibalism, incest, and unrestrained sexual license” (Grenby 7) into 
which anti-Jacobin portraits of revolution—which still had heavy circulation and mighty 
influence in Britain well into the 1800s—had cohered. Indeed, that Juliet’s own half-brother 
Lord Melbury propositions her early in the novel only further proves the irrationality of such 
portraits as well as the deliberate blindness of the extremist nationalism that they obscure. 
What is left, then, in addition to the kaleidoscope-pastiche of radical rumblings, is a 
vaguely disturbing reminiscence of Juliet’s experiences of persecution and constraint, two 
substantives that, because the novel takes place on British soil, make the appellation of anti-
Jacobin impossible to assign here. The private, domestic femininity that anti-Jacobin texts laud is 
forbidden to Burney’s heroine, and what she witnesses of domesticity during her passage through 
both aristocratic homes and those on the periphery of society is enough to convince anyone of 
the failure of family reform in Britain. Though her eventual marriage to Harleigh reinserts her 
into the socio-sexual hierarchy, she and her husband leave England precipitously for the dreaded 
revolutionary France, where they spend the next few years before the birth of their first child. We 
can only assume that, given her dual nationalities and languages and her many ties to the land of 
England’s sworn enemy, that Juliette and her family will continue their intimate congress with 
France, thus subverting anti-Jacobin nationalist agendas and fictions of national relations.   
In conclusion, then, while some feminist scholars discount Burney for what they see as 
her criticism of women at every level of the novel, I have argued that  the root of the problem 
lies, in each case, in the exigencies of an increasingly patriarchal society that was closing them 
further and further into the hermetically sealed domestic realm in order to fend off the attack on 
“Christianity, and natural religion, [on]  monarchy, [on] order,  subordination, property and 
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justice” (Robert Bisset qtd in Grenby 8) that their revolutionary liberation from the natural yokes 
of their sex appeared to represent. As I have shown, Burney condemns this reality with the ironic 
and sometimes hyperbolic displays of her heroine’s propriety. In other words, her portrait is not 
an example of prescriptive mimesis, as Claudia Johnson reads it, but satirical mimesis which, 
through its subversive irony, becomes reformative. Perhaps the most disruptive sentence in the 
novel, the secret thesis with which Burney declares the paradox inherent to the conception of 
woman, is spoken by Elinor: “This Woman, whom they estimate thus below, they elevate above 
themselves. They require from her, in defiance of their examples!—in defiance of their lures!—
angelical perfection. […] She must always be guided by reason, though they deny her 
understanding!” (399-400). In it, the author challenges not only the double standard both of 
reason and of sexual purity for women, but also the impossible juxtaposition of femininity and 
divinity in the increasingly influential portrait of the Angel in the House. In the privacy of their 
radical subjecthood, both Juliet and Burney ultimately denounce obligatory duplicity and 
dissimulation, dependency, weakness, selfishness, submission and ornamentalism for women, 
while freeing rationalism, reason, equality, and democracy from the tainted grip of French 
revolutionary doctrines.  
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Chapter V 
“Ni un homme, ni une femme”: Nanon and the women’s Revolution 
 
George Sand’s Nanon may seem an unusual choice for a study that, so far, has focused on 
turn-of-the-century novels of the French Revolution because, while the narrative unfolds during 
the Terror, Sand wrote the book in 1871, nearly one hundred years after the storming of the 
Bastille. And yet, it is the ideal way to close this discussion of feminism and femininity, 
citizenship, and nationalism for the very reason that makes it seem out of synch with the other 
novels analyzed here: Sand’s generation had the privilege of being close enough to the 1789 
revolution to be keenly aware of its ideals, accomplishments, and shortcomings, and yet was 
young enough to witness the full scope of the revolutionary struggle as France stumbled into 
modern statehood through successive uprisings in 1830, 1848, and 1871. The last of those 
conflicts, the Paris Commune, had a profound influence on the composition of Nanon, and 
encouraged the drafting of this, her most pacifistic novel. With nearly a century’s perspective, 
then, on the quest for liberté, égalité, and fraternité, Sand is able to undertake a powerful 
rewriting of the story of 1789, demonstrating that one of the primary failings of each 
revolutionary manifestation was the continued systematic neglect of women’s education and the 
institutionalized underestimation of their potential as citizens. In so doing, she returns time and 
time again to the same arguments put forth by de Staël, Edgeworth, and Burney, analyzed in the 
three previous chapters, which aim to deconstruct pre- and post-revolutionary conceptions of 
woman, gender, and citizenship and their relationship to the nation. In each case, however, both 
Sand’s historical perspective and her particular literary approach allow her to reconcile the true 
revolutionary turn of events (bloodshed and increased oppression) with a successful playing out 
of pro-women theses through the miraculous local successes that Nanon and her friends 
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experience. Indeed, the novel answers and neutralizes every concern that authors in the previous 
chapters have voiced, realizing every hope for female betterment, gender equality, and education, 
despite the chaos and violence of the Terror that surround the characters.  
 As one of Sand’s lesser-known and lesser-read novels, Nanon has not received the 
scholarly attention of classics such as Indiana or Consuelo. However, those that have treated the 
novel have tended to congregate around a fairly consistent series of themes: universal citizenship 
and the confounding of social hierarchy, economic growth based on non-collectivist agrarian 
reform, woman as a source of social regeneration after the disorientation of the Revolution, and 
the valorization of women’s alternative forms of knowledge, primarily visual, topographical, and 
geographical. My arguments will necessarily take a slightly different direction since I will be 
reading these same themes, as well as others, through the lens of the Revolutionary Heroine. But 
my analysis will also differ in significant ways: Nicole Savy treats the question of citizenship, for 
example, but argues that the heroine seeks it in order to make herself an eligible marriage partner 
for Émilien. In my reading, however, Nanon’s awakening to civic awareness long precedes her 
awareness of love—in fact, it is dependent upon her initial indifference to romantic love. 
Moreover, while many critics such as Nancy Rogers, Simone Bernard-Griffiths, and Françoise 
Massardier-Kennedy have highlighted the heroine’s atypical femininity in her economic and 
academic pursuits, none has studied them explicitly in the context of the long eighteenth-
century’s prescriptions for women’s roles and domesticity, nor, moreover, in relation to how 
those long-standing assumptions about women’s capacities and duties played out in 
revolutionary iconography, which Nanon, I will argue, purposefully counters. Claire Lise-
Tondeur, in turn, has called Nanon an avatar of Rousseau’s Julie because of her virtue, her 
‘honnêteté intransigeante et [a]ltruisme généreux” (45) an understandable comparison, since 
152 
 
Sand’s novel attempts to bridge the gap between the Revolution’s philosophical jumping off 
point with the first stirrings of the Rights of Man discourse—of which Julie, like other women in 
literature, was unable to benefit significantly—and its bloody final destination, the Terror.  
However I disagree with Tondeur’s comparison in that, unlike Julie, Nanon commits no great 
transgression that must be overcome, and while she creates and inhabits various forms of the 
paradisiacal domesticity of Julie’s and Wolmar’s Clarens, she carries no seed of rebellion in her 
breast as Rousseau’s heroine does with her continued love for St. Preux. The only transgression 
that could possibly be attributed to her is the same assumption detailed above of so-called 
“masculine” skills, which lead her to become “ni une femme ni un homme” (272) but rather a 
happy amalgam of the two; however, the novel completely valorizes this androgyneity that in 
pre-revolutionary times Rousseau might have condemned according to his assessment of 
masculine women in Emile, that she is “worth more as a woman, but less as a man; […] 
wherever she attempts to usurp ou[r] [rights] she remains inferior to us” (262). However, Sand’s 
Revolutionary Heroine proves her superiority in everything that she undertakes, and her story of 
“une mutation économique spectaculaire orchestrée par une femme” (Mozet 75) both concretizes 
the development of Wollstonecraft’s manly virtues23 in women as well as proves the absolute 
necessity of less strictly delineated gendered spheres for the reformation at the national level that 
Nanon inspires and coordinates at the domestic level. As the novel’s capitalist and philanthropic 
vigilante, then, Sand’s Revolutionary Heroine necessarily counters the portrait of femininity that 
the domesticating discourse prescribed, and which has been at stake in the three previous 
chapters. Contrasted with her foil, Louise de Franqueville, who is “une vraie femme, avec toutes 
les séductions et toutes les fantaisies de la faiblesse” (272), Nanon rejects the passivity, duplicity, 
                                                 
23
 Her manly virtues are “those talents and virtues, the exercise of which ennobles the human character, and which 
raises females in the scale of animal being, when they are comprehensively termed mankind” (Wollstonecraft 72) 
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and frivolity characteristic of other fictional women. Finally, though Tondeur has argued that 
Sand “remet en question les modèles romanesques féminins qui se trouve dans les romans 
historiques, rustiques, ou les récits d’aventure, trois genres auxquels appartient ce roman” (50), I 
will argue that the very real revolutions that Nanon brings about in those around her allow her to 
become a vehicle for Sand’s rewrite of the Bildungsroman genre, which the author considers in 
the scope of the nation’s own coming-of-age-story as it emerged from the failed Revolution. 
Reimagining a version of the Revolution that could have succeeded if it had been able to avoid 
violence and sought the source of its regeneration both in its own past and in the neglected half 
of its citizenry, Nanon poses women, as we will see, as the only beings capable, because of their 
innate gifts of pity, sensibility à la Delphine, as well as their capacity for production of all kinds, 
of bringing prosperity to the family and the nation.  
The development of the Revolutionary Heroine who is able to spearhead this non-violent 
revision hangs upon several unorthodox events that presage her refusal of violence and her keen 
economic insight, both of which are key to the success of her mission. To start, when her uncle 
first has it in his mind to encourage her independence, he sits her on his knee and gives her “une 
bonne claque sur la joue” (3) before beginning his speech on responsibility. That a young girl’s 
life in this era would be punctuated by violence is a surprise neither to the modern-day nor to the 
nineteenth-century reader, but Sand transforms this fact of life, which her uncle carries out “pour 
votre bien” (3) into the catalyst for Nanon’s entrance into self-awareness and the origin of her 
agency: it is after this wake-up slap that he explains his plan to buy her a sheep, the grain of her 
eventual “fortune assez considerable […] dont elle se plaisait à dire qu’elle […] avait 
commencée avec un [seul] mouton” (352). In so doing, her uncle perpetrates the notion that 
woman must accept what seem like inevitable acts of violence against her; Nanon, however, 
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rather than succumb\ing to this display of force rechannels it into the author’s quest to “redo the 
Terror,” by instead transforming violence into the material production that Rosette will spur and 
the philanthropy that she will practice with the fruits, an act that will eventually thwart exterior 
violence, as Delphine also demonstrated. Nanon will soon after adapt this theory to Émilien in 
matters of abuse between social classes, and together they will symbolize pacifism at the national 
level. Nanon’s refusal to accept violence as a function of a necessary feminine subjugation—and 
later class subjugation—further parallels Sand’s denial of love-potential as what qualifies a 
woman first and foremost as such, because it is not when Nanon meets her future husband 
Émilien, but rather when she receives her first piece of property and her first responsibility of 
“maternité” (8)—the sheep Rosette—that “je sentis que j’étais quelqu’un.  Je distinguais ma 
personne de celle des autres” (8), thereby promoting economic awareness and the capacity to 
care for the helpless as an alternative to the ability to arouse desire for the basis of a woman’s 
identity. And like any other ideal Republican mother, the model that she proposes for social 
reform, of which her stewardship and cultivation of Rosette is a mere microcosm, rests not on 
violence toward others to achieve one’s goals, but violence to one’s self for the good of others: 
“je me mis les mains en sang dans les épines,” she says of her ardent search for feed for Rosette, 
“mais je ne sentais rien et je n’avais peur de rien” (7). Her devotion to this creature that 
represents her identity, her self-awareness, and her subsequent ability as a woman to love and to 
sacrifice while still being deeply immersed in the machinery of capitalism, gives birth to the 
guiding principle of her life, one that Sand wishes to see realized at all levels of society: 
Si vous le faites bien manger, si vous ne le perdez pas, si vous tenez bien sa 
bergerie, il deviendra beau, et, avec l’argent qu’il me revaudra l’an qui vient, je 
vous en achèterai deux, et l’année suivante, quatre; alors vous commencerez à être 
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fière de marcher de pair avec les autres jeunesses qui ont de la raison et qui font 
du profit à leur famille (3). 
Nanon’s uncle’s directions to her about caring for her property stand in as an analogy that the 
novel advocates for the value of work and education in elevating society at large: a person, a 
family, or a nation can profit from the same regime of care and cultivation, can “devenir beau” 
and walk proudly in equality with others. Indeed, Sand takes purposeful steps away from the 
brewing Marxist sentiments in 1871 France,
24
 away from collectivism, back to the equal access 
to private property that the ideals of the Revolution itself seemed to promote with the sale of 
church and noble properties beginning in 1791. Of course, we see the gap between reality and 
ideal insofar as this liquidation in fact served to fill the nation’s empty coffers, while few 
peasants could raise the money to acquire these properties; the sale did not, therefore, lead to the 
emancipation from class hierarchy that was expected. Indeed, in the novel it is the bourgeois 
Costejoux who initially purchases the most significant piece of property in the Valcreux, the 
moutier. As Sand’s rewrite of the revolution continues, however, the peasants band together to 
buy a single piece of property for Nanon to govern: this, together with Rosette, becomes the 
financial foundation that allows her later to buy the moutier from Costejoux. Sand’s 
Revolutionary Heroine, with her blossoming education and financial savvy, eventually 
demonstrates that agrarian reform rather than either collectivism or monarchism could spur on 
the establishment of true civic equality, according to which, the fruit of one’s work and good 
deeds is a greater social leveler than one’s birth or wealth. Following this pattern, Nanon’s thirst 
                                                 
24
 The 1871 Paris Commune prompted a reevaluation of the various branches of collectivist reform that had been 
coalescing over the previous decades, from Saint-simonion socialism to Marxism. Despairing of the bourgeoisie or 
the working class ever being able to lead genuine, nation-wide reforms, Sand was convinced only the agrarian 
class—“la France matérielle, invincible”—in possession of “propriété achetée et non reçue” (Mozet 46) is capable 
of revitalizing the nation. For the author, the collectivism of Marxism undermines the necessary education and 
responsibility that comes from true proprietorship. 
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for education grows as the novel progresses, and her concomitant skills and knowledge, ability to 
teach and help others, and economic and agricultural successes all become the criteria that set her 
apart from other men and women, who ultimately declare her to be “une personne supérieure” 
(324). 
Since education is the primary means that this Revolutionary Heroine uses to elevate 
herself from poverty and peasantry to wealth and citizenship, and since she is, at the start of the 
novel, living in the basest degree of poverty, the realization of this transformation at the level of 
the nation, the novel illustrates, requires a necessary collaboration between rich and poor, of 
which Nanon and Émilien’s symbiotic relationship is symbolic, and which the Revolution itself 
failed to realize. Though he is of noble birth, because he is the youngest child with no right to the 
family fortune, his parents have abandoned him to a monastery. His class, however, gives him 
access to materials that Nanon could never acquire, but which he scorns and refuses out of 
frustration and disdain for his situation: “À quoi cela me servirait-il? Je ne dois jamais rien 
avoir!” (35), he insists. Because of his impending monastic vows, he has determined “[de ne pas] 
me donner mal pour des bien périssables” (19). But Nanon understands the word “avoir” 
differently, more as a potentially rich state of being than a potentially rich way of possessing: 
“C’est une honte que de rester simple quand on peut devenir savant” she chides him. “Moi, si 
j’avais le moyen, je voudrais tout apprendre” (35). She presses Émilien to share his “moyens,” 
and he begins to teach her the little that he knows, his own knowledge increasing as he does so. 
This remonstrance acts as the slap in the face—the pacifistic alternative to violence that the 
Revolutionary Heroine champions—that wakes him from his own stupor: from that day forward, 
he too devotes himself to study and self-improvement. As Émilien benefits from teaching Nanon 
and beginning his own studies, he experiences a similar awakening and initiation into self-
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awareness: “Il me semble que je commence à exister,” he tells her. "Et quand je veux parler, je 
viens à bout maintenant de dire quelque chose: c’est que j’ai quelque chose dans la tête. Je ne 
sais pas encore ce que c’est, mais mon cœur me dit que ce sera quelque chose de bon et 
d’humain” (69-70). Nanon’s consciousness, too, has evolved from simple self-awareness to a 
complex understanding of her place in society, of the duties that accompany it, and of her 
potential. She sees that she is part of a larger whole to which she has some responsibility, and 
which prompts her philanthropy: “Elle a beaucoup d’esprit et elle apprend vite et bien tout ce 
qu’elle peut apprendre,” Émilien says of her at La Fête de la Fédération. ”Ce qu’elle sait, elle ne 
le garde pas pour elle, elle est pressée de l’enseigner […], elle donne autant de soins aux plus 
pauvres qu’aux plus riches” (63). Indeed, after her very first lesson with Émilien, in which she 
learns the alphabet, Nanon prophetically declares: “L’envie de savoir me mena très-loin” (47), 
foreshadowing for the reader not only the breadth of knowledge that she will acquire, but also 
the travels that she will undertake, which will expose her to new ideas and new ways of living, 
but also to dangerous people and parts of the landscape, even leading her to the foot of the 
guillotine.  
If there is a temptation to which Nanon falls prey (as an avatar of Julie, as Tondeur has 
suggested), it is the reading of “forbidden” books as part of her self-education, specifically 
Histoire des Hommes, “un ouvrage nouveau en ce temps-là” that the monks forbid Émilien from 
reading but which he and Nanon study together. This handbook of revolutionary justification “ne 
cachait pas la vérité sur les superstitions et les injustices de ce monde” (114). Like Adam and 
Eve in the Garden of Eden, the couple acquires knowledge of socio-political good and evil upon 
tasting this forbidden fruit, becoming keenly aware of the inequity and intolerance that exist 
outside of their small community and that has driven the history of the world thus far. However, 
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rather than banishment and divine disenfranchisement,
25
 their transgression provokes “un tas 
d’idées […] à propos de tout” (115) and marks, tellingly, the break between parts one and two of 
the novel, a moment of transition at which Nanon, because of her quest for knowledge and the 
empirical economic experiments that she has tested, realizes that “je n’étais plus paysanne que 
par l’habit et the travail” (115). Her transformation—the fruit of the knowledge that she could 
never have acquired without Émilien (and vice versa)—proves Sand’s thesis that the necessary 
collaboration between classes and genders, such as the union of his aristocratic resources and her 
peasant work ethic, is the key to progression. Indeed, the various arts in which the hero and 
heroine instruct one another, and which they always find occasion to draw upon to increase their 
domestic and economic production, frequently save them from the multitude of threats that the 
era places before them. Their practice, in turn, sees wider play in the novel as a whole as Nanon 
(a peasant), Émilien (an aristocrat), the lawyer Costejoux (a bourgeois) and Dumont (of the 
servant class) together pool their skills, money, and savoir-faire in order to cultivate prosperity.  
Both Nanon’s and Émilien’s trajectories—in education and in love—illustrate Sand’s 
desire to reshape the classic bildungsroman, thereby proposing feminine/feminist alternatives to 
this classic genre and creating a literary vehicle capable of containing politics, love, adventure, 
history, and economics with a woman at its head. Thus, although Émilien, like other bildungs 
heroes, increases in wisdom and intellect throughout the novel, in Sand’s feminist rethinking of 
the genre, he actually chooses to move down the social scale, and ultimately renounces his 
nobility, an act that is made possible exclusively by Nanon’s catalytic influence over him. That a 
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 This, for me, is the problem with Tondeur’s comparison: if we can consider Nanon’s reading, education, and 
“masculine” pursuits as a giving into temptation as Julie did, such transgressions elevate her to the status of heroine 
and gain her a noble title, as well as the admiration of nearly every other character in the novel. While Julie is not 
“punished” in the traditional sense for her carnal sin, she is instead “banished” from love as Eve was banished from 
the garden. She cultivates the desert of Clarens and causes it to fructify, but always carries the paradisiacal vision of 
St. Preux with her. 
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woman’s actions and influence spur him to renounce his superior position in the social hierarchy 
in his journey from noble to Français fulfills the political ideals of 1789 while running counter to 
expectations of male dominance in marriage. That is, in previous literary models, men married 
socially inferior women, whom they elevated to their own status; or, if not, they, at the very least, 
did not suffer for their choice. In Sand’s version, however, the upper echelon of social worth is 
utterly valueless compared to the ability to enjoy the fruits of one’s mind and body that comes 
with an honest agrarian existence and that reflects the couple’s eventual citizen’s imperative: “la 
sobriété, le travail des bras et l’honnêteté ne suffisent pas pour assurer l’indépendance, sans 
l’épargne qui permet la réflexion, le travail de l’esprit, l’usage de l’intelligence” (337). By 
“épargne,” Émilien is referring to the stores of character that only education and reflection can 
provide; it is no mistake, however, that this resource is couched in financial terms, as Sand 
continues to associate personal amelioration with regional and national growth. 
The classic bildungsroman plot “entails the submission of human beings to the influence 
of […] the outside world on their growth” (Summerfield and Downward 2), which often 
manifests itself as a reconciliation of private desires and social expectations. That Émilien, as a 
noble, is initially prepared to “m’engager comme soldat” (88) to support the aristocratic cause 
when civil war breaks out is therefore not surprising. However, there are several factors at work 
that complicate the very idea of private versus public expectations in the novel, which Sand uses 
to displace bildung resolution from society at large to individual integrity. For one, since Émilien 
was pawned off on country folk at a young age, “pour l’empêcher de prétendre au premier rang” 
(27) that belonged to his older brother, he has little connection to his mother and father, whom 
“[il] ne connaî[t] presque pas” (18). Bound to the duties of his class more by convention than by 
love, then, Émilien’s situation evokes that of other heroes that we have seen in this study, such as 
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Léonce and Oswald, who struggle to reconcile duties of the heart with duties of rank and class. 
Moreover, abandoned as he was, he grew up amongst peasants, is “un paysan plus qu’un 
monsieur” (26), having spent his early years poaching birds and rabbits on his own family’s land 
and learning to climb trees and to work like a common laborer. Furthermore, at the outset of the 
Revolution, the nation was entirely polarized, and one’s social class was not necessarily the 
determining factor of one’s political views. Such is the case with Nanon’s great-uncle who, poor 
and dependent as he is, condemns the uprising for the utter lawlessness that it will provoke: 
“Mes enfants, cette chose-là, c’est la fin des fins. Quand on n’a plus de maîtres, on ne peut plus 
vivre” (52). Others in the same position, however, are overjoyed to have “une seule et même loi 
pour toute la France” (58) and to become “maîtres de ces épis, de ces fruits, de ces animaux, de 
tous ces produits de la terre” (61) that they formerly cultivated in “esclavage” (61), without 
ownership of the means or their fruits. What’s more, as the novel advances, Émilien becomes 
aware of the corruption and sloth of the monks, with whom he is supposed to spend his life, as 
well as “leur mauvaise volonté pour le bonheur de ces pauvres dont ils se disent les pères et les 
tuteurs” (69).  To which class, therefore, Émilien actually owes loyalty is entirely unclear, and 
which political discourse, in turn, he is supposed to heed, which courant of thought represents the 
“social expectations” that apply to his situation, has become entirely confounded. In this manner, 
Sand displaces bildung action from the growth and maturity that comes from self-sacrifice in 
reconciliation with powerful social discourses to the transformation that arises from the eventual 
rapprochement of individual desire and one’s contrasting individual potential. Spurred on by 
Nanon’s remonstrance, her shock that, with such resources at his disposal, he would choose to be 
a “fainéant,” Émilien has “résolu de me changer moi-même […]. J’ai travaillé, oui, petite j’ai 
beaucoup appris tout seul” (69). When the crucial moment arrives in which he must decide to 
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which cause he has responsibility, he ultimately seeks the one that will best foster accord 
between his own desires and his developing self-awareness. When he finally hears from his 
father, who has been silent since Émilien entered the monastery years before, the letter is 
addressed not to the son but to the father’s paymaster, with orders that Émilien join him in the 
emigrant army. The Marquis de Franqueville warns that if his son refuses to obey, “déclarez-lui 
que je l’abandonne et ne le considère plus comme étant de la famille” (125). As a footnote to his 
own already evident insensitivity, he closes the letter by casually mentioning the death of 
Émilien’s mother.  
The utter lack of paternal tenderness from a figure who “ne le jugeait pas digne de 
recevoir une lettre de lui” (125), and who sends such vital information through M. Prémel his 
paymaster, as though his son were simply paid help, seals Émilien’s departure from the class to 
which he was born:  
Qu’[il] m’abandonne donc! […] Avec quelque peu de tendresse, j’aurais tout 
sacrifié, non pas ma conscience, mais mon honneur et ma vie; [j’étais] résolu, le 
cas échéant, à courir me jeter sur les baïonnettes française […] les bras et les yeux 
levés vers le ciel témoin de mon innocence. (127) 
In effect, fighting for his family’s cause—which M. Prémel wholly predicts that he will do, and 
which other aristocrats might legitimately expect from him—rather than departure from his 
father’s wishes has come to represent a sacrifice of honor. In Sand’s complex exploration of the 
bildung genre, then, honor (duty of sex and rank) has taken second place to conscience (duty to 
self, to one’s own integrity), a responsibility of which he becomes aware only at Nanon’s 
encouragement; this transmutation of duty has essentially freed the characters from social 
hierarchy, a state of being that they bring about themselves with their self-sacrifice, with 
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Émilien, as Nanon explains, “souffrant beaucoup pour votre pays et pour sa liberté, moi […] en 
faisant tout ce qui m’était possible pour vous et pour votre liberté personnelle” (337). And yet, 
with a little paternal tenderness, the opposite choice could have just as easily been acceptable, 
which confirms that with these self-sacrificial acts of patriotic and personal love, Sand has also 
displaced the bonds that foster duty to others from socio-economic factors to, essentially, love, a 
theme that strongly echoes de Staël’s novels.  
Tellingly, although Émilien chooses to forfeit his nobility—a determination that his own 
sister condemns, arguing that “le monde ne lui en saura point de gré” (315) for his choice—while 
he moves down the social scale in class, he moves up in civic recognition: “Je ne suis plus un 
noble, je suis un paysan, un Français!” (128). He differs, then, from the men of his family who, 
since they have emigrated, have become traitors and all eventually die outside of the country; 
they can no longer, therefore, make claims to such an appellation of civic belonging. Indeed, this 
scene in which he receives his father’s letter is the first time that Émilien calls himself “un 
Français,” and his determined reclamation of such a title in exchange for that of Monsieur de— 
and eventually Marquis de Franqueville marks a sharp contrast with his choice to become “le fils 
de personne quand il s’agit de trahir la France” (128). In Sand’s reconsideration of the genre, the 
only traitors are those who locate their duty in institutional dogma—revolutionary or royalist—
rather than in a personal conscience that develops from education and the joint exercise of reason 
and unbiased love. Costejoux walks a fine line between these two poles throughout the novel, 
and finds himself, at the end, a tormented, unhappy being, a result of “le vide dans son âme à 
l’endroit du vrai bonheur et de la vraie tendresse” (351) that would have resulted had he favored 
love over principle, as all of the Revolutionary Heroines in the study have advocated. 
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 Though everything in the novel points toward Émilien choosing a life of work and 
growth over one of idleness and privilege, it is especially telling that his choice to reject the 
patriarchal model is cast in terms of “expiation” (332) of his nobility—an atonement for the civic 
sin of his arbitrary high birth—which he achieves with the time that he serves in the republican 
army and the arm that he sacrifices to the cause. In so doing, he “breaks” the line of honor, birth, 
and wealth between father and son, and reassigns his notion of honor and civic belonging to his 
country and to the goal of equality that the Revolution represents, because he understands 
intuitively that the models of father-king and father-priest are merely further examples of the 
paternal betrayal of man’s natural liberties that the Marquis’ callousness represents. His choice to 
sacrifice a part of himself in disentangling his fate from a social institution that symbolizes 
centuries of systematic abuse is the primary act that seals his worth as a citizen, as it replaces 
“son identitié sociale et familiale, liée à sa naissance, par une identité nationale qui représente un 
choix politique” (Mozet 78). Like Belinda, whose choice of marriage partners—Misters Baddly, 
Vincent, and Hervey—empowers her to place her stock in her country’s future with men of 
different social-political aspirations and beliefs, Émilien has elected to place his investment 
firmly in the hands of everything that is frankly capitalist and anti-monarchical: “Eh bien, il me 
plaît de choisir le travail des bras et la fidélité à mon pays” (128). Here the author picks up the 
theme common to mal du siècle literature in the masculine tradition, in which distressed family 
relationships and absent parents leave “le champ libre [aux] hommes nouveaux en quête de leur 
identité sociale et sexuelle” (Mozet 78), and in which men fill that void, as Flaubert’s Frédéric 
Moreau does, with a default political impotence. In the absence of the fallen patriarchal 
authorities, many scholars have observed in the era’s literature that the children-citizens must 
find their own way in the wake of the violence and disappointment. I argue in contrast that Sand 
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proposes a feminine resolution to this Romantic quandary. That Émilien regularly refers to 
Nanon as his mère reflects the Revolution’s brief turn to matriarchal fascination, except that in 
Sand’s idealized version, rather than devouring her children, the Nanon-Maman works arduously 
for their benefit, educates them, loves them, gives herself to them entirely, and saves them from a 
life of brutish ignorance and despair, or, in Émilien’s case, from the guillotine itself.  
With this deliberately maternal portrayal of Nanon, Sand’s enters the debate on 
domesticity and maternity that has been so important in the three preceding chapters. By setting 
up her Revolutionary Heroine as the catalyst, essentially, of the private revolution in Valcreux, 
where she reforms Émilien and inspires scores of others through her unparalleled ability to “tirer 
partie de tout” (323) in matters of agriculture, animal husbandry, and home economics, Sand 
positions women and a productive domestic realm as necessary elements of the Revolution’s 
resolution in her imagined reinscription, and thus, as the answer to its continued reverberations in 
France nearly one hundred years later. “La chronologie d’un roman,” Nicole Mozet has said, “est 
un moyen privilégié de produire de subtiles coïncidences entre la sphère du privé—avec ses 
naissances, ses mariages et ses crises—et la scène de l’Histoire, présente à l’esprit de tous les 
lecteurs” (73). And this is Sand’s very tactic: she aligns Nanon’s formative moments with key 
events of the Revolution in order to link her heroine’s civic awakening with revolutionary 
doctrines and the ways that they failed or succeeded in practice. The abolition of feudal law 
coincides with Nanon’s elevation to deity-figure in Valcreux’s Fête de la Fédération, where she 
becomes the region’s first property owner, the first true escapee from feudal slavery; the 
invalidation of monastic vows, in turn, intersects the heroine’s first act of economic autonomy 
and altruism, when she buys clothes for “impoverished aristocrat” Émilien when he leaves the 
monastery, thus demonstrating both Sand’s thesis about the essential collaboration between 
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classes and her belief in the necessary valorization of the petit paysan-propriétaire; finally, the 
execution of the queen synchronizes with Nanon’s diaspora in Crevant, where the feminocentric 
history of the region encourages the gradual perfection of her extraordinary domestic skills and 
marks a stark contrast with the frivolity and inutility that the body of the queen represented.  
By underpinning her vision of domesticity with political examples, then, Sand 
demonstrates the necessity of women’s contributions to the nation’s reformation, and vice versa. 
Indeed, the authors that I addressed in the previous chapters use domestic settings as a coded 
means of talking about exterior politics, thus remaining faithful to the well-advertised 
interdiction on women in the public sphere. Decades later, however, Sand uses politics to talk 
about domesticity, which in turn informs her vision of politics since, in her estimation, it is the 
conjoining of the two—the entrance of women into the political sphere and the recognition of 
domestic work as playing a profound role in the nation’s development—that is necessary to 
socio-political rejuvenation. However, Sand’s version of domesticity in Nanon differs 
significantly from that which was preached in France and Britain during and leading up to the 
1790s, one which posited a tractable “Angel in the House” and her passive family devotion as an 
antidote to eighteenth-century excess. It is impossible to imagine, for example, Nanon agreeing 
with conservative British author Laeticia Matilda Hawkins (1759-1835), that “The whole world 
might be at war, and yet not the rumor of it reach the ear of an English woman—empires might 
be lost, and states overthrown, and still she might pursue the peaceful occupations of her home” 
(qtd in Craciun 7). On the contrary, awareness and engagement are the guiding principles that 
often take Nanon out of the home and into the world, where she manages equations of injustice 
such as Émilien’s arrest under false pretenses—a miscalculation that she resolves by breaking 
him out of prison. Sand’s portrait, in turn, of Nanon as unconditional in her care for others, as 
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someone who “secourut ceux qui étaient tombés dans la détresse” (352), represents a valorization 
of women’s roles—of wife and motherhood—that is nevertheless dependent upon the equal and 
willing contribution of her partner, as well as the freedom of the woman herself. And, of course, 
by freedom, Sand implicitly means everything that the authors in previous chapters demanded: 
freedom of movement (Nanon’s forays from the Valcreux to Limoges to Châteauroux to Crevant 
and beyond), the right to work (beginning with Rosette and ending with a vast financial empire), 
the valorization of women’s work (Dumont’s insistence that her work “à nous procurer la 
nourriture et le gîte” (259) in Crevant was worth as much as the labor that he and Émilien did in 
the fields), the rights and privileges of citizenship (with both Nanon and Émilien eventually 
determining that they have earned the title of Française/Français), including education, and, of 
course, the separation of innate worth and sexuality (Nanon’s value being located in her “force 
de sagesse et de bonté” (352)) and of gender and biology (her highly-valued “ouvrages de 
garçon” (202) and ability, for example, to “faire la journée de marche d’un homme” (145)). 
Unlike her counterpart in Sandian heroinism, la petite Fadette, this Revolutionary Heroine’s rise 
to greatness is not strictly personal and apolitical. As we saw in  Delphine, because Nanon’s code 
has such a tremendous influence on those around her, and because she exercises her new-found 
knowledge and skills in the public sphere, the personal becomes political as she makes the 
political personal. That is, as she becomes French and unites a heterogeneous family of equally-
becoming citizens into a small national family, ancient Gaul embarks upon the journey of 
becoming modern France.  
Sand evokes France’s coming-of-age story, one which resists the revolutionary violence 
that had just made another appearance in the 1871 Paris Commune episode to which Sand was 
witness, during the couple’s exile in Crevant. There, the author is able to allegorize the turn from 
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ancient to modern belief systems and notions of class and duty with the couple’s personal 
transmutation among the vestiges of druidic history. The name, which could be translated as “the 
dying place” or “the exhausting land,” leads the reader to expect great suffering and deprivation. 
And, indeed, the terrain is deep and impenetrable, an “oasis de granit et de verdure, un labyrinthe 
où tout était refuge et mystère” (198). Huge stones and cliffs frame the sky, and tiny, rocky paths 
and rivers traverse the brush and sand, while heavy vegetation covers every surface. The massive 
roots of giant chestnut trees, thick bushes, and wild pear trees, Nanon observes, run over the 
land, “[trainant] comme des serpents monstrueux” (198). Though the region is savage, sparsley 
populated, and tainted with fantastical myth, Nanon, Émilien, and Dumont have their most 
profitable and happiest period of existence in this wilderness that echoes the nation’s past. Like 
Robinson Crusoe’s castaway genius and island economy, their panoply of artisanal survival 
skills—from woodworking to cheese making to viticulture—allows them, much to their own 
surprise, to live comfortably, thanks to Nanon’s masterful domesticity, which proves to be the 
source of their wealth here as it later is in Valcreux. On the other hand, the region’s poverty, they 
discover, is a result of the inhabitants’ ignorance in agricultural matters, relative laziness, and 
dogged attachment to ancient superstitions: “Ils sont restés Celtes sans le savoir,” Nanon 
observes, “puisque leur dévotion d’aujourd’hui ne les empêche pas de trembler devant les 
anciens dieux de la Gaule” (230). However, the unusual family finds several occasions to 
reconcile the ancient reverence for omens that flourishes in the landscape with the pragmatism 
and common-sense economy that they represent, and of which Sand’s Revolutionary Heroine is 
emblematic. When a local sorceress comes to invoke the devil near their dwelling on Christmas 
night, the Christian hymn they are singing frightens her off. In the morning they discover on their 
doorstep “une peau d’anguille contenant sept gros clous” which the old women “avait laissée 
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tomber en entendant le noël.” Dumont “fit de la peau d’anguille une bourse, et mit à profit les 
clous” (212). In effect, superstition gets “laissée tomber” (on more occasions than one in 
Crevant) when it comes in contact with this group, and the members transform its vestiges into 
“une bourse,” or a material manifestation of the possible financial increase that can come from  
integrating ancient belief systems into modern existence. Indeed, the reconciliation that Sand 
proposes is one that is meant to temper modern barbarism—“la facilité avec laquelle on fait 
tomber les têtes […] dans un siècle de philosophie et de lumières comme le nôtre” (216)—by 
showing that ancient savages are scarcely more savage than modern ones.  
In their encounters with Crevant’s ancient druidic world, however, this group, led by their 
Revolutionary Heroine, reveals Sand’s central thesis about both the Revolution’s failure and the 
subsequent further immurement of women: by favoring erasure of the past—embodied by 
Costejoux’s insistence that “le passé n’est plus” (151) and that the nouvel ordre cannot emerge 
without this definitive break—over integration of the past into the changing present and hoped-
for future, the Revolution condemned its own project. This Saussurean rupture with history,  
while it doomed the nation to playing a series of fabricated roles in the utterly non-sequitur 
imitation of a neo-Greco-Roman republic, also categorically devalued women’s historical 
contribution to the nation by cutting the cord that linked France to Gaul. As Nanon and Émilien 
find themselves lost in the “fôret enchantée” (232) of Celtic monuments and ancient stones and 
trees, they realize that they are submersed in “un specimen de la Gaule primitive dans son 
intégralité” (232). They observe that “depuis le règne [des dieux Celtiques],” “le pays n’a pas 
change; ce sont les mêmes arbres qui ont caché la retraite sacrée des mystérieuses druidesses; ces 
tapis d’herbes sauvages se sont renouvelés d’année en année”(230). Such repetitions both of 
duration and of continual renewal link the past to the present through Émilien and Nanon with 
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both their skillful management of local superstition as well as their ability to see the value of the 
ancient land, which they call “plus imposant et plus beau que tout ce que nous avons pu voir 
ailleurs” (230). In their “bois merveilleux,” in turn, chestnut trees have enveloped massive 
stones, which they “portaient fièrement dans leur ventre ouvert, montrant cet oeuf monstrueux 
avec orgueil” (232). This organic “oeuf,” the source of creation, stands as a monument of the 
past’s fertility that the three Crusoes carry away with them when they leave Crevant in the form 
of a proud nationalism that looks backward as much as forward.  
Émilien and his Revolutionary Heroine maintain this necessity of historical coherence in 
their joint identity, as one of their first conversations when he returns from the war is to look 
back on their own personal revolution:  
Te souviens-tu, dit-il, que c’est ici que nous nous sommes vus pour la première 
fois, il y a sept ans? Tu possédais un mouton et ce devait être le commencement 
de ta fortune; moi, je ne possédais et ne devais jamais rien posséder. Sans toi, je 
serais devenu un idiot ou un vagabond, au milieu de cette révolution que m’eût 
jeté sur les chemins, sans notions de la vie et de la société, ou avec des notions 
insensées, funestes peut-être! Tu m’as sauvé de l’abjection, comme, plus tard, tu 
m’as sauvé de l’échafaud et de la proscription: je t’appartiens, je n’ai qu’un 
mérite, c’est de l’avoir compris. (338) 
Émilien’s recognition of his deep debt to Nanon brings the imagery in Crevant full circle: the hut 
that they inhabited there, which she transformed into home with her “inventions délicates pour 
nous cacher notre dénuement” (226), is itself a Celtic monument, a dolmen “qu’on appelait le 
trou aux fades, [autrefois occupée] par les femmes sauvages,” or “des mystérieuses druidesses 
(207, 232). We see, then, that the Revolutionary Heroine reconnects past and present by 
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rehabilitating this ancient monument of superstition with her “soins” and her “dévouement 
immense” (226), at the same time that the druidic region’s matriarchal, feminocentric past 
confirms for her the value of women’s historical contribution to the nation. The same “oeuf” 
entangled in the forest womb—the immortal roots of a chestnut tree whose fruit comprises the 
majority of the family’s sustenance in Crevant—while it overtly signals the ancient Gallic origin 
of the modern French nation, also implicitly points to the necessary and enduring maternity that 
precedes it. The unbending nationalism of the French Revolution, in which men “mettaient la 
Révolution au-dessus de tout et de leur propre conscience […] en persécutant les modérés [et en 
disant] ‘C’est pour le salut de la cause” (122), succumbs under the weight of feminocentric 
history in Crévant. The fertile root systems, keepers of the nation’s historical ova—that is, its 
source of duration and continual renewal—designate the woman as the site of genesis, a 
condition that makes her a de facto necessary and equal participant in the nation’s original 
cohesion as well as a rightful agent of its contemporary and future wealth, industry, and 
innovation. Sand illustrates the nation’s socio-political regeneration—that is, the reconciliation 
of the “femmes sauvages,” the wild terrain and the seemingly savage history that it protects, and 
the dream of an egalitarian modern France—as dependent upon a certain degree of female 
empowerment: it is Nanon’s small band alone, armed with her particular feminine savoir, that is 
finally able to make the space of the ancient Gallic land produce in the age of modern France 
(they survive on the chestnuts that the locals lack the savoir-faire to prepare and preserve, and 
have a tremendous grain harvest where the inhabitants’ ignorance and superstitious fear kept 
them from planting). Nanon’s sublime contemplation of the primitive landscape, where “la 
nature est bien au-dessus de l’homme,” and her mental fructification there, in which “beaucoup 
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d’idées me [sont venues] en tête” (231), mark Crevant and its druidic past as symbolic of a 
specifically feminine source of lost wealth for the budding nation.  
This identification is especially important for Sand’s critique of revolutionary allegory, 
which took the form of neoclassic feminine figures standing in for broad ideals such as Liberté 
and Raison (see figures 1 and 2 below), and which I will analyze in detail below. Since, as 
Madelyn Gutwirth explains, the events of the Revolution were “out of all historical context […], 
a fresh ‘mythic present’ had to be invented, to which the nation might give its consent” (253). 
The neoclassic template provided the necessary break from the Ancien Régime past, offering the 
appearance of having created a new way to represent the Revolution’s untried ideas, at the same 
time that it vindicated the revolt by linking it to the historical authoritative credit held by past 
democracies admired by the entire western world. However, Sand is not the only one to criticize 
this false parentage created by the Greco-Roman images of republican consent and justification: 
the very women who spoke out against the anti-woman course that the Revolution was taking 
and against the empty images of feminine Liberté  and Égalité, asserted that “among the ancient 
Gauls women had a deliberative voice in the assemblies and things went no worse” (Gutwirth 
286). With her return to France’s druidic past in the Crevant scenes analyzed above, Sand echoes 
revolutionary feminists’ assessment that the “mythic present” that the Revolutionaries sought to 
create should have found its roots in France’s own fabled history, not in an imaginary Greco-
Roman resurrection. In the author’s national Bildungsroman then, the nation comes of age in 
Crevant, reaching an equilibrated accord between its savage past and the its savage present 
through Nanon, who is “pas une machine,” unlike the unbending perpetrators of violence, but 
rather “un espirt très-prompt, très-étonnant, très-cultivé déjà et capable de tout comprendre” 
(226). 
172 
 
As if to mark a counterpoint in her symbolic resurrection of ancient woman and the 
richness that she represents, however, Sand simultaneously points to the death of modern woman 
by having her characters learn of Marie Antoinette’s execution during their diaspora in Crevant.  
“Pourquoi faire mourir un femme?” Nanon wonders incredulously. “Quel mal peut-elle avoir 
fait? N’était-ce pas à elle d’obéir à son mari et de penser comme lui?” (215). The Queen, whose 
already imperfect reputation nose-dived at the onset of the Revolution, became an object of scorn 
for the debauchery and excess that she represented, which the media translated into sexual 
depravity: “People only spoke of her wantonness,” L.S. Mercier insists (qtd in Gutworth 229). 
While Sand does her the favor, through Émilien’s critique, of leaving out the accusations of 
sexual perversion, she does not hesitate to fault the queen for her role, and does not, despite 
Antoinette’s slightly rehabilitated image by 1871, excuse the woman nor the practices that she 
represents when she states that “La reine a bien su ce qu’elle faisait et ce qu’elle voulait” (216). 
Her extermination represents the willful smothering of the pernicious femininity that authors had 
railed against for two centuries, and which Louise, Émilien’s younger sister, personifies in the 
novel: “Les femmes de cette race nous subjuguent” (348), her lover Costejoux says of her 
bitterly. A misappropriation of power, the sexual manipulation that the queen personified 
throughout the crisis was the hallmark of the feminine presence in private and public politics and 
in literary portrayals of the sex. The news of her death arriving in the characters’ primeval desert 
serves to mark the disjunction between past, present, and future—in terms of feminine policy—
from which the French Revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have suffered: just 
as one cannot “[bâtir] une nouvelle église avec ce qui a fait écrouler l’ancienne” (123), one 
cannot expect a reformed femininity to rise from the violent decimation of the original. The 
“dying place,” then, is not a reference to the land, Crevant, but to all of the assassinated forms of 
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femininity: the ancient feminine force that Nanon imbibes in her druidic paradise, but which the 
nation cannot embrace, and the attempted snuffing out of the modern feminine force via the 
execution of Marie Antoinette, which is only fanned into greater flames with the continued anti-
woman legislation that made the nineteenth century one of the darkest times in the history of 
women. 
In the space left by a martyred portrait of dangerous femininity, Sand proposes an 
alternative in the form of her Revolutionary Heroine Nanon, who builds her feminine identity 
from the ground up since she has had “devant les yeux aucun modèle à qui elle pourrait 
s’identifier et [aucun] discours, implicite ou non, sur sa féminité” (Mozet 78). Surrounded by 
masculine models and feminine counter-models, such as Louise, Nanon’s conception of a 
woman, her strengths and weaknesses, and her duties, coalesces slowly as she becomes literate 
and begins to participate in her community. Her role in La Fête de la Fédération is especially 
formative for her conjoining of work, education, and creation (cultivation, beautification, 
procreation) as women’s path to self-actualization and citizenship, and the nation’s attendant 
path to regeneration. At the same time, her participation in the symbolic festival presents a 
challenge to the empty feminine iconography of the Revolution.  
Madelyn Gutwirth has researched this issue at length, though not in relationship to 
Nanon.  She argues that the Revolution’s leaders put these hollow signifiers into place in order to 
contain the sex’s very real reclamations of rights in the early years of political upheaval. 
Speaking of reactions to the female-lead 1789 march on Versailles, Gutwirth explains  
The women’s formation of a crowd—a body—seemed to embolden them to 
articulate their own needs and desires. This could not be tolerated. The wind in 
the women’s sails had to be calmed. One of the ways of achieving this was, 
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ironically, to set them up as figures de proue, goddesses on the prow of the ship of 
the Revolution, heading into the winds. (245)   
In the nation’s haste to discard the iconic representation of royalty that had prevailed for 
centuries, the revolutionary leaders turned to a repertory of allegorized, abstract bodies 
(see figures 1 and 2) to represent their ideals, and woman, as the definitive vessel of 
otherness, represented a kind of void in the male world and therefore was able to embody 
just about anything: positive attributes such as Innocence and Virtue, or negative ones, 
such as Sloth or Superstition. These female figures served several ideological projects, 
such as filling in the void left by the destruction of Ancien Régime iconography, as well 
as providing a living link to the French language (which played a vibrant role in during 
the crisis), since most of the abstract nouns for which they stood are gendered feminine.  
However, the images had no relationship to any particular traits that the woman were 
believed or encouraged to possess, as Mr. Scope so aptly observed in Burney’s novel,26 
nor to any attribute of femininity that the organizers wished for the onlookers of these 
images to adapt. Instead, the female body, as a neo-classical statue and little more, was 
reduced to a noble and deified bystander, her body holding the place of meaningful ideals 
rather than in motion as an actual participant in or recipient of pro-democracy legislation. 
Devoid of any ideological connection between the woman’s body and the idea that it 
represented, then, women’s iconographic role in revolutionary festivals represents the 
pinnacle of the irony of Rights of Man discourses because their bodies stand in for 
                                                 
26
 “I should like to enquire, what good they expect to accrue by […] making a new [religion] by the figure of a 
woman. […] And as so many females being called Goddesses of Reason […] one don’t very well see what that 
means; the ladies in general,--I speak without offence, as it’s out of their line,--not being particularly famous 
for their reason” (Burney 269). 
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reformative, idealistic principles and ideals which they are forbidden to exercise, such as 
Raison, and from which they will never benefit, such as Liberté.  
 
Figure 1: Liberty armed with the scepter of Reason strikes down Ignorance and 
Fanaticism, 1793. 
 
Figure 2: Liberty, with help from Reason, protects Innocence and crowns Virtue, 1793. 
176 
 
 
With her treatment of revolutionary festivals and her tracing of the true source of French 
regeneration back to the nation’s Gallic past in Crevant, Sand has clearly made the same 
observation that Gutwirth puts forth about the hollow association of women’s bodies and abstract 
principles. When Nanon witnesses a revolutionary festival in Chateauroux, for example, she 
comments on the absurdity not of women as objects of homage, but of this blatant ideological 
breach between the near deification of her sex and the extant attitudes that keep its members 
from becoming productive individuals. When she sees the local “goddess of liberty” (played by 
the cobbler’s daughter), at whose feet the people “fit un discours, […] chanta je ne sais quoi,” 
force a suspected royalist to come act as her footstool as she dismounts her horse, the heroine 
calls it “une scène plus significative” (182) than any other that she has seen in the strange 
procession. Rather than encouraging and demonstrating positive feminine traits—or any 
identifiably “republican” traits at all—the goddess perpetuates her lower class vulgarity, the 
upper class imperiousness that she is aping, and the manipulation and abuse of lovesick men for 
which aristocratic women were famous. When Nanon calls the scene “significative,” she means 
that she is getting a glimpse of where the Revolution is inevitably heading: her prediction that “la 
haine de nobles et des prêtres contre la Révolution, la haine des révolutionnaires contre les 
prêtres et les nobles [vont faire que] notre pauvre France agricole [va] être écrasée entre ces deux 
avalanches” (118) is beginning to come true. Instead of using public forums to encourage 
positive, patriotic values, these empty icons merely serve to foment hatred between classes and 
political groups by reanimating the very social power struggles the Revolution was in theory 
trying to extinguish. Nanon laments that the participants aren’t out working their land instead of 
being captivated by this meaningless “fête burlesque” (183): “J’assistai à cette chose insensée 
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comme si je faisais un rêve, et je crois bien que personne n’était plus avancé que moi. Ces fêtes 
republicaines étaient de pure fantaisie” (182). In historical reality, as Nanon suggests, then, the 
allegories between women’s bodies and abstract ideals often failed—especially in live festive 
performances like the above, in which the women were chosen to embody revolutionary allegory 
according to their beauty and their highly-valued connection to lower class professions. 
Ultimately, the images had little practical value outside of the page.  
But Sand’s Revolutionary Heroine subverts this paradigm of unmeaning and 
contradictory allegory when her extraordinary characteristics are the reason for her own 
elevation to the status of icon during Valcreux’s Fête de la Fédération. Rather than appearing as 
an empty vessel at the base of the “autel de la patrie,” a rustic monument composed from the 
fruits, vegetables, grains, and tools of which the people of Valcreux are now the masters, Nanon 
takes her place as “un ange en prière” (62), and exudes genuine, identifiable meaning:  because 
of the traits that she has already displayed, “le courage, la douceur, le respect pour les parents 
and la grande amitié du coeur” (63), and because of the ways in which she has already 
transformed herself with all that she has learned, and the fact that she is “pressée de l’enseigner” 
(63), she becomes a flesh and blood symbol of the quantifiable capacities to which all members 
of the nation should aspire; rather than indicative of an empty allegory, Nanon’s elevation to the 
status of revolutionary icon is at once dependent upon her capacity to bring wealth to the 
community (with her unbiased instruction in literacy, which “rendr[a] de grands services” (63), 
helping all members of the community to exploit their new-found proprietorship and freedom 
from servitude) as well as upon her feminine “tendresse” and “soins” (the fact that “elle a pleuré 
son grand-père avec une tendresse au dessus de son âge” and that “elle donne autant de soins aux 
plus pauvres qu’au plus riches” (63)). Unlike the specious images of allegorical women that 
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alienated real women from revolutionary action, Nanon’s transformation into an avatar of 
national potential leads to actual material increase for the woman herself: moved by Nanon’s 
humility and the promise of prosperity that she represents, the crowd determines to buy her land 
from the church holdings and make her the sole proprietor. She becomes the “essaye,” or the 
experiment of giving rights and property to women, which the Revolution never did, but which, 
in Sand’s correction, proves to be not only a success, but an eventual source of enormous wealth 
to a large number of people. 
The Revolutionary Heroine’s precipitous journey from peasant to “la première 
acquéreuse” effectively rewrites the fable of Eve that has surfaced several times in this study. 
The original mother, whose unforgivable transgression in the Garden of Eden—her reclamation 
of knowledge—has fueled the misogyny that has characterized women’s history for millennia, is 
exonerated and reinstalled as the very origin of multiplication itself. Because of Nanon’s thirst 
for knowledge, this modern Eve is praised for her foresight rather than punished for her 
presumption to “masculine” knowledge. Valorized and admired, she becomes the inaugurator—
the mother, in a sense—of a new age of gender and class equality. Indeed, her own reflections 
confirm this to her. Uneasy about her governing the property that townsfolk have bought for her, 
she remembers her great-uncle telling her that “le devoir de la pauvreté est de sortir de la misère 
pour plaire à Dieu qui aime le travail et le bon courage” (66). This realization of her divinely-
sanctioned agency reconciles her to both ownership and to capitalist potential not only as 
opportunities, but as moral obligations for men and women. Once her identity has become rooted 
to this notion that God himself advocates her prosperity, she begins to make plans for the 
“bâtisse” that she will add to Rosette’s hovel, the “deux ou trois poules” and “un petit chevreau” 
that she will add to her budding empire in the next year. Indeed, with these realizations and this 
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first confirmation of her value, she is on the path to becoming the woman that she will be at the 
end of the novel, one who locates her complete sense of purpose and duty in the domestic cares 
that support her loved ones, beautify her space, advance her understanding of the world, and 
reclaim the right and the means for her to interact with that world. In Crevant she begins to 
glimpse this destiny, and says of her moment of discovery: “Je me voyais utile à des personnes 
que j’aimais plus que tout, et je trouvais dans mon activité et dans ma force de corps et de 
volonté, une gaîté que je n’avais jamais connue” (103). 
In the end, the impression that the Revolutionary Heroine has left on those around her—
as an icon and as a woman of flesh and blood—is one of “revolution” in the sense of a complete 
and total reformation of philosophy and lifestyle, with Émilien being the primary object of her 
influence. A foolhardy and careless youth at their first meeting, under Nanon’s tutelage he 
quickly recognizes the extent of his wastefulness. Citing her little chastisements, her accurate 
judgments, her desire to learn, her agency, her will, and her absolute devotion, he identifies her 
as the being that “m’[a] renouvelé…m’[a] reveille d’un triste et lâche sommeil. Dans les plus 
petites choses,” he continues, “tu m’as rendu aux instincts que l’homme doit avoir” (225-6). 
Using her encouragement and her example alone, Nanon effectuates a gendered reformation to 
his behavior (much like Belinda did for Clarence Hervey and Lord Delacour, and as Corinne 
tried to do for Oswald), removing him from a path of masculine lethargy and pushing him 
toward the actions that would eventually earn him the right to citizenship in the new nation. 
Calling her his “bienfaitrice,” she continues to support him financially and emotionally until the 
end of his life. From the first clothes that she buys him with her teaching money when he leaves 
the monastery to the fortune that she is able to present to him when he returns from the war, 
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Nanon has superior business acumen from which Émilien benefits, and for which he ultimately 
casts his love to her in terms of debt: “Je te devrai la vie de l’âme, […] je t’appartiens” (337).  
She has similarly prompted a transformation for the female gender as well with her 
refusal of many of the stereotypes of the literary heroines of all types that preceded her. When 
she learns that Émilien has been imprisoned, for example, she assures the reader: “Je ne dirai pas 
mes angoisses, j’irai vite au fait” (174), overturning the belief that women, creatures of instinct 
and emotion, only exist by constantly verbalizing their emotional state, while rarely, if at all, 
getting to the point, a fault criticized at length by characters like the Admiral and Mr. Scope in 
Burney’s novel. Later, when she discovers that Émilien loves her, she acknowledges that her 
concern for him while he is at war will cause her added anxiety. And yet, she reveals,“Je ne 
m’accordai pas le droit d’être faible et de faire l’amoureuse qui souffre et se plaint” (Sand 259). 
Again, this is extraordinary behavior for the heroine of a novel. Her breed of heroinism, like that 
of Belinda, entails the refusal of the tired platitudes of womanhood, such as excessive emotion 
and blind coquetry as well as the assumption of the virtuous “masculine” qualities that Mary 
Wollstonecraft admired. It is this conjoining of gendered virtues that causes Costejoux to declare 
that she is “ni un homme, ni une femme,” but rather “l’un et l’autre avec les meilleures qualités 
des deux sexes” (272). It seems that Sand has finally found resolution with her life-long battle 
against socially-constructed gender roles. It is lamentable that another heroine of hers—Gabrielle 
(1839), a woman disguised as a man for most of her life in order to preserve her inheritance—
was unable to find a partner who appreciated her alchemistic gender fusion as Émilien does with 
Nanon. While Gabrielle ultimately dies of grief for her inability to find a place in the world, 
Sand’s Revolutionary Heroine becomes the head of an empire, a marquise, and the mother of a 
large and very happy family. And, of course, she is, like the other Revolutionary Heroines 
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studied here a heroine in another sense of the word, if we consider the word to be the direct 
ideological counterpart to the mythical, courageous “hero.” By this I mean that Nanon—perhaps 
more than Delphine, Corinne, Belinda, and Juliette put together—braves dangers and risks her 
life, despite the alleged constraints of her gender, to physically save the life of another human 
being, in this case, Émilien. During her extended rescue mission she walks the distance of a man 
in one day, sleeps on the ground in the forest, thwarts robbers, undertakes complex recon 
operations, forges a passport, dons a variety of disguises—in short, has a brief stint as a Scarlett 
Pimpernel-esque secret agent. Though none of this is unique for Nanon herself, who “as toujours 
eu l’idée du courage,” Émilien insists, “puisque c’est toi la première qui me l’as donnée” (71). 
The couple—the perfected and actively domestic Nanon and the newly-baptized Français 
Émilien—ultimately reunites after the war and continues to build the empire that Nanon began. 
Their mutual esteem and love as well as their continued commitment to the unrealized 
revolutionary ideals of work and education ordain their successes. The new French state, of 
which they are a microcosm, represents Sand’s “croyance inébranlable en la libération de 
l’individu, homme ou femme, par le travail, une foi profonde en l’instruction des masses comme 
base sine qua non de la démocratie, un appel à la tolérance et à la liberté d’esprit” (Witkin 42). It 
is the combination of Nanon and Émilien’s best traits, sanctified by their mutual sacrifice to the 
new nation, that make this utopia, small-scale as it is, possible. And the author wishes to draw a 
clear distinction between willing individual self-sacrifice and forced sacrifice at the level of the 
nation. The guillotine doesn’t just kill people, the prieur reminds her: “elle tue le sens humain! 
on cherche à persuader au people qu’il doit sacrifier une partie de lui-même declarée mauvaise, 
pour sauver une autre partie réputée bonne” (222). The only way that the nation could have 
successfully navigated the revolutionary period and emerged stronger would have been to 
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“combattre avec des armes qui ne blessent point […]. C’est la discussion libre qui éclaire les 
esprits, la force de l’opinion qui déjoue les complots fratricides, la sagesse et la justice qui 
règnent au fond du cœur de l’homme et qu’une bonne éducation développerait, tandis que 
l’ignorance et la passion les étouffent” (223).  In the end, Sand cherishes the same opinions that 
Madame de Staël put forth about the Revolution in Delphine. That woman has a special capacity 
to foster this pacifistic ideal of social reform, the two great authoresses seem to agree. 
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Conclusion 
 
I have attempted in this study to delineate a specific kind of fictional character that came 
forth in a wholly unique period of time, thanks to an unimaginable set of events. The 
Revolutionary Heroine, in her many incarnations, is a representative and a product of an era of 
acute epistemological inquiry, and it is likely that she could not have been born at any other point 
in history. The ontological rupture that took place, the severing of history itself in France, the 
obsessive recovery of it in Britain, created a fertile ground for the reexamination of Pope’s 
assertion that “Whatever is, is right,” which Edgeworth’s Harriet Freke zealously reassesses: 
“Whatever is, is wrong” (230).S The Renaissance and early Enlightenment saw the rise of 
literacy and the economic power of the middle-class coupled with the simultaneous decrease in 
the practical authority of princes and popes that made such examples of categorical reformism as 
Harriet Freke’s even possible, and continues to make them so today. Indeed, the intellectual and 
philosophical legacy of the Revolution in the modern state and the mind of modern man cannot 
be overstated.  
And yet, as I have slowly pored over these texts, studied the cultural context that 
surrounded them, and meditated on the metatext and subtext of each of these authors’ projects, I 
have been continually struck at how very relevant all of these questions—of gender, of nation, of 
economy, of violence—continue to be. Nevermind that women still earn less than men for equal 
work in most countries; nevermind that the economic value of their domestic  labor often still 
goes unrecognized, and often by other women themselves, as Democratic strategist Hilary Rosen 
made clear in her recent remarks about Ann Romney having “never worked a day in her life.”27 
Indeed, these unfortunate facts begin to seem relatively unsurprising when it becomes glaringly 
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clear that the nature and so-called duties of woman herself are still the object of furious political 
debate. We have yet to resolve, for example, the place of women’s sexuality as human beings in 
civil society, as the recent debate on birth control in Congress has demonstrated: the fear that a 
woman would have rampant sex and that her actions might have economic consequences on 
other citizens or cause moral decay in society at large merely goes to show that the sex’s 
“unbounded appetites” (Poovey 20) still pose a threat to phallic hegemony that manifests itself in 
a very real economic hysteria;  moreover, it proves that the belief that  “every appearance of vice 
in a woman is something more disgusting than in a man” (qtd in Poovey 8), as eighteenth-
century Gothic novelist Clara Reeve argued, is a still deeply-ingrained truism of western 
civilization’s conception of gender normativity. The media’s treatment, in turn, of our own 
century’s public women who have left the home to play a role in the nation’s political future 
receive, paradoxically, the opposite criticism: condemned for their manly pantsuits, for not being 
“satisfactorily feminine,”28 for aging badly (and therefore unfemininely), and for not being real 
advocates for women’s issues, those who have broken through the proverbial glass ceiling 
quickly find that the view from above is not very pretty.  
The fear of foreign contamination, in turn, continues to plague the modern psyche, as I 
discovered when I recently began watching the PBS series Downton Abbey, which portrays the 
intrigues and scandals of an aristocratic English family during the first decades of the twentieth 
century. The Dowager Countess, matriarch of the clan, makes no fewer than three references to 
the French Revolution in the first season alone, defending herself from the appellation of 
Jacobinism, fearing the return of the guillotine when she hears even a whisper of reform, and 
cautioning her to daughter to avoid resembling Robespierre lopping off the head of Marie 
Antoinette in her zeal to break up an undesirable partnership. Indeed, as my viewings proved, the 
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timelessness of the French Threat in Britain is truly astonishing. However, the continued fear of 
a more general other—whether it is women perseveringly claiming a place for themselves in 
masculine-dominated spheres or foreigners expanding their footprint on the native soil of nations 
far and wide—is a cultural paradigm that simply will not recede, and that persists in its curious 
ability to unite citizens around chimerical fantasies of nationalism. The modern French state, for 
example, is not alone in its inquietude of foreign threats that seem capable of fundamentally 
altering the cultural landscape of the nation: most developed countries around the world are 
grappling with the cultural ramifications of recent waves of immigration that have, otherwise, 
been so instrumental to the growth of their national economies. At the same time, nations of 
vastly diverse circumstances face what appears to be the threat of America’s own well-
disseminated commercial-cultural contagion. The much commented and thoroughly promoted 
US War on Terror is no exception to the us against them mentality that arises when a foreign 
menace appears to imperil deeply-held practices and totems of cultural and national identity. In 
each of these cases, the tendency is, as it was in the novels studied here, to rally around 
increasingly narrow ideals of acceptable versions of citizenship in order to purify the public 
sphere of contamination.  
How can it be that so little has changed, despite the fact that so very much has changed? 
And who is working, as the Revolutionary Heroine did, against these perennial forms of 
prejudice that so often lead to violence? Perhaps we should take a lesson from these very 
heroines and reconsider what it means to truly conjoin reason and sensibility in our modern, 
secular world where the rule of law reigns. For if there is one thing that they have taught us, it’s 
that there is no harm in being an armchair cultural critic and no danger in opening one’s eyes to 
the ways in which one’s own nation might benefit from the cross-cultural intercourse. Such was 
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the Enlightenment’s legacy, in part, and such is the potential of its soaring resurgence in 
contemporary movements of globalism.  
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